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1THE ELIMINATION OF THE 
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF GRAPHIC 
REPRESENTATION AND TRADE 
MARK REGISTRATION1
Maria Miguel Carvalho2
Abstract: Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2015 has eliminated the requirement for the suscepti-
bility of graphic representation in the registration of trade marks, and foresees 
that, for a sign to be registered as a trade mark, it must  be capable of distingui- 
shing the goods or services of one undertaking  from those of other underta- 
kings and being represented  on register in a manner which enables the competent 
authorities and the public to determine the clear and precise subject matter of the 
protection afforded to its proprietor.
Since this requirement has been repealed and the preparatory work for the new 
Portuguese Industrial Property Code is underway, we propose to briefly reflect 
1 The text published here served as a basis for our intervention in the panel entitled «Intellectual 
Property» at the 5th International Congress «Law in Lusophony», on 23 March 2018, at the School 
of Law of the University of Minho, under the theme «Law and New Technologies» and is updated 
until 26 April 2018.
2 Assistant Professor at the School of Law of the University of Minho.
Principal investigator of the research group E-Tec (State, Enterprise and Technology) that integrates
the Centre for Research in Justice and Governance (JusGov). mmiguel@direito.uminho.pt
2on the meaning and scope of the amendment introduced by the new Trade Mark 
Directive.
Keywords: Trade Mark Law Reform – trade mark representation – new tech-
nologies
Summary: Introduction 1. The legislative amendment determined by the Trade 
Mark Directive (recast) 2. The scope of the legal amendment for non-traditional 
trade marks 2.1. New technologies and the Internet of Things 2.2. The meaning 
of the reference to the «Sieckmann» criteria in the Trade Mark Directive 3. Final 
remarks
Introduction
The legal concept of trade mark, foreseen in the Portuguese Industrial 
Property Code [CPI, Código da Propriedade Industrial]3, and which is still in 
force, is based on the sign’s ability to distinguish products or services. However, 
influenced by the Trade Mark Directive4, the current article 222 of the CPI, in 
addition to including an exemplary list of signs that may constitute trade marks, 
establishes another requirement for registration: the susceptibility of the sign’s 
graphic representation.
The latter requirement – which is found in several legal orders and is jus-
tified on technical grounds (since the graphic representation would facilitate the 
assessment of the application for trade mark registration by the competent au-
thority and its publication) and legal certainty (in so far as it would be necessary 
to determine, more precisely, the subject matter of the protection afforded to the 
trade mark) – , has been criticised by the doctrine, essentially for considering 
that a requirement «of an objective, formal and functional nature»5 should not 
incorporate the definition of a trade mark6, and because it was established at a 
time when there were no technological means enabling the disclosure of regis-
tered signs that were «different», «new» or «non-traditional» – such as tactile, 
3  Approved by DL No 36/2003, of 5 March. 
4  First Council Directive of 21/12/1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating 
to trade marks, No 89/104/EC, codified by Directive 2008/95/EC of 22/10/2008 (OJ L 299 of 
8/11/2008, 25 ff.)
5  Marco arcalá, «Prohibiciones absolutas», in: Comentarios a la Ley de Marcas (Rodríguez 
Cano/García-Cruces González), Cizur Menor (Navarra), Editorial Aranzadi, 2003, 138 ff.
6  Cf., among others, otero lastres, José Manuel, «La definición legal de marca en la nueva Ley 
Española de Marcas», in: Actas de Derecho Industrial, Tomo XXII, 2001, 200 ff. 
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3gustatory and olfactory signs, among others –, would, in practice, make it im-
possible to register them7.
The Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU], which was asked 
to interpret the meaning of the susceptibility of graphic representation in the 
Trade Mark Directive, stated that this does not mean that a sign must be, in 
itself, capable of being perceived visually; what it must be is capable  of being 
represented graphically, namely through images, lines or characters, which fulfil 
the so-called “Sieckmann criteria”8, i.e., the graphic representation must be clear, 
precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective.
If the requirement for susceptibility of graphic representation may raise 
difficulties and, in fact, make it impossible to register the so-called «new» trade 
7  We have already had the opportunity to research this subject in another study: carvalho, Ma-
ria Miguel «“Novas” marcas e marcas não tradicionais: objecto», in: Direito Industrial (coord. 
José de Oliveira Ascensão), Vol. VI, Coimbra, APDI/Almedina, 2009, 217-145 ff. On the same 
subject, cf., among  us, silva, Pedro Sousa and, «Sinal e marca: as marcas não tradicionais», in: 
Direito Industrial (coord. José de Oliveira Ascensão), Vol. VIII, Coimbra, APDI/Almedina, 2012, 
363-381 ff. and also, among others, lalonde, Anne Gilson/Gilson, Jerome, «Getting real with 
non-traditional trademarks: what’s next after red oven knobs, the sound of burning methamphe- 
tamine, and goats in a grass roof?», in: The Trademark Reporter, 101, no.1, January/February, 
2011, 186-218 ff. (available for consultation at https://www.brinksgilson.com/files/gilsontmrnon-
traditional_trademarks_2011.pdf, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018). 
Critically, on the need to protect these non-traditional signs, cf. Port, Kenneth L., «On Nontraditio- 
nal Trademarks», Faculty Scholarship, Paper 235, 2011, available for consultation at http://open.
mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/235 (visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018). This work was also 
published in Northern Kentucky Law Review, 381, 2012, 1-59 ff.
8  The usual description of these criteria is due to the fact that they were first established in para-
graphs 45 and 55 of the Judgment of 12/12/2002, given in Case C-273/00, «Sieckmann» case, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:748.
In this case, were discussed preliminary questions concerning article 2 of the Trade Mark Directive 
submitted by the Bundespatentgericht, following the appeal by Ralf Sieckmann against the de-
cision of the Deutsches Patent-und-Markenamt [DPMA] refusing to register an olfactory sign as 
a trade mark - the pure chemical substance methyl cinnamate (cinnamic acid methyl ester) - for 
various services in classes 35, 41 and 42. The DPMA’s refusal to register was based on the lack of 
graphic representation and the lack of distinctive capacity (§§ 3 Abs.1, 8 Abs. 1 and 2 of Gesetz 
über den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen [MarkenG]).
Regarding the first plea referred, it must be understood that that olfactory sign was represented by 
the corresponding chemical formula (C6H5-CH = CHCOOCH3) and, with the application for 
registration, Ralf Sieckmann also provided a container with a sample of the sign’s scent, adding 
that it is commonly described as «a balsamically fruity scent with a slight hint of cinnamon» (v. 
paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Judgment cit.).
The CJEU decided in the sense referred to in the text and this understanding was reiterated in sub-
sequent judgments of the same Court.
All the CJEU Judgments referred to in this work are available for consultation at: https://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/pt/.
On the judgment in the «Sieckmann» case, cf., among us, Gonçalves, Luís M. Couto, «Marca olfac-
tiva e o requisito da susceptibilidade de representação gráfica – Court Judgment, of 12.12.2002, 
Case C-273/00», in: Cadernos de Direito Privado, no. 1, January/March 2003, p. 26.
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4marks or non-traditional trade marks, which many have been trying to exploit 
commercially9, the truth is that the technological advances that emerge daily, 
and which allow new forms of representation, not exactly graphic, but which 
may not jeopardize legal certainty, are undeniable. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that one of the major changes resulting from the adoption of the new Trade Mark 
Directive – Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2015 [TMD]10 – was the elimination of the requirement 
of susceptibility of graphic representation of the sign, in order to access the re- 
gistration of trade marks.
1. The legislative amendment determined by the Trade 
Mark Directive (recast) 
With the entry into force of article 3 of the TMD, on 15th January 201911, 
in order for a sign to be registered as a trade mark, in any Member State12, it 
must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one  undertaking from 
those of other  undertakings (paragraph a) but, in order to «ensure legal certain-
ty and sound administration, it is also essential to require that the sign is capable 
of being represented in a manner which is clear, precise, self-contained, easily 
accessible, intelligible, durable and objective», allowing the representation of the 
sign «in any appropriate form using generally available technology, and thus not 
9  As we have already had the opportunity to mention in other studies, since Man is a multisensory 
animal and since everything that is perceptible by the senses and not only by one of the senses 
(vision), may constitute indicators for the consumer, the attempt of commercial exploitation of 
these other signs is understandable. For further developments, carvalho, Maria Miguel, «“No-
vas” marcas…», cit., p. 219. On the attempt to take advantage of the colour mark,, cf. carvalho, 
Maria Miguel, «A possibilidade de registo como marca da cor per se», in: Estudos em comemo-
ração dos 20 anos da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho (org. Mário Ferreira Monte/
Joaquim Freitas da Rocha/Joana Aguiar e Silva/Elizabeth Fernandez), Coimbra, Coimbra Edito-
ra, 2014, 469-487 ff. and «A proteção jurídica da cor única como marca no âmbito da indústria da 
moda – breves notas a propósito dos casos da «sola lacada a cor vermelha», in: Actas de Derecho 
Industrial y Derecho de Autor (Espanha), vol. XXXIV, 2013-2014, 137-152 ff.
10  OJ L 336, de 23/12/2015, 1 ff.
The TMD establishes the repeal of Directive 2008/95/EC, of 22/10/2008, as of 15 January 2019
(article 55). On this, cf. Carvalho, Maria Miguel, «A nova diretiva europeia sobre marcas e a sua
transposição para a ordem jurídica portuguesa», in: Revista de Direito Intelectual, no. 02-2017,
89-122 ff. 
On the preparatory work for this Directive, cf. Carvalho, Maria Miguel, «O estudo sobre o
funcionamento geral do sistema europeu de marcas», in: Actas de Derecho Industrial y Derecho de
Autor (Espanha), Tomo XXXI, 2010-2011, 509-526 ff., esp.  521 f.
11  V. article 56 TMD. 
12  In the case of the EU trade mark, v. article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14/06/2017 on the European Union trade mark [EUTMR], OJ L 
154, of 16 June 2017, 1 ff.
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5necessarily by graphic means, as long as the representation offers satisfactory 
guarantees to that effect» (v. Recital 13 of the TMD). 
For these reasons, being removed  the requirement for the susceptibility 
of graphic representation of the sign, it is now required that it must be capable 
of being represented on the register in a manner which enables the competent 
authorities and the public to determine the clear and precise subject-matter of the 
protection afforded to its proprietor (paragraph b).
Although we continue to consider that it would have been better to sepa-
rate the regulation of the requirements concerning the representation of the sign 
from the concept of trade mark, we agree with the meaning of the amendment 
introduced by the new TMD in regard to the susceptibility of representation, 
since it seems to us that if a sign has  distinctive capacity (and there are no other 
grounds for refusing its registration as a trade mark), it must be able to access the 
register if it can be appropriately represented. This appropriate form does not 
mean that the representation has necessarily to be done through graphic means, 
being allowed the use of any possible technological means, provided that legal 
certainty is guaranteed13.
Assuming a substantial nature, this amendment requires transposition 
by the Member States until 14th January 201914. However, given that the TMD 
does not lay down specific  representation requirements - thus remaining the 
risk that the desired legislative approximation will not be achieved on this point, 
since some types of signs may be registered as trade marks in some Member 
States and rejected in others -, the European Trade Mark and Design Network 
(which includes the European Union Intellectual Property Office [EUIPO]), the 
Intellectual Property Offices of the Member States (including, of course, the Por-
tuguese Institute of Industrial Property [INPI, Instituto Nacional da Propriedade 
Industrial]) adopted a Common Communication on this subject15.
13  carvalho, Maria Miguel, «A nova diretiva europeia…», cit., p. 98.
14  V. article 54(1) of the TMD.
15  This Common Communication can be found at: https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/web-
dav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_euipo/who_we_are/common_communication/
common_communication_8/common_communication8_en.pdf (visited, for the last time, on 26 
April 2018).
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6This Common Communication – which has no legally binding effect16 – 
aims to «facilitate the transposition process and strengthen the harmonising im-
pact of the new directive» by promoting the uniform and consistent application 
of the new provisions in the European Trade Mark Law through information on 
the understanding reached in the context of the debate on common approaches 
to the «definitions and representation requirements for the new types of trade 
marks resulting from the abolishment of the graphical representation require-
ment»17.
This will happen before the legislative process for the transposition of 
the TMD in each Member State begins18 – by providing «structured information 
in a transparent manner, with a view to facilitating pre-legislative alignment, on 
the types of marks, their definitions and means of representation in respect of 
each Office»19 – but also after its conclusion. Therefore, this document will be 
updated regularly and bi-annually20. 
In the version made available to this date, the Common Communication 
mentions two substantive issues.
On the one hand, it addresses the definitions and means of representation 
for the different types of marks, based on those established in article 3 of the 
16  Furthermore, as stated in the same Communication, it should also not be read or interpreted “(...) 
as containing specific undertakings by Member States that would limit their freedom to make 
their own choices within the framework of the provisions of the new Trade Mark Directive” – 
Common Communication, cit., p. 2.
It should also be noted that this Communication is part of a more comprehensive programme - the 
Convergence Programme of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) - launched 
in 2011 and which links the EUIPO, the national industrial property offices and user associations 
in order to reach a common base in areas where different practices occur. For further develop-
ments, v. https://www.tmdn.org/network/converging-practices. 
17  Common Communication, cit., p. 3.
18  In the case of the European Union trade mark, in addition to the Common Communication and 
the Implementing Regulation (referred to in the text and footnote 19, respectively), the provi-
sions of the EUIPO in the «Guidelines for Examination in the Office, Part B, Examination, Final 
version, 1.0 01/10/2017» should be taken into account, especially «Section 4 Absolute grounds 




ination_section_4_chapter_2_EUTM%20definition_en.pdf (visited, for the last time, on 26 April 
2018). 
19  Common Communication, cit., p. 3.
20  The first update is scheduled for 1 June 2018 (information collected at: https://euipo.europa.eu/
ohimportal/en/news?p_p_id=csnews_WAR_csnewsportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=nor-
mal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=2&journalId=3941045&jour-
nalRelatedId=manual/, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
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7Implementing Regulation of the EUTM21/22, differentiating the word; figurative; 
shape; position; pattern; colour; sound; motion; multimedia and hologram trade 
21  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1431 of the Commission, of 18 May 2017 which establishes the rules for implementing certain provisions 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the EU trade mark, OJ L 205, of 8 August 2017, 39 ff. [Implementing Regulation of the EUTM]. 
This rule states the following: 
“1. The trade mark shall be represented in any appropriate form using generally available technology, as long as it can be reproduced on the register 
in a clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective manner so as to enable the competent authorities and the 
public to determine with clarity and precision the subject-matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor.
2. The representation of the trade mark shall define the subject matter of the registration. Where the representation is accompanied by a description 
pursuant to paragraph 3(d), (e), (f)(ii), (h) or paragraph 4, such description shall accord with the representation and shall not extend its scope.
3. Where the application concerns any of the trade mark types listed in points (a) to (j), it shall contain an indication to that effect. Without prejudice 
to paragraphs 1 or 2, the type of the trade mark and its representation shall accord with each other as follows:
a) in the case of a trade mark consisting exclusively of words or letters, numerals, other standard typographic characters or a combination thereof 
(word mark), the mark shall be represented by submitting a reproduction of the sign in standard script and layout, without any graphic feature 
or colour;
b) in the case of a trade mark where non-standard characters, stylisation or layout, or a graphic feature or a colour are used (figurative mark), inclu- 
ding marks that consist exclusively of figurative elements or of a combination of verbal and figurative elements, the mark shall be represented by 
submitting a reproduction of the sign showing all its elements and, where applicable, its colours;
c) in the case of a trade mark consisting of, or extending to, a three-dimensional shape, including containers, packaging, the product itself or their 
appearance (shape mark), the mark shall be represented by submitting either a graphic reproduction of the shape, including computer-generated 
imaging, or a photographic reproduction. The graphic or photographic reproduction may contain different views. Where the representation is 
not provided electronically, it may contain up to six different views;
d) in the case of a trade mark consisting of the specific way in which the mark is placed or affixed on the goods (position mark), the mark shall be 
represented by submitting a reproduction which appropriately identifies the position of the mark and its size or proportion with respect to the 
relevant goods. The elements which do not form part of the subject-matter of the registration shall be visually disclaimed preferably by broken or 
dotted lines. The representation may be accompanied by a description detailing how the sign is affixed on the goods;
e) in the case of a trade mark consisting exclusively of a set of elements which are repeated regularly (pattern mark), the mark shall be represented 
by submitting a reproduction showing the pattern of repetition. The representation may be accompanied by a description detailing how its 
elements are repeated regularly;
f) in the case of a colour mark,
i) where the trade mark consists exclusively of a single colour without contours, the mark shall be represented by submitting a reproduction of the 
colour and an indication of that colour by reference to a generally recognised colour code;
ii) where the trade mark consists exclusively of a combination of colours without contours, the mark shall be represented by submitting a repro-
duction that shows the systematic arrangement of the colour combination in a uniform and predetermined manner and an indication of those 
colours by reference to a generally recognised colour code. A description detailing the systematic arrangement of the colours may also be added;
g) in the case of a trade mark consisting exclusively of a sound or combination of sounds (sound mark), the mark shall be represented by submitting 
an audio file reproducing the sound or by an accurate representation of the sound in musical notation;
h) in the case of a trade mark consisting of, or extending to, a movement or a change in the position of the elements of the mark (motion mark), the 
mark shall be represented by submitting a video file or by a series of sequential still images showing the movement or change of position. Where 
still images are used, they may be numbered or accompanied by a description explaining the sequence;
i) in the case of a trade mark consisting of, or extending to, the combination of image and sound (multimedia mark), the mark shall be represented 
by submitting an audiovisual file containing the combination of the image and the sound;
j) in the case of a trade mark consisting of elements with holographic characteristics (hologram mark), the mark shall be represented by submitting 
a video file or a graphic or photographic reproduction containing the views which are necessary to sufficiently identify the holographic effect 
in its entirety.
4. Where the trade mark is not covered by any of the types listed in paragraph 3, its representation shall comply with the standards set out in para-
graph 1 and may be accompanied by a description.
5. Where the representation is provided electronically, the Executive Director of the Office shall determine the formats and size of the electronic file 
as well as any other relevant technical specifications.
6. Where the representation is not provided electronically, the trade mark shall be reproduced on a single sheet of paper separate from the sheet on 
which the text of the application appears. The single sheet on which the mark is reproduced shall contain all the relevant views or images and 
shall not exceed DIN A4 size (29,7 cm high, 21 cm wide). A margin of at least 2,5 cm shall be left all around.
7. Where the correct orientation of the mark is not obvious, it shall be indicated by adding the word ‘top’ to each reproduction.
8. The reproduction of the mark shall be of such quality as to enable it to be: (a) reduced to a size of not less than 8 cm wide by 8 cm high; or (b) 
enlarged to a size of not more than 8 cm wide by 8 cm high. 
9. The filing of a sample or a specimen shall not constitute a proper representation of a trade mark”.
22  V. also EUIPO, «Guidelines for Examination…», cit.
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8mark; - for which it lays down   the admissible form of representation23 - from 
the other types of marks, establishing for these  the principle of admissibility of 
representation «in any appropriate form using generally available technology, 
as long as it can be reproduced on the register in a clear, precise, self-contained, 
easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective manner so as to enable the 
competent authorities and the public to determine with clarity and precision the 
subject-matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor», while also foreseeing 
the possibility of being accompanied by a description. 
On the other hand, the Common Communication indicates which elec-
tronic file formats are acceptable for non-traditional trademarks, admitting a 
«mono-format»24 - given the lower build-in and maintenance costs, and better 
interoperability between systems when conducting searches25 - without exclu- 
ding, however, the acceptance of other formats.
In the Portuguese Law, as mentioned, there is still a requirement for the 
susceptibility of graphic representation (article 222), so it will be effectively 
necessary to amend this and all the rules in which it is foreseen (v.g., article 
234(1)), in order to eliminate and replace it with the representation requirement 
that respects the characteristics mentioned26.
However, in addition to the changes in the legal order for trade marks, 
determined by the new TMD, it is also necessary to transpose, into the inter-
nal legal system, the Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business 
information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclo-
sure, and to simplify and clarify the administrative procedures relating to the 
aquisition, maintenance and cancelation of the industrial property rights fore-
seen in the CPI, as well as introduce mechanisms that strengthen the system 
for the protection of those rights and foster  effectiveness on the repression of 
23  V. the different paragraphs of article 3(3) of the Implementing Regulation of the EUTM, which 
are almost identical to the previsions in Table 1 of the Common Communication (v. p. 4). Exclu- 
ding one word or another (replaced by a synonym), the only difference concerns the omission, in 
relation to the form of representation of three-dimensional trade marks, of the limitation – which 
appears in the final part of article 3(3)(c) of the Implementing Regulation of the EUTM – to six 
views if the representation is not submitted electronically.
In Portugal, however, the forms of representation referred to are not yet in force, as is noted in 
https://inpi.justica.gov.pt/Portals/6/PDF%20INPI/Not%C3%ADcias%20-%20ficheiros%20
de%20apoio/PT%20Common%20Communication%20-%20Portal%20Justi%C3%A7a.pd-
f?ver=2017-11-30-145429-233 (visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
24  V. Common Communication, cit., 5 ff.
25  V. Common Communication, cit.,  5 f.
26  carvalho, Maria Miguel, «A nova diretiva…», cit., 97 ff.
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9violations27, it is the intention of the Portuguese Government to approve a new 
CPI, and work is currently underway to prepare that proposal28.
In the proposal we had access to29 - and not knowing if it corresponds 
to the  law authorising the Government to approve the new Industrial Property 
Code30 -, which distances itself from the initial regulatory change project31, it was 
foreseen that a trade mark could be constituted by a sign or a set of signs capa-
ble of being represented graphically, namely words, including personal names, 
designs, letters, numerals, sounds, colour, shape of the product or its packaging, 
or a sign or set of signs which may be represented in a manner which enables 
the subject-matter of the protection afforded to the proprietor to be determined, 
in a clear and precise manner, provided they are capable of appropriately distin-
guishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other underta- 
kings. Therefore, it is proposed a disjunctive provision 32 regarding representation 
, which is criticisable in our opinion, since it would appear that susceptibility 
27  Preamble to the CPI Proposal, cited infra.
28  In fact, on 26 April 2018, the Council of Ministers approved the  law authorising the Government 
to approve the new Industrial Property Code (v. https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc21/governo/
comunicado-de-conselho-de-ministros?i=205 and https://justica.gov.pt/Noticias/Governo-apro-
va-Revisao-do-Codigo-da-Propriedade-Industrial).
Although, at first, only the amendment to the CPI was still in force, as it also appears from the word-
ing of Order No 10126/2017, of 10 November 2017 (DR, 2nd series, No 225, of 22 November 
2017, 26337 ff.), which constituted “a CPI Review Working Group with the main objective of 
analysing the current CPI project, which includes the contributions of the interested parties” (our 
translation) and that should present its conclusions until 15 December 2017, (v. paragraphs 1 and 
2 of said Order).
29  We had access to this proposal because an opinion about it had been requested from the Portu-
guese Association of Intellectual Law (APDI, Associação Portuguesa de Direito Intelectual), in 
which we had the opportunity to participate, co-authoring with vicente, Dário Moura/Marques, 
João Paulo Remédio/alMeida, Alberto Ribeiro de/silva, Ana Pereira da. It should also be noted 
that APDI is part of the working group referred to in the previous footnote (v. 4(d) of the afore-
mentioned Order).
On the preparatory work, cf. Marques, João Paulo Remédio, «Algumas notas sobre a revisão do 
CPI, no quadro do grupo de trabalho constituído na Secretaria de Estado da Justiça», in: Revista 
de Direito Intelectual, No 1, 2018, 195 ff..
30  V. footnote 28.
31  We had access to this document in the same terms explained in footnote 29.
In this initial proposal, regarding this point, the elimination of the requirement of susceptibility of 
graphic representation of number 1 of article 222 was contemplated and is replaced by the re-
quirement of representation in a way which clearly and precisely identifies the subject-matter of 
the protection afforded to its proprietor and appropriately distinguishes the goods or services of 
one company from those of other companies. 
32  In fact, the disjunctive provision is highlighted in the preamble to the new CPI proposal to which 
we have had access and we do not know, as we have already mentioned, if it is part of the autho-
rization law approved by the Council of Ministers.
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of graphic representation is required for a sign or a set of signs which may be, 
according to the list of examples referred to therein, word, figurative, colour or 
shape «trade marks» while  for the remaining signs (sign or set of signs), the 
representation  must be in a manner which, clearly and precisely, determines the 
subject-matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor. 
It may be said that this provision is aligned with the provision of the Im-
plementing Regulation of the EUTM and the content of the Common Commu-
nication referred supra33. However, on the one hand, this approximation is only 
partial (since it does not specifically refer to all types of trade marks referred to 
therein – v.g. position, pattern, sound, motion, multimedia and hologram trade 
marks34), as it omits the initial provision of the referred Implementing Regu-
lation – v. article 3(1) – that establishes which should be the rule - «The trade 
mark should be represented in any appropriate form using generally available 
technology, as long as it can be reproduced on the Register in a clear, precise, 
self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective manner so 
as to enable the competent authorities and the public to determine with clarity 
and precision the subject matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor» 
[our italic] - and, on the other hand, it seems to ignore the concept of normative 
regulatory provisioning and even the non-binding nature of the Common Com-
munication35... 
Therefore, it would be preferable to establish one single requirement re-
garding the representation of the sign to be registered as a trade mark, since, 
as we have referred, it would have to comply with what is foreseen in the Trade 
Mark Directive (as it appeared in the initial draft proposed for the amendment of 
article 222(1) referred to above36), that is to say, it must be formulated in a man-
ner that allows any form of representation that enable to determine, clearly and 
precisely, the subject matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor. Of course, 
graphic representation – depending on the specific case – may be sufficient. For 
the remaining cases, the specification of the forms of representation may be left 
to a possible Implementing Regulation or to guidelines provided by INPI, which 
may (and should) be aligned with the position adopted in the Common Com-
33  This also seems to result from the preamble to the new CPI proposal to which we have had ac-
cess and we do not know whether it appears in the authorization law  approved by the Council of 
Ministers.
34  Regarding these, v., respectively, paragraphs d), e), g), h), i) and j) of article 3(3) of the Imple-
menting Regulation of the EUTM.
35  V. footnote 15 supra.
36  V. footnote 29 supra.
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munication. Moreover, this is the direction that is being projected in other legal 
orders in the EU (as is the case of Spain37).
2. The scope of the legal amendment for non-traditional 
trade marks
Focusing on the subject of the present study, it is important to determine 
the scope of the legal amendment implemented by the Directive.
As we mentioned, the previous requirement for susceptibility of graphic 
representation was eliminated. However, the reasons for its requirement remain. 
In other words, it continues to result from the adoption of a registration system 
to the acquisition of trade mark rights the need for a representation that will 
technically facilitate the operability of that system and, at the same time, gua- 
rantee legal certainty. Thus, in order for a sign, which is capable of distinguishing 
goods or services, to be registered as a trade mark, it must be capable of being 
represented in any form that is technologically possible, but it must always enable 
the competent authorities and the public to determine, clearly and precisely, the 
subject matter of the protection afforded to the trade mark proprietor. 
2.1. New technologies and the Internet of Things
The technologically possible form is something that is constantly evol- 
ving. And while it is true that a great deal of progress has already been made – 
compared to the initial trade mark registration situation – where we highlight 
the possibility, at least in national law, of submitting the application for regis-
tration digitally38 and of representation in electronic format for some types of 
37  In Spain, in Anteproyeto de Ley de modificación parcial de la Ley 17/2001, de 7 de diciem-
bre, de Marcas (available for consultation at http://www.oepm.es/export/sites/oepm/comun/
documentos_relacionados/Propiedad_Industrial/Normativa/AnteproyectoLeyModificacionPar-
cialLey172001_7dic_Marcas.pdf, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018), it is foreseen in 
article 2 the amendment of the current article 4 of the Ley de Marcas,  that states: “A trade mark 
may consist of all signs, especially words, including names of natural persons, drawings, letters, 
numbers, colours, shape of the product or its packaging, sounds, provided that such signs are 
appropriate to:
a) distinguish the goods or services of one  undertaking from those of other  undertakings and
b) be represented in the Trade Mark Register in a manner so as to enable the competent authorities 
and the public to determine with clarity and precision the subject matter of the protection afforded 
to its proprietor” (our translation).
38  V. article 10-A of the CPI. Online registration is done on the website: https://servicosonline.inpi.
pt/registos/main/start.jsp?timo=M.
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marks39, enormous changes are expected in the near future, making it also worth 
briefly mentioning the new possibilities opened up by the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI).
The IoT refers to the capacity of all objects («things») to be permanently 
connected to the Internet, identified on the network and able to communicate 
with each other40. AI refers to the capacity of a computer or robot to perform 
tasks, usually reserved for intelligent beings, to machines that react like human 
beings, who have autonomous decision-making skills. Both may be relevant re-
garding the registration of trade marks41. 
In fact, the trade mark’s legal regulation may come to reflect, if this is to 
happen, a change in the products/services’ marketing model referred to, among 
others, by Lee Curtis and Rachel Platts. We refer to the  suggested modifica-
tion of the traditional paradigm, which presupposes an interaction between peo-
ple and trade marks (reactive system), to a decision based on predictions deter-
mined by a form of artificial intelligence (prediction system) and that potentially 
withdraws the human consumer from the process of acquisition of products/
services42.
This model – where products are purchased automatically (based on pre-
dictions43/44) and sent, for example, to the consumer’s home – raises several ques-
tions regarding management and marketing (for instance, how exactly do dif-
ferent forms of artificial intelligence choose products? Based on trade marks or 
39  V., for instance, the case of the sound signs for whose registration must be presented the cor- 
responding musical phrases or a digital representation of the sign recorded in MP3 or WAVE 
format – 4.1.2.(d) of Order No 357/2014, of 6 March (amended by Order No 9179/2016, of 
8/7/2016, republished in the DR, 2nd Series, No 137, of 19/07/2016, 22103 ff.) that establishes the 
regulation of the applications’ formal requirements and the instruction documents for the requests 
of concession of exclusive industrial rights.
40  The Internet Society’s definition of IoT generally refers to scenarios in which network connectivity 
and computing capacity is extended to objects, sensors, and everyday objects that are not normally 
considered computers, allowing these devices to create, exchange and consume data with minimal 
human intervention. V. Internet Society - «The Internet of things: an overview», October, 2015, 
available for consultation at: https://cdn.prod.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
ISOC-IoT-Overview-20151221-en.pdf (visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
41  It also raises issues that are very relevant to industrial property, in general, and to certain exclu-
sive industrial rights, in particular, that are not addressed here for economic reasons.
42  Cf. Curtis, Lee/Platts, Rachel, «AI is coming and it will change trade mark law» (available at: 
http://www.hgf.com/media/1173564/09-13-AI.PDF, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
43  The cited authors refer, as an example for the future, the possibility of our refrigerator having the 
ability to monitor its contents and order products such as cheese or milk (op. cit., p. 12). 
44  They may come to constitute as examples of these antecedents, although in a very incipient and 
non-automatic manner, the suggestions for purchasing products based on previous choices or 
visits that already exist today.
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only on price and/or quality?), but also regarding the Law and, particularly in the 
context of this study, on Trade Mark Law. V.g., how likely is artificial intelligence 
to be misleaded in the case of the imitation of a trade mark? Can it be confused 
or even associate similar trade marks? Can it be considered a «consumer», as it is 
currently considered in the European Trade Mark Law? If so, how will the «ave- 
rage consumer»45 be determined? And also, from a different perspective, how 
can artificial intelligence be used to protect trade marks more effectively?46 
Notwithstanding the relevance of all these (and many other) questions, 
for the present study, it is important that two aspects should be emphasised.
One concerns the registration process itself.
Until now, even online registration supposes some human intervention. 
But, in the more or less near future, it may be possible that the registration ap-
plication is completely analysed by devices connected to other devices or com-
puters which, with access to digital data (data bases; devices which allow the 
representation of «non-traditional» signs, etc.), and analysing all available infor-
mation, automatically decide whether to grant or refuse the registration of a sign 
as a trade mark, perhaps with a smaller margin of error.
Another aspect, with even more interest for the subject under analysis, 
concerns the susceptibility of the representation of signs, especially in the cases 
of the so-called «non-traditional» trade marks.
In addition to the fact that technological advances have made it possible 
to eliminate the legal requirement concerning the susceptibility of the graphic 
representation of the signs to be registered as a trade mark, since it is already 
technologically possible to represent some of those «non-traditional» signs (v., 
45  These and other questions are raised in the work cited, which, in turn, is heavily based on studies 
by economists (namely, aGrawal, Ajay/Gans, Joshua/Goldfarb, Avi, authors of several articles 
published in 2017 in the Harvard Business Review, for instance, of 3 October 2017, «How AI 
Will Change Strategy: A Thought Experiment», available for consultation at https://hbr.org/prod-
uct/how-ai-will-change-strategy-a-thought-experiment/H03XDI-PDF-ENG, visited, for the last 
time, on 26 April 2018).
46  On the role of artificial intelligence regarding trade mark protection, v. also, «Protect Your Trade-
mark with Artificial Intelligence» (available for consultation at https://news.developer.nvidia.
com/protect-your-trademark-with-artificial-intelligence/, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 
2018) and also Meale, Darren, «The future of trade marks: my co-worker is a robot», in: Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Vol. 13, 2018, No 2, p. 91.
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for example, the sound trade mark47, the shape trade mark48, the colour trade 
mark49), it is anticipated that new forms of representation may arise – namely 
47  The form of representation of sound signs has already been the subject of a CJEU decision. V. the Judgment of 
27 November 2003, delivered in the scope of the case C-283/01, which opposed Shield Mark BV to Joost Kist 
h.o.d.n. Memex, «Shield» case.
For a comment on this judgment, cf. Martinez Gutiérrez, Ángel, «En torno a la descripción como forma de 
representación gráfica de un signo olfactivo», in: Actas de Derecho Industrial y Derecho de Autor, Tomo XXVI, 
2005-2006, 527 ff.
As we have already pointed out in another study, the difficulties in graphically representing this type of signs are 
essentially related to finding a mean that  fulfill the «Sieckmann» criteria, i.e., a form of representation, namely 
by figures, lines or characters, which is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and 
objective. For this purpose, the doctrine has proceeded to the differentiation between musical sounds and other 
sounds.
In the first case, the representation by means of a stave (i.e., by a score divided in tempos and which includes, in 
particular, a clef, musical notes and silences, whose form indicates the relative value and, if necessary, acciden-
tals) has been accepted. However, some authors also admit the relevance of the indication of the title or of a 
description that allows the clear and precise identification of the concrete sound when it is a sound (or a set of 
sounds) known to the public.
In the remaining cases, in the impossibility of representation by stave, the admissibility of other forms of represen-
tation, such as the use of a verbal description of the sound and the digital recording of the sound, is discussed. 
In the «Shield» case, the CJEU – by limiting its assessment to the means of graphic representation actually pre-
sented – considered that the «Sieckmann» criteria are not observed when the sign is graphically represented 
by musical notes or by a simple onomatopoeia without other accuracy and may not be respected by the verbal 
description. But it admitted the representation through the stave. 
As we have seen with respect to olfactory signs,  also/as well in the case of sound marks which cannot be repre-
sented by a stave, the possibility of constituting a trade mark, admitted by the CJEU, is endowed with technical 
difficulties, a situation which is  increased by the fact that other forms of representation  currently available of 
such signs (and some used in other legal orders) have not been analysed.
In fact, in addition to digital recordings, it is possible to use graphics such as the oscillogram and the spectrogram 
or the sonogram to represent non-musical sounds, however, doubts have been raised regarding the accessibility 
and understanding of these means by the general public.
After the amendment, in 2008, of the CPI still in force, the Portuguese legislator expressed some openness in this 
matter, since in article 234(1), it is now accepted that the graphic representation of sound signs be made through 
the respective musical phrases, in support defined by an order of the president of the INPI board of directors.
Currently, as we have already mentioned supra, this representation is admitted through «musical phrases or a digital 
representation of the sign to be recorded in MP3 or WAVE format» (our translation) (Order No 3571/2014, of 6 
March, amended by Order No 9179/2016, of 8 July, in: DR, 2nd Series, No 137, of 19 July 2016, 22103 ff.).
In Portugal, two national sound trade marks have already been registered. The first is the national trade mark No 
480308, to distinguish insurances and was represented as a stave and accompanied by a multimedia audio file - v. 
https://www.inpi.pt/portal_resources/sons/3415601.mp3. Registration was granted on 16 November 2011. The 
second is the national trade mark No 531888, to distinguish intellectual property legal and consultancy services 
and was represented as a stave and accompanied by a multimedia audio file - v. https://www.inpi.pt/portal_re-
sources/sons/5150301.mp3. Registration was granted on 19 September 2014. 
48  On the three-dimensional trade mark, cf. Carvalho, Maria Miguel, «O registo de marcas de forma no âmbito 
da jurisprudência europeia», in: Cadernos de Direito Privado, No 55, 2016, July/September, 23-31 ff. and also 
Gonçalves, Luís M. Couto, «Marca tridimensional», in: Nos 20 anos do Código das Sociedades Comerciais – 
Homenagem aos Profs. Doutores A. Ferrer Correia, Orlando de Carvalho e Vasco Lobo Xavier, Vol. I (Congresso, 
empresas e sociedades), Coimbra, School of Law of the University of Coimbra/Coimbra Editora, 2007, 139 ff. 
and referring to the Industrial Property Code of 1940, Serens, M. Nogueira, «Parecer», in: Colectânea de Juris-
prudência, Ano XVI, Tomo IV, 1991, 59 ff.
49  On the subject, cf., among us, carvalho, Maria Miguel «A possibilidade de registo como marca da cor per se», 
in: Estudos em comemoração dos 20 anos da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho (org. Mário Ferreira 
Monte/Joaquim Freitas da Rocha/Joana Aguiar e Silva/Elizabeth Fernandez), Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2014, 
469-487 ff. and «A proteção jurídica da cor única como marca no âmbito da indústria da moda – breves notas 
a propósito dos casos da «sola lacada a cor vermelha», in: Actas de Derecho Industrial y Derecho de Autor 
(Espanha), vol. XXXIV, 2013-2014,137-152 ff.
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electronic sensing or e-sensing – regarding signs whose registration has been 
denied (also50) because of the impossibility of representation in the forms legally 
required until now, as is the case, for example, of olfactory51, gustatory52 and tac-
tile53 trade marks, in the scope of European law.
In this context, future technological developments may make it possible 
to overcome some of the barriers that have been placed on them in certain legal 
orders54, serving as examples of the development of «digital scent technology» 
50  We say «also» because non-traditional trade marks often fulfill other grounds to refuse the registration. V. 3 
infra.
51  On the possibility of registering olfactory signs, cf., among us, Cruz, Rui Solnado da, A marca olfactiva, Coim-
bra, Almedina, 2008.
At the European level, the then Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [OHIM] (now EUIPO) granted 
the (community) trade mark registration of «the smell of freshly cut grass» for tennis balls (V. Decision of the 
Second Board of Appeal of 11 February 1999 in Case R 156/1998-2, concerning the application for registration 
No 428 870 («the smell of freshly cut grass»)), which has meanwhile expired. However, following the Court of 
Justice Judgment in the «Sieckmann» case, this possibility began to be rejected, v., for example, the Judgment 
of the then Court of First Instance, of 27 October 2005, regarding case T-305/04, where the registration of «the 
smell of ripe strawberry» to mark products of classes 3, 16, 18, 25 was discussed. For a commentary on this 
judgment, cf. Martinez Gutiérrez, Ángel, op. cit., 739 ff.
On the problems raised by the olfactory trade mark, cf. Karapapa, Stavrovla, «Registering scents as community 
trade marks», in: The Trade Mark Reporter, 100, 2010, No 6, 1335 ff. (available for consultation at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574642, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
52  We would like to recall that, while the requirement for susceptibility of graphic representation was in force, 
OHIM refused to register any gustative sign as a community trade mark (the current European Union trade 
mark). V. the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of 4 August 2003 in the case R 120/2001-2, regarding the 
taste of artificial strawberry flavouring to mark pharmaceutical products.
53  Gonçalves, Luís M. Couto («Marca tridimensional», cit., 143 f.) refers to as a tactile mark, although disguised 
as a three-dimensional mark, the application for community trade mark of optical lenses with a particular touch, 
which was assessed and rejected by the OHIM Board of Appeal in the «Five Ribs» case, by the decision of 21 
March 2001 (R-0448/1999-2).
On the registration of this type of trade marks in the USA, cf. Monteiro, Christina S. («A Non-traditional Per-Spec-
trum: The Touch of Trademarks», in: INTA Bulletin, June 15, 2010, Vol. 65, No 11, available for consultation 
at http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/ANontraditionalPerSpectrum.aspx (visited, for the last time, on 26 
April 2018), which indicates, for example, the registration, in 2006, by American Wholesale Wine & Spirits, 
Inc. of trade mark No 3,155,702, for a tactile mark, alone or used with the Khvanchkara wine, described in the 
register as «a velvet textured covering on the surface of a bottle of wine».
It should also be noted that INTA’s [International Trademark Association] Board has adopted a resolution favou- 
ring the extension of recognition, protection and registration of tactile marks under appropriate circumstan- 
ces (v. http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/ProctectabilityofTouchMarks.aspx, visited, for the last time, on 
26 April 2018).
54  Cf. serGio balaña («El entorno digital? segunda oportunidad para la marca olfativa? Estudio acerca de la 
capacidad del signo olfativo para funcionar como marca en el mercado», in: Actas de Derecho Industrial, Tomo 
XXVI, 2005-2006, 25 ff.) which refers, in particular, to telematic networks. 
Cf. also the study on «virtual reality environment» by wilson, Caroline «Trade mark law in an online future – 
coming to its senses?», of 19 September 2007, consulted on the Internet at the website: http://www.law.ed.ac.
uk/ahrc/gikii/docs2/wilson.pdf (visited, for the last time, on 9 April 2018).
Law & Technology - E.Tec Yearbook
p.001 - p.018
16
(or «olfactory technology»), the so-called «electronic noses» (or «e-noses»)55 – 
devices that incorporate chemical sensors, which analyse scent, collect qualita-
tive and quantitative information regarding their composition and identify it by 
standardised methods of recognition, generating an «image» of the scent in a 
graphic form, which will include colour, in the case of «colorimetric electronic 
noses»56; «smelling screens» (screens with devices that emit scents on specific 
parts of the emitted images)57 and also «scent domes» (peripheral devices, con-
nectable to computers, which create simulations of scents for their users, by va-
porisation and emission through the device in the direction of the user’s nose, 
based on order processing, sent by a computer programme or digital file, re-
sulting in a combination of aromatic oils - synthesised from natural fragrances 
- which are found inside this device, in «replaceable cartridges»)58.
More incipient seems to be the digital technology regarding gustatory 
signs59 and haptic or tactile signs60.
2.2. The meaning of the reference to the «Sieckmann» crite-
ria in the Trade Mark Directive
Although the Directive stipulates, as a rule, the admissibility of the re- 
presentation of the sign in any appropriate form, using generally available tech-
55  As referred by Wilson, Alphus D./Baietto, Manuela, «Applications and Advances in Electron-
icNose Technologies», in: Sensors, 2009, 9(7), 5099-5148 ff. (available for consultation at https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3274163/pdf/sensors-09-05099.pdf, visited, for the last 
time, on 9 April 2018), the term «electronic nose» was coined by Gardner, J.W./Barlett, P.N., 
in 1988. For further developments, cf., by the last-mentioned authors, A brief history of electronic 
noses, Sens. Actuat. B: Chem 1994, 18, 211–220 ff., https://doi.org/10.1016/0925-4005(94)87085-3 
(visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018). 
56  Karapapa, Stavrouvla, op. cit., 1355 ff.
57  Cf., on this subject, la dieGa, Guido Noto, «Non-conventional marks: the EU reform of trade 
marks, Brexit, and the Internet of Things», in: Diritto Mercato Tecnologia, 16 January 2018, esp. 
11 f. (available for consultation at: https://www.dimt.it/index.php/it/notizie/16608-non-conven-
tional-marks-the-eu-reform-of-trade-marks-brexitand-the-internet-of-things, visited, for the last 
time, on 26 April 2018).
58  KaraPaPa, Stavrouvla, op. cit., 1355 ff.
59  Regarding these, cf. ranasinGhe, Nimesha/cheoK, Adrian David/fernando, Owen Noel New-
ton/nii, Hideaki/GoPalaKrishnaKone, Ponnampalam, «Digital Taste: Electronic Stimulation of 
Taste Sensations», in: International Joint Conference on Ambient Intelligence, 2011, 345 ff., 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25167-2_48. 
60  Regarding these cf. WassoM, Brian, «A distinctive touch: augmented textures and haptic trade-
marks», 21/07/2011, http://www.wassom.com/a-distinctive-touch-augmented-textures-and-hap-
tic-trademarks.html (visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
The elimination of the susceptibility of graphic representation and trade mark registration
Maria Miguel Carvalho
17
nology, the truth is that, as we have already mentioned, it has not gone without 
expressly stating that, in order to «ensure legal certainty and sound administra-
tion, it is also essential to require that the sign is capable of being represented 
in a manner which is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, 
durable and objective» (v.  Recital 13 of the TMD), which seems to reaffirm the 
seven «Sieckmann» criteria,  making it important to reflect briefly on the mea- 
ning of this reference.
For some authors, the elimination of the requirement for the susceptibi- 
lity of graphic representation, determined by the TMD, will imply the elimina-
tion of the «Sieckmann»61 criteria. For others, however, the suppression of gra- 
phic representation will not «“open the door” to the registration of unconventio- 
nal trade marks», defending that «the representation requirements remain very 
strict»62. There is also another doctrine that defends that the new legal configu-
ration may imply a different interpretation of those jurisprudential guidelines63.
We personally believe that if the criteria are explicitly mentioned in the 
Directive’s Recitals , this must mean that the legislator has been sensitive to their 
need and goodness, and should therefore continue to be applied, even if the con-
sideration of new forms of representation – other than graphic – may effectively 
come to require a different interpretation, in order to take into account the spe- 
cificities resulting from their character, but without neglecting the need to en-
sure legal certainty and the registration system management.
3. Final remarks 
Notwithstanding the admissibility of new forms of representation, which 
may facilitate the registration of certain non-traditional signs (v., for example, 
sound signs, holograms, position trade marks), we believe that for others, the 
grounds for refusal of registration will remain, at least for now.
Moreover – and this is the most important point for us – even if a sign 
can be represented, by any form that is technologically possible and meets the 
referred criteria, that does not mean that it can be necessarily registered as a 
trade mark.
In fact, the trade mark is a distinctive sign of goods or services and, there-
fore, only distinctive, differentiating signs can be registered as trade marks. The 
problem that affects many of these non-traditional signs concerns this (in)apti-
61  In this sense, cf., sahin, onus, «The past, the present and the future of colour and smell marks», 
in: European Intellectual Property Review, 2016, 38 (8), p. 513.
62  Gonçalves, Luís M. Couto, Manual de Direito Industrial – Propriedade Industrial e Concorrên-
cia Desleal, 7th edition, revised and updated, 2017, p. 201.
63  Cf., in this sense, la dieGa, Guido Noto, op. cit., p. 6.
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tude and this is not solved by the acceptance of non-graphic forms of representa-
tion, even though these may not question legal certainty. Therefore, we agree 
with LaLonde/Gilson: “the tension between nontraditional trademarks used 
in sensory marketing and the trademark requirement of identifying the source 
of products is palpable. A trade mark must identify the source, and if a scent or 
flavor or texture just makes a product smell, taste or feel more desirable, that may 
well be its legal death knell”64, since it also raises further grounds for refusal of  its 
registration (v.g. functionality)65.
It remains to be seen whether if, also here, technology – and in particular 
artificial intelligence – may change the status quo by influencing the signs’ dis-
tinctive capacity and/or whether it implies a new (average)66 consumer paradigm 
or a different conception of the trade mark and the functions performed by this 
distinctive sign. 
64  Lalonde/Gilson, op. cit., p. 217. The authors also add that “in terms of trademark protection, 
marketing can also be self-destructive in directing consumers to  a product’s useful features.” Cf. 
also Aurea Suñol, «Las marcas no convencionales: signos gustativos, sonoros y olfativos», 16 
Nov 2016, in: Almacén de Derecho (http://almacendederecho.org/las-marcas-no-convenciona-
les-signos-gustativos-sonoros-olfativos/, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018).
65  For further developments on this point, cf., among others, Hughes, Justin, «Non-Traditional 
Trademarks and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Functionality», Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Le-
gal Studies Research Paper No 2017-15 (available for consultation at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2946257, visited, for the last time, on 26 April 2018). This study will be published in The 
Protection of nontraditional marks: critical perspectives (Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben, eds.), 
in press.
66  V. 2.1 supra.
The elimination of the susceptibility of graphic representation and trade mark registration
Maria Miguel Carvalho
19
ROBOTIC SOFTWARE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1)
Alexandre L. Dias PEREIRA2
Abstract: Is software executed by robots protected by intellectual property 
rights? If so, which branch of IP applies to robotic software: copyright, patents, 
trade-secrets, all together? This paper focus on robots generated by humans and 
increasingly provided with artificial intelligence (AI). Will IP be an obstacle to 
the development of artificial intelligence or rather a stimulus in the evolutio- 
nary process?
Keywords: robotics – software – intellectual property 
Summary: 1. Introduction.  2. Legal protection of robotic software. 3. Copy-
right in the Software. 4. Trade Secrets. 5. Patents for inventions related to com-
puter programs. 6. Patenting the brains of robots? 7. Patents for robotic pros-
theses (i.e. replicas of parts of the human body). 8. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
The robot is, basically, an automaton whose functionality, mobility and 
ability to communicate and learn depends on the model. The meaning of the 
word robot ranges from the toy dog-robot to Sofia, passing through the auto- 
1 English version of the paper presented by the author at the Workshop on Law & Robotics orga-
nized by the Institute for Legal Research (Group 3) of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Coimbra, on 16 November 2017.
2 Faculty of Law of Coimbra University. Email: aldp@fd.uc.pt
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matons of industrial production, especially in the automotive, electronic or tex-
tile sectors.
Robots execute instructions programmed in the form of software. The 
software is the computer program, i.e. the set of instructions performed or exe-
cuted by a computer device, namely a computer or a smartphone. Software has 
a source code, written in programming language (e.g. Basic, Cobol, Pascal, C 
++, Java, Python, etc.) and an object code or executable file (in machine or bi-
nary language). There are several kinds of software: firmware, which is software 
embedded in the machine (e.g. ROM, BIOS); operating systems (iOS, Android, 
Windows); and applications (Office, Antivirus, Browsers, Games). In broad 
sense, software also includes software algorithms and documentation (program 
description and instruction manual), as well as databases or broad-based infor-
mation that it processes (so-called ‘dataware’).
In the field of robotics, software is the centre of operations or commands 
of the robot, and the degree of intelligence of the robot depends on the software 
it performs or executes. The robot is often designed according to the image and 
likeness of its human creator, both in physical appearance and in behaviour and 
communication. However, robots do not all look human-like. Compare, for - 
example, the Astro-mechanical droid R2-D2 with the C-3PO, the latter an an-
droid of protocol, with shapes closer to humans, and which is presented in the 
following terms: “I am C-3PO, cyborg of human relations and fluent in 6 million 
different languages and speeches.”
These characters from George Lucas’s epic fiction Star Wars are mechani-
cal (as opposed to biological) beings endowed with intelligence. Intelligence will 
evolve not only in communicational and behavioural terms, but also physically, 
with the Hasbro Transformers, alien robots that are able to turn their bodies into 
other objects like motor vehicles. Many of these beings are not even human crea-
tions, instead they come from worlds yet undiscovered and may pose a threat to 
the survival of the human species...
This paper focus on robots generated by humans and increasingly provi- 
ded with artificial intelligence (AI), although not necessarily in human form. 
AI is a branch of computer sciences that looks for computational methods or 
devices capable of emulating the rational capacity of the human being to solve 
problems, to think or, in general, to act intelligently. That is the case of IBM’s 
Watson, with relevant applications in healthcare and the legal sector, as well as in 
water, energy or traffic management systems. There is even mention of Watson 
overcoming Google: it is able not only to search information in the web, but also 
to process it in terms similar to human thinking, and it can be used on a smart-
phone. Legal challenges posed by technological advances impact several fields of 
law, from civil law to labour law, as well as administrative and tax law.
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The European Parliament has passed a resolution of 16 February 2017 
with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics. In 
particular, it states “general principles concerning the development of robotics 
and artificial intelligence for civil use”, notably a principle on intellectual proper-
ty rights according to which “there are no legal provisions that specifically apply 
to robotics, but that existing legal regimes and doctrines can be readily applied to 
robotics, although some aspects appear to call for specific consideration; calls on 
the Commission to support a horizontal and technologically neutral approach 
to intellectual property applicable to the various sectors in which robotics could 
be employed”.3
2. Legal protection of robotic software
This paper focus the legal protection of software executed by the robot, 
i.e., whether robotic software can and should be protected, and if so on what 
terms.
Robotic software, as a computer program, can be, and is, protected under 
intellectual property. The question has been raised more than half a century ago 
and it has been widely discussed, to the point that an author exclaimed about 
papers on the legal protection of software: “Not another one!”4
Some argued that software by its very nature should be protected as a 
technical invention by patent law, while others argued for the protection of com-
puter programs under copyright law. A third way would be to assign a new sui 
generis protection to software, a mixture of patent and copyright. Finally, it was 
also possible to resort to the protection of trade secrets or technological know-
how.
However, in 1973, the Munich Convention on the European Patent ex-
cluded the computer program as such from the subject matter of patents, and 
this exclusion was laid down in the domestic legislation of the contracting 
parties to that convention. In 1980, the US Copyright Act has been amended 
to grant copyright to computer programs.5 In 1985, virtually all G7 countries 
adopted legislation in the same direction. In 1991 the European Community also 
3 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission 
on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, para. 18 (2015/2103(INL)).
4  DWORKIN, G., «Copyrights, Patents and/or ‘Sui Generis’: What Regime Best Suits Computer 
Programs», in: International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (ed. HANSEN, H), I, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 165.
5  Cf. MILLER, Arthur, «Copyright protection for computer programs, databases, and compu- 
ter-generated works: is anything new since CONTU?», Harvard Law Review, 106/5 (1993), p. 
977-1073, 985 ss.
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enshrined the copyright solution, as later did several international intellectual 
property instruments such as the 1994 TRIPS Agreement and the 1996 WIPO 
Treaties.6
3. Copyright in the Software
In Europe, the Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 (later replaced 
by Directive 2009/24/EC) has harmonized the legal protection of computer pro-
grams. It has been implemented in Portugal by Decree-Law No 252/94 of Oc-
tober 20, which has provided a kind of “anomalous” or “improper” copyright.
Instead of amending the Copyright (and Related Rights) Act, domestic 
legislation drew up a specific statute for software.7 In short, computer programs 
which, in their form of expression - including their preliminary design material 
(e.g. diagrams) - have a creative character (i.e. when they constitute intellectu-
al creations) are protected (DL 252/94, art. 1/2). However, copyright does not 
protect the principles or algorithms implemented in the program, nor its func-
tionality, but only the way in which they are presented, namely in source code.
Copyright belongs in principle to its intellectual creator. However, it can 
be assigned to a third party by contract and the law assigns it to the principal, 
the employer or the company where software is created, respectively, for hire, by 
employees, or within a company as a collective work (DL 252/94 art. 3, Copy-
right Act, art. 19). The moral rights of the creator of computer programs appear 
reduced to the right of paternity as the right to claim the authorship of the pro-
gram and identification in the work (DL 252/94, art. 9). The right to the integrity 
of the work is deleted from moral rights, as article 15 (2) of the Copyright Act 
is excluded from computer programs (DL 252/94, art. 3/5). Said Article of the 
Copyright Act reads that “The right to make changes to the work depends of 
the express agreement of its creator and can only be exercised under the terms 
agreed upon.” However, the courts do not exclude the moral right to integrity 
of the work, so that employers or acquirers of the program are prevented from 
freely modifying it.
With regard to economic rights, a broad concept of reproduction, as con-
firmed by the courts, and the right to produce and sell copies are listed (subject 
to EU exhaustion). The duration of the copyright is governed by the general rule 
of 70 years post mortem auctoris or, where rights belong to a legal person (e.g. 
6  Further developments, PEREIRA, Alexandre Dias, Informática, direito de autor e propriedade 
tecno-digital, Coimbra Editora, 2001, VIEIRA, José Alberto, A proteção jurídica do programa de 
computador pelo direito de autor, Lex, Lisboa, 2005.
7  Belgian has also adopted a specific Act, Law of 30 June 1994. Cf. STROWEL, Alain/ TRIAILLE, 
Jean Paul, Le droit d’auteur, du logiciel au multimedia, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, p. 136 s.
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a company), from its dissemination (Copyright Act, art. 36). In free use, com-
paring with copyright law in general, no freedom of reproduction is foreseen for 
private use of computer programs.
An innovative aspect of copyright that the directive introduced concerns 
the rights of the legitimate user (or license holder), who is provided with the 
rights to reproduce and to study the program in the context of its use, to make 
a backup copy, to reproduce and to modify the program for the purpose of cor-
recting errors, including in our view reverse engineering strictly necessary for 
interoperability with independent program, and the use, for those purposes, of 
the information thus obtained. Users’ rights are mandatory and do not detract 
from other means of software protection, namely patent law and protection of 
trade secrets (DL 252/94 arts. 6 and 7).
4. Patents for inventions related to computer programs
Is robotic software eligible for patent law protection?
The assignment of patents depends on the application fulfilling certain 
requirements. Patents concern technical inventions, i.e., works of the spirit on 
technical problems and that are not just mathematical or logical formulas. Tech-
nical inventions must be novel in the light of the state of the art and result from 
an inventive step, in the sense that they are not obvious. Finally, the invention 
must be susceptible of industrial application, i.e., capable of use in industry or 
agriculture.
The patent object does not cover all the works of the mind. Discoveries, 
scientific theories and mathematical methods, materials or substances already 
existing in nature and nuclear material, aesthetic creations, designs, principles 
and methods of engaging in intellectual activities in the field of games or in the 
field of economic activities, computer programs as such, without any contribu-
tion, and presentations of information, are not eligible for patents, unless the 
object for which the patent is applied is limited to the elements mentioned in it 
(Industrial Property Code, art. 52).
The provisions of the Munich Convention on the European Patent un-
derpinning said internal system have not prevented the European Patent Office 
from granting patents to inventions relating to computer programs, in particu-
lar in the sector of medical devices. In the case of robots, reference is made to 
patent EP 1169092 B1 on a telescopic fire-fighting robot, controlled manually 
or remotely, and automatically connected to the water-channeling system and 
hung in a monorail in tunnels. According to the summary of the disclosure of 
the invention, the fire-fighting robot serves to extinguish fires in tunnels. It hangs 
in a carriage that runs on a monorail to the tunnel vault. An oil-dynamic tele-
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scopic piston allows transport to be reduced to the road surface. This feature 
allows the robot to overcome any obstacle, protect people and transport people 
without traffic obstacles and fight the fire. To have a continuous extinguishing of 
fire, the robot is connected to the water conduit by a flexible tube with 30 meters 
with an automatic arm.8
In the USA, patents do not meet a standard similar to CPE. There are 
software patents, including robotic software. This is the case, for example, of 
patent US 8996429 B1: methods and systems for the development of the robotic 
personality. According to the patent summary, the patented technology consists 
of methods and systems of interaction of the robot with the user in order to ge- 
nerate a personality of the robot. The robot can access a user’s device to deter-
mine or identify information about a user’s identity and the robot can be confi- 
gured to the user’s measure with the identifiable information. The robot can find 
data associated with the user’s identity through voice or facial recognition. The 
robot can provide a personalized interaction or response to the user based on 
the user’s specified information. In some instances, the personality or persona- 
lization of a robot can be transferred from one robot to another (machine), and 
the information stored in one robot can be shared with another robot through 
the cloud.9
5. Patenting the brains of robots and robotic prostheses?
Should there be software patents on the logical component of the robot? 
The Free Software Foundation, created by Richard Stallman, launched the GNU 
GPL (General Public License) licenses ensuring the freedom to reproduce, mo- 
dify, and/or distribute software. The use of free software developed by this 
community would be free, conditioned only to the duty to provide the license 
together with the software and to share the same freedom that is received. The 
idea is to prevent copyright and patents from impeding the free development 
of software, which is considered a language subject to the constitutional impe- 
ratives of free speech. In the EU, there is a European version of the GPL, the 
European Union Public License. Will patents deter the development of AI and 
the evolution of Robots? The rational of patents is the opposite: patents provide 
a stimulus to innovation by granting inventors with a temporary monopoly over 
a new product or process. So, the case may be that patents in robotic software 
contribute to the evolution of Artificial Intelligence.
8  https://patents.google.com/patent/EP1169092B1/sv
9  https://www.lens.org/lens/patent/US_8996429_B1
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Another question is whether pieces of the robot that replicate parts of 
the human body can be patented. Article 54(c) of the Industrial Property Code 
provides that a new invention may be patented, where it involves an inventive 
step and is capable of industrial application, affecting any element isolated from 
the human body or otherwise produced by a technical process, including the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene, even if the structure of that element is 
identical to that of a natural element, provided it is expressly observed and spe-
cifically set forth in the patent application, the industrial application of a se-
quence or a partial sequence of a gene. Therefore, robotic prostheses are arguably 
eligible for patent protection.
6. Trade Secrets
Robotic software can be protected as know-how or confidential business 
information. Article 318 of the Industrial Property Code protects trade-secrets 
or know-how as undisclosed information. It is a special form of unfair com-
petition, i.e., acts of competition contrary to the honest standards and practi- 
ces of any branch of economic activity. It is the disclosure, acquisition or use of 
business secrets of a competitor, without the consent of the competitor, where 
such information (1) is secret, in the meaning that it is not generally known or 
easily accessible in its entirety or in the exact configuration and connection of 
its constituent elements to persons in circles who normally deal with the type of 
information in question; (2) has commercial value because it is secret; (3) has 
been the subject of considerable diligence in the light of the circumstances of the 
person legally in control of the information to keep it secret.
In the European Union, the European Parliament and the Council have 
adopted Directive 2016/943 of 8 June 2016 on the protection of know-how and 
confidential business information (trade secrets). Protection is provided against 
the acquisition, use and disclosure of confidential business information, which 
is considered secret information in the sense that: (1) in its entirety or in the 
exact configuration and connection of its constituent elements, it is not generally 
known to those in circles who deal normally with the type of information in 
question, or is not easily accessible to such people; (2) with commercial value 
because it is secret; (3) and which has been the subject of reasonable action, 
in the light of the circumstances, to be kept secret by the person exercising his 
control by law.




Robotic software is an essential dimension of AI systems. This paper fi- 
gured out several possibilities to protect robotic software under intellectual pro- 
perty law. The first way is copyright law, as computer programs are listed as 
eligible copyright subject-matter, yet with special rules. However, copyright is 
limited in scope and does not exhaust the legal protection of robotic software. 
In particular, the patent system may prove a relevant solution for robotic soft-
ware to protect its functionality. Finally, regardless of copyright and/or patent 
law, trade-secret protection is also an important branch of legal protection for 
robotic software.
In any case, is it important to preserve freedom of innovation so that AI 
can be developed to the benefit of Mankind and Nature.
Robotic Software Intellectual Property
Alexandre L. Dias Pereira
27
FIGHTING PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE 
OR ‘THE LIGHTBULB CONSPIRACY’ AS 
AN UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICE: 
FOR A CIRCULAR ECONOMY
R. Koolhoven/E. L. Heerema 1
Abstract: The French environmental group Halte à l’Obsolescence Program-
mée (HOP) reported several producers of printers and Apple for deliberately 
shortening the lifespan of their products, for the first time enforcing the new 
legislation on ‘planned obsolescence’. Deliberately shortening product lifespan 
is not only detrimental to the environment and the consumer who is being eco-
nomically disadvantaged; it is also contrary to the commonly shared opinion 
that our current level of consumption and production are depleting the earth 
and its resources. On a European level, course is therefore set to shift from the 
linear model of production and consumption towards a sustainable, circular 
economy. The question we address in this article, is whether the Directive on 
Unfair Commercial Practices could provide for a legal basis to tackle planned 
obsolescence as an environmental and consumer issue.
Keywords: planned obsolescence, unfair commercial practices, circular eco- 
nomy 
Summary: Introduction 1. Planned obsolescence and the light bulb conspi- 
racy 1.1. Definition 1.2. Types of obsolescence 1.3. The French prohibition of 
‘planned obsolescence’ 1.4. Elements 1.5. Enforcement 2. Towards a circular 
1 Rosalie Koolhoven and Luc Heerema are members of the Law & IT section at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
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economy 2.1 The Sustainable Development Goals 2.2 European initiatives 3. 
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 3.1 The UCPD in overview 3.2 The 
active, misleading information provision 3.3 The misleading omission a. Omis-
sion of information b. Another transactional decision? c. No prevention of the 
practice 3.4 The general clause of unfair commercial practice a. Professional 
diligence b. Material distortion of the economic behaviour of the average con-
sumer c. Prevention? 4. Concluding remarks
Introduction
On the 27th of December 2017, the French Environmental group ‘Halte 
à l’Obsolescence Programmée’ (Stop Planned Obsolescence) filed a complaint 
against Apple for intentionally slowing down older iPhone models.2 Earlier that 
year, it filed a case against printer producers Epson, HP, Brother and Canon, 
causing the French prosecutors to launch an investigation.3 On January 5th 
2018, the Parquet de Paris entrusted the Competition and Consumer Authorities 
(DGCCRF)4 to start a preliminary inquiry on Apple as well, for deceit by means 
of ‘obsolescence programmée’ (planned obsolescence).5 
Even though there have not yet been any fines imposed on producers, it 
is commonly believed and even proven in other cases that producers are using 
techniques to deliberately reduce the lifespan of their products.6
2  WHITE, Jeremy, Apple sued over slowing phones in France, independent.co.uk/life-style/
gadgets-and-tech/apple-lawsuit-phones-slow-france-planned-obsolescence-legal-challenge-
crime-a8132371.html#gallery, March 19, 2018. 
3  AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apple, Epson face French legal pressure over planned obsolescence, 
news.abs-cbn.com/business/12/28/17/apple-epson-face-french-legal-pressure-over-planned-ob-
solescence, March 22, 2018.
4  The ‘Direction générale de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes 
(DGCCRF)’ is the authority entrusted with the enforcement of competition legislation, consumer 
affairs and fraud control. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apple visé en France par une enquête pour 
obsolescence programmée, france24.com/fr/20180108-france-apple-vise-enquete-obsolence-
programmee-iphone-hop, March 19, 2018.  HOP, Les fabricants d’imprimantes mis en cause par 
une plainte, halteobsolescence.org/les-fabricants-dimprimantes-mis-en-cause-par-une-plainte, 
March 19, 2018.
5  The French term is ‘tromperie’: un délit qui consiste à induire en erreur. According to the IATE 
dictionary this is to be translated with ‘deceit’: intentionally giving a false impression, see IATE.
europa.eu search ‘tromperie’.
6  Article L441-2 Code de la Consommation (France): ‘Est interdite la pratique de l’obsolescence 
programmée qui se définit par le recours à des techniques par lesquelles le responsable de la mise 
sur le marché d’un produit vise à en réduire délibérément la durée de vie pour en augmenter le 
taux de remplacement’.
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For a long time, it was argued that this practice is only detrimental to 
consumers to some extent because rapid product renewal stimulates innovation 
and was necessary to keep our economies flourish. Lately though, planned obso-
lescence and the E-waste deriving from it - started playing a big role in the public 
debate on climate-change. Global policymakers agree that we need to restructure 
production and consumption, because our linear production and consumption 
model is depleting the earth of its resources and creating too much waste. 
France was the first European country to draft legislation to tackle ‘planned 
obsolescence’ as an environmental, societal and economic problem by imposing 
sanctions on fraudulent producers aside the European Unfair Commercial Prac-
tices legislation.7 In this article, we will explore whether the European Directive 
on Unfair Commercial Practices (hereafter: UCPD) as such offers a European, 
legal basis for tackling planned obsolescence.8 We will answer this question in 
light of the fact that the European Commission, European Parliament and Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee (EESC) all announced the search for a 
way to ban planned obsolescence and head for sustainable consumption in a cir-
cular economy, whereas the UCPD provides for maximum harmonisation. We 
will conclude with advantages and disadvantages to the proposed solutions and 
emphasise that further research into the efficacy of numerous public and private 
law instruments in this field is necessary. 
1. Planned obsolescence and the light bulb conspiracy
Obsolescence is in the nature of goods. Products become worn out and 
that is normal. However, there is a practice that producers adopt to make a con-
sumer need something sooner than technically necessary. This causes many 
goods being thrown away even though they could still function properly.9
In 1932 the New York real estate agent Bernard LONDON wrote an ar-
ticle titled ‘Ending the depression through planned obsolescence’. He explained 
that producers could speed up obsolescence to give the economy and labour 
market a boost. If a product is perceived as ‘old’ or does not function as good as a 
7  BERNE, Xavier, Une proposition de loi veut pénaliser l’obsolescence programmée, nextinpact.
com/news/78504-une-proposition-loi-veut-penaliser-l-obsolescence-programmee.htm, March 
20, 2018.
8   Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), 2005, OJEU 11.6.2005, L 149/22. 
9  RITZER, George & DEAN, Paul, Globalization: A Basic Text, 2nd edition, Chichester, John Wiley 
& Sons, 2015, p. 312-313.
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newer model or wears down easily, consumers will buy more which in turn helps 
the economy flourish. The core strategy became to augment the volume of sales 
by planning obsolescence, whereas before that, in the 19th century, goods were 
built to last a lifetime or longer.10 
In the ‘20s and ’30s of the 20th century, parallel to LONDON’s article, the 
mass production of light bulbs for commercial purposes started, which grew to 
become – rightly or wrongly - the first well-known example of ‘planned obso-
lescence’. Allegedly, the leading producers came together as the Phoebus cartel 
to not only standardize light bulbs, but also to conspire about deliberately shor- 
tening the lifespan of the bulbs below their possible lifespan to maximize sales 
volumes - hence the name ‘the light bulb conspiracy’. The so-called ‘Centennial 
Light’, a light bulb burning since 1901 in a Fire Department in Livermore Cali-
fornia, is said to be the evidence for the conspiracy because it is a light bulb that 
dates from before the Phoebus cartel. 
The Centennial Light became a symbol for planned obsolescence as a 
business model.11  
 1.1 Definition
Over the course of years, several definitions of the term ‘planned obso-
lescence’ have appeared, of which the core always is the shortening of the re-
placement cycle to generate long-term sales volumes.12 According to BULOW, 
planned obsolescence is ‘the production of goods with uneconomically short 
useful lifes so that customers will have to make repeat purchases’.13 In his defini-
tion he incorporates the effect that design decisions have on customers, which is 
also a prerequisite in Article 5 UCPD which we turn to later. The lifespan is ‘the 
ability of a product to perform its function at the anticipated performance level 
over a given period (number of cycles – uses – hours in use), under the expected 
10  SLADE, Giles, Made to Break: Technology and Obsolescence in America, 1st edition, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 72-73. LONDON, Bernard, Ending the depression 
through planned obsolescence, pamphlet online on commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:London_
(1932)_Ending_the_depression_through_planned_obsolescence.pdf, May 9, 2018. 
11  WIERING, Frank, Tegenlicht Lab: Einde van bezit, VPRO, 2015, vpro.nl/programmas/tegen-
licht/kijk/afleveringen/2015-2016/einde-van-bezit.html, May 9, 2018; KRAJEWSKI, Markus, The 
great lightbulb conspiracy, spectrum.ieee.org/tech-history/dawn-of-electronics/the-great-light-
bulb-conspiracy, March 20, 2018.
12  JONKER, Jan, STEGEMAN, Harry & FABER, Niels, De circulaire economie - Denkbeelden, 
ontwikkelingen en business modellen, Nijmegen, Whitepaper, 2016, p. 7.
13  BULOW, Jeremy, «An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence», The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 101(4), 1986, p. 729–749.
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conditions of use and under foreseeable actions’.14 The appearance of planned 
obsolescence is not limited to the design or production phase. It can relate to 
maintenance and replacement as well. One can imagine that designing a product 
to discourage DIY repair or replacement of a component is a form of planned 
obsolescence. Not because the product is of inferior quality material, but because 
the buyer needs to make economic decisions repeatedly: to have the product re-
paired by an official dealer at a high price, to wait for a long time for a spare part 
or to buy a new product which is maybe only twice that price and is immediately 
available in another colour or style or ‘newer’ model. 
The definition offered by the French Code de la Consommation (hereafter: 
CC) consists of the same three elements – (1) acting/designing (2) to shorten 
the lifespan of a product (3) to encourage repeat purchases – and adds a fourth 
element: (4) the lifespan should be shortened deliberately. There is a difference 
between designing a product with a shorter lifespan and deliberately shortening 
the lifespan to encourage repeat purchase. A short lifespan could be a matter of 
price and quality. A producer might bring two types of an alike product on the 
market; an expensive one consisting of higher quality materials and a cheaper 
one. The argument could be to make innovations accessible to the greater public. 
We will discuss this further in our legal analysis.
 1.2 Types of obsolescence
SLADE defines three types of obsolescence in his book Made to break: 
technological, psychological and planned obsolescence.15 Other distinctions are 
made as well and there is overlap.
Technological obsolescence is characterised by the invention of a tech-
nically advanced product that makes the previous model obsolete. An exam-
ple SLADE gives is the electric starter motor for cars. When the electric starter 
motor was invented, all cars that had to be hand cranked became ‘old’. Under 
technological obsolescence, also ‘systemic obsolescence’ is ranged: if the system 
in which a product is used is altered in such a way that its continued use becomes 
difficult. For example introducing non-compatible software updates or updates 
which are more voluminous and require more memory (such as ‘eye candy’ – 
more pixels) so that older computers are unable to process them.16 Perfectly 
14  BOULOS, Stéphanie et al., The Durability of Products: Full Report, DOI 10.2779/37050, p. 7.
15  SLADE, Giles, Made to break: technology and obsolescence in America, 1st edition, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 3-4.
16  MIAO, Chun-Hui, «Planned obsolescence and monopoly undersupply», Information Economics 
and Policy, 23(1), 2011, p. 51–58, explaining that making a new generation of technically incom-
patible products - like game consoles - is a form of planned obsolescence. 
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functioning computers are rendered technically or systemically obsolete by the 
fact that the newer versions demand too high performances. An example can 
be found in the microprocessors for personal computers, whose highly obsolete 
market is dominated by two global producers Intel and AMD. It is argued that 
the systemic innovations are put on the market gradually to force consumers to 
regularly update their equipment.17 If two dominant players in the field gradu-
ally introduce novities to the market, they are sure that consumers are forced to 
repeat purchases.18 
A problem that goes hand in hand with technological obsolescence is the 
fact that the current design of laptops and mobiles, that always need to be thin-
ner and lighter, complicates the possibility of repairing or updating hardware 
components. Apple for example has soldered their RAM to the motherboard of 
its computers. If a new software version demands more of the hardware, it is im-
possible to upgrade the hardware, thus rendering a functioning device obsolete 
faster than when its parts would have been replaceable. A comparable practice is 
to use a non-standard format of hard drives on computers. 
The French organization ADEME - involved in environmental research 
and advocacy for tackling planned obsolescence, calls technological or systemic 
obsolescence ‘obsolescence fonctionnelle’: ‘a product does not respond anymore 
to the new expected use for technological reasons (incompatibility with new 
equipment) or rules’.19 
The second type of obsolescence defined by SLADE is ‘psychological ob-
solescence’. This is in a narrow sense a marketing strategy, consisting of intro-
ducing a different ‘fashion’, a different colour or slightly changed style. SLADE 
describes General Motors’ cars as an example, because it introduced differently 
coloured cars which competitors did not do.20 Henry T. FORD opposed: ‘Any 
customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black.’ 
Coloured cars became fashionable status symbols and with that development, 
General Motors found a strategy to shorten the replacement cycle of its cars and 
to gain an edge on its competitors.21 Another strategy is not to change the colour, 
17  LEE, Dave, The problem with forced tech obsolescence, bbc.com/news/technology-35984185, 
March 21, 2018.
18  GOTTINGER, Hans-Werner, Economies of Network Industries, 1st edition, London/New York, 
Routledge, 2003, p. 176-177.
19  ADEME, Étude sur la durée de vie des équipements électriques et électroniques, 2012, p. 15, 
ademe.typepad.fr/files/dur%C3%A9e-de-vie-des-eee.pdf, March 21, 2018.
20  SLADE, Giles, Made to break: technology and obsolescence in America, 1st edition, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 36, 49-50.
21  SCHAUB, Coralie, La vie gâchée des objets, liberation.fr/futurs/2012/10/28/la-vie-gachee-des-
objets_856572, March 22, 2018.
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but to add an extra function to ‘model 3’, calling it ‘super-3’ or ‘3i’, which makes 
the previous model appear old. 
ADEME would categorise this under ‘obsolescence d’évolution’ cor- 
responding to the fact that a product does not respond to the wishes of the con-
sumer anymore because they want a newer model for other functionalities or 
design.22 In this description technological obsolescence overlaps with psycho-
logical obsolescence: producers that release technically updated products might 
persuade consumers that are vulnerable to status, to buy the technically newer or 
better product, whereas the ‘old’ product still functions properly. 
Thirdly, SLADE describes the term ‘planned obsolescence’ as a catchall 
phrase to describe the assortment of techniques used to artificially limit the du-
rability of a manufactured good in order to stimulate repetitive consumption.23 
Producers plan the lifespan of a product shorter than technically necessary to 
prevent the market from becoming saturated. Planning the lifetime of a product 
is done already during the design phase of a product. The process also referred 
to as ‘contrived durability’ is about designing a product to deteriorate quickly for 
cost or weight saving reasons. Using inferior material, soft metal, cheap plastic 
in stress-bearing components will decrease the lifespan of a product. If this is 
done, this will not in itself be an example of a planned obsolescence strategy with 
the producers’ purpose to self-enrichment, because a producer has the freedom 
to set the durability level of a product and offer a cheaper model. Even though 
making decisions to create cheap and single-use products or disposables is not a 
crime detrimental to consumers, it is detrimental to the environment. According 
to the Belgian Senate ‘planned obsolescence’ is the design of a product, plan-
ning the expiration-date.24 A way to plan the expiration-date and influence the 
lifetime of a product is not only to choose inferior materials, but also to make 
repair more difficult.25 FORESMAN wrote how Apple ‘screwed the iPhone out 
22  ADEME, Étude sur la durée de vie des équipements électriques et électroniques, 2012, p. 15, 
ademe.typepad.fr/files/dur%C3%A9e-de-vie-des-eee.pdf, March 22, 2018.
23  SLADE, Giles, Made to break: technology and obsolescence in America, 1st edition, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 5.
24  Belgian Senate, Proposition de résolution en vue de lutter contre l’obsolescence programmée des 
produits liés à l’énergie 2011, senate.be (search by File Number 5-1251/1), March 22, 2018.
25  KINOKUNI, Hiroshi, «‘Planned antiobsolescence’ occurs when consumers engage in mainte-
nance», International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Vol. 28, 2010, p. 441–450. For obvious 
reasons Kinokuni considers repairing products to augment their lifespan a form of ‘planned an-
ti-obsolescence’.
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of DIY repair’.26 DIY repair is an important, yet simple way to save resources and 
prevent waste.
Within the notion of planned obsolescence, some authors distinguish the 
term ‘programmed’ obsolescence. It is planned obsolescence in the sense that pro-
ducers disable a product deliberately to prevent it from working to incite repeated 
purchases by customers. ‘Programmed’ obsolescence refers to the employment 
of chips (one specific technique) in cartridges that make it impossible to use the 
printer after a certain number of prints or duration of time.27 Apparently, when 
printers warn the user that the cartridge is empty, 50 percent of the toner car-
tridge is often still full. In the United States Hewlett Packard (HP) was involved 
in three putative class-action lawsuits (Ciolino v. HP, Rich v. HP, and Blennis v. 
HP), which were consolidated into one suit (In re: HP Inkjet Printer Litigation) 
for unfair business practices relating to its inkjet printers’ use of ink cartridges. 
The parties agreed to a global settlement, in which HP promised to discontinue 
the use of unnecessary replacement messages and compensate the consumers 
in the class action for $5,000,000 for future purchases from Hewlett Packard.28
26  FORESMAN, Chris, Apple ‘screwing’ new iPhones out of simple DIY repair, online: arstechnica.
com/gadgets/2011/01/apple-screwing-new-iphones-out-of-simple-diy-repair/ (last visited March 
22, 2018).   
27  WRBKA, Stevan, «Warranty Law in cases of planned obsolescence – The Austrian situation», 
Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2017(2), p. 67-76 describes a distinction of ‘obso-
lescence of function, desirability and quality’.
28  POWER, James, «Tearing Down a House of Coupons: CAFA’s Effect on Class Action Settle-
ments», University of St. Thomas Law Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (2012), p. 906-932; In re HP Inkjet 
Printer Litig., No. 5:05-cv-3580, 2011 WL 1158635, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011); JDSUPRA, In 
re: HP Inkjet Printer Litigation: Ninth Circuit Reverses And Remands Hewlett-Packard Coupon 
Settlement, online: jdsupra.com/legalnews/in-re-hp-inkjet-printer-litigation-nin-77516/ (last vi- 
sited March 22, 2018).
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In (legal) literature, there is no clear distinction or division of types of obsoles-
cence into criminal or fraudulent planned obsolescence and ‘acceptable’ con-
trived durability.29 The figure we incorporate, only offers our understanding of 
different types of obsolescence and their overlap. Because there are no data on 
how often, in what sector, nor in which way ‘obsolescence’ is deliberately prac-
ticed, the illustration does not represent a scale either.
 1.3 The French prohibition of ‘planned obsolescence’
In the last decade, the problem of planned obsolescence - called ‘obsoles-
cence programmée’ - received a lot of attention in France. In 2010, there was the 
broadcast of a documentary on the French television channel Arte, Prêt à jeter, 
which means ‘Ready to throw away’.30 
Then, planned obsolescence received political attention; Eva Joly, candi-
date during the presidential campaign of 2012 of Europe Ecologie, proposed to 
ban the practice of planned obsolescence.31 The group Europe Ecologie-Les Verts 
offered draft legislation, which was debated in parliament in March 2013 as part 
29  WRBKA, Stefan, «Warranty Law in Cases of Planned Obsolescence - The Austrian Situation», 
Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2017(2), p. 67-76. 
30  DANNORITZER, Cosima (prod.), Prêt à jeter, ARTE, 2010, online: arte.tv/fr/vid-
eos/042441-000-A/pret-a-jeter (last visited March 26, 2018).
31  VIGNAL, François, Eva Joly veut interdire ‘l’obsolescence programmée’, publicsenat.fr/lcp/poli-
tique/eva-joly-veut-interdire-l-obsolescence-programmee-197806, March 22, 2018.  
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of the ‘consumer’ bill of rights.32 It was suggested to prolong product confor- 
mity, facilitate access to spare parts needed for repair for ten years, and to make 
planned obsolescence strategies punishable by two years imprisonment and a 
fine of € 37,500. Article 8 of Loi no. 2014-344 of 17 March 2014 on consumption 
then provided that ‘within one year of the promulgation of this law, the Go- 
vernment shall submit to Parliament a report on planned obsolescence, its legal 
definition and its economic questions’.33  
Almost six months after the deadline, no report was submitted even 
though the battle against planned obsolescence was one of the key goals of the 
ecological transition desired by the President of the Republic. After a question 
from the Senate, the Ministry of Environment Energy and the Sea, responsible 
for international climate relations, answered in September 2016 that planned ob-
solescence still is a priority in the transition to the circular economy, but more 
time was necessary to finish the report, to be able take into account the Law 
on Energy Transition for Green Growth.34 Article 99 of that law made planned 
obsolescence an offence, sanctioned by maximum two years imprisonment and 
a fine of € 300,000 for an individual, and 5% of the annual turnover for a contra-
vening company. 
Article 99 was inserted into the French Code de la Consommation as the 
new Article L441-2, which defines forbidden planned obsolescence as ‘the prac-
tice defined by the use of techniques by which the person responsible for putting 
the product on the market aims to deliberately reduce the lifetime of a product 
with the purpose of increasing the amount of replacements’.35 This addition to 
the Code de la Consommation was part of a greater operation, in which the pre-
sumption of non-conformity was extended as well to 24 months (article L. 217-7 
32  FRANCEINFO & AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Que dit la proposition de loi contre l’obsoles-
cence programmée?,  francetvinfo.fr/politique/que-dit-la-proposition-de-loi-contre-l-obsoles-
cence-programmee_309719.html, March 22, 2018; SENET, Stéphanie, Une loi pour lutter contre 
l’obsolescence programmée?, journaldelenvironnement.net, March 22, 2018. 
33  LOI n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, Article 8.
34  MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND THE SEA, senat.fr/questions/base/2015/
qSEQ151018275.html; LOI n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour 
la croissance verte, Article 99, legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2015/8/17/2015-992/jo/article_99.
35  The original wording of Article L-441-2 Code de la Consommation is: ‘Est interdite la pratique de 
l’obsolescence programmée qui se définit par le recours à des techniques par lesquelles le respon- 
sable de la mise sur le marché d’un produit vise à en réduire délibérément la durée de vie pour en 
augmenter le taux de remplacement’. 
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Code de la Consommation).36 Consumers also obtained improved information 
rights, like the right to know for how long spare-parts will be available, and the 
right to receive these parts within two months (article L. 111-4 Code de la Con-
sommation)37, with the  purpose to support sustainability and reparability. One 
question one can debate about is how this article can exist next to the UCPD, 
because the character of the UCPD is maximum harmonization, so that Member 
States are no longer free to regulate or prohibit such practices.38 The European 
Commission in its guidance of 2016 enshrined that the UCPD does not affect 
national rules intended to protect interests not of an economic nature; Member 
States can set more stringent rules to regulate commercial practices in case of the 
protection of health, safety and the environment.39 The environment can there-
fore be considered as one of the exceptions to the harmonisation system that lead 
to differences between countries. We are of the opinion that the French article 
was a necessity as well, for the purpose of legal certainty (lex certa and lex scrip-
ta), given the fact that also criminal prosecution - and not only civil consumer 
law enforcement - is aimed for.
 1.4 Elements
The French legislator chose to further elaborate four elements in Article 
L441-2 to battle planned obsolescence: ‘le recours à des techniques’, ‘réduire la 
durée de vie’, délibérément’, ‘pour en augmenter le taux de remplacement’. One 
may assume that the use of techniques to shorten the lifespan can be ranged 
under technological or psychological obsolescence as well; it may have as a result 
36  Article L217-7: ‘Les défauts de conformité qui apparaissent dans un délai de vingt-quatre mois 
à partir de la délivrance du bien sont présumés exister au moment de la délivrance, sauf preuve 
contraire. Pour les biens vendus d’occasion, ce délai est fixé à six mois. Le vendeur peut combattre 
cette présomption si celle-ci n’est pas compatible avec la nature du bien ou le défaut de conformité 
invoqué’.  
37  Article L111-4: ‘Le fabricant ou l’importateur de biens meubles informe le vendeur professionnel 
de la période pendant laquelle ou de la date jusqu’à laquelle les pièces détachées indispensables à 
l’utilisation des biens sont disponibles sur le marché. Cette information est délivrée obligatoire-
ment au consommateur par le vendeur de manière lisible avant la conclusion du contrat et con-
firmée par écrit lors de l’achat du bien. Dès lors qu’il a indiqué la période ou la date mentionnées 
au premier alinéa, le fabricant ou l’importateur fournit obligatoirement, dans un délai de deux 
mois, aux vendeurs professionnels ou aux réparateurs, agréés ou non, qui le demandent les pièces 
détachées indispensables à l’utilisation des biens vendus. Les modalités d’application du présent 
article sont précisées par décret.’
38  BECKERS, Anna, «The regulation of market communication and market behaviour: Corporate 
social responsibility and the Directives on Unfair Commercial Practices and Unfair Contract 
Terms», Common Market Law Review, 2, 2017, p. 475–515.
39  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance on the implementation/application of Directive 2005/29/
EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, COM(2016) 320 final, p. 8.
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that an older model is not popular anymore or does not look good anymore or 
functions slightly slower which could be annoying.  However, to act within the 
realm of Article L-441-2 the subjective or psychological element is not key. The 
goal of the definition on L441-2 is ‘[…] to limit the term ‘planned obsolescence’ 
to (a) objective technical reasons and to exclude the subjective dimension linked 
to a consumer’s own choices.40 The techniques that could be used to reduce the 
lifespan are the introduction of a flaw, a weakness, a scheduled stop, a technical 
limitation, incompatibility, insufficient memory to cope with updates or other 
obstacles for repair. A common example is software for which the publisher ends 
support after a certain date, forcing users to purchase a newer version that they 
do not necessarily need and that is not compatible with the user’s hardware and 
causes the obsolescence of the hardware.
In time, all products show signs of wear. Therefore, not all decrease of va- 
lue or performance by technique can be seen as a crime or unfair practice. Only 
(b) actively restricting the lifespan by saving on durability without any technical 
reason to do so, is seen as ‘obsolescence programmée’. The act should further-
more be (c) deliberate and have the purpose to (d) increase the sales volume. As 
we have seen how certain techniques can have different effects, it will be difficult 
to draw a line between affordable product design and planned obsolescence. In 
addition, the legislator acknowledges it is a phenomenon which is hard to cha- 
racterise.41 
 1.5 Enforcement
The Code de la Consommation (Article L454-6) punishes planned ob-
solescence with imprisonment and a fine of 300,000 euros. The fine may be in-
creased, in proportion to the benefits derived from the offense, up to 5% of the 
annual average turnover, calculated based on the last three annual turnovers 
known at the date of the facts. Natural persons may be prohibited -  see Article 
131-27 of the Penal Code - to exercise certain public functions or exercise certain 
social activities related to the offense. 
It will be up to the individual consumer who wishes to sue a producer 
for fraud to provide proof of the use of a planned obsolescence technique. It is 
however proven to be difficult for the consumer to prove that the producer acted 
deliberately with the objective to maintain a market for his own products and to 
40  ADEME, Étude sur la durée de vie des équipements électriques et électroniques, 2012, p. 15, 
ademe.typepad.fr/files/dur%C3%A9e-de-vie-des-eee.pdf, March 22, 2018.
41  GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAISE, Rapport du Gouvernement au Parlement sur l’obsolescence pro-
grammée, sa définition juridique et ses enjeux économiques, p. 9, ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/
default/files/RAPPORT_Obsolescence_programmee.pdf, March 26, 2018.
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create a necessity for replacement or renewal. It is discussed that this difficulty 
is the reason that in the two years after the entering into force of the new legisla-
tion, no consumer has yet challenged a producer.42 Other problems rise as well. 
Companies are often based abroad and able to invoke business secrecy or the 
protection of their patents.43 Enforcing these rules requires technical research 
and many expenses, which explains that the consumer is bound to turn to a 
consumer organisation (such as the aforementioned HOP) to start a class action. 
2. Towards a circular economy
 2.1 The Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 during a United Nations Summit, the ‘2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’ was adopted as a resolution by the UN. This reso-
lution is regarded as the follow-up on the Millennium Goals, which were in effect 
until 2015. Seventeen goals were implemented, amongst them tackling poverty, 
inequality and climate change and pursuing a sustainable way of consumption 
and production. These SDG’s are not legally binding to any of the countries that 
have ratified the resolution, but they do put political and ethical pressure on the 
partaking countries.44 In particular, there is the issue of the export of waste to the 
low-income countries. The waste that is exported to poorer countries to dispose 
of it or to store it, leads to drinking water pollution and environmental problems 
in those countries.45 It is however, partly the result of our current high level of 
consumption and disposal. This trend morally forces consumers in first-world 
countries to change their consumptive behaviour and at the same time, forces 
producers to change their methods. The initiatives we see on European and na-
tional levels align with these Sustainable Development Goals, but try to translate 
them into more concrete policy measures and (future) legislation.
42  MARTIN, Marie & ROTA, Daniel, Obsolescence programmée: le Parquet de Paris ouvre une 
seconde enquête, fidal-avocats-leblog.com/2018/02/obsolescence-programmee-parquet-paris-
-ouvre-seconde-enquete, March 26, 2018.
43  DELAPIERRE, Michel, La loi sur l’obsolescence programmée ne panique pas l’industrie, tendan-
ces.info/2015/03/02/la-loi-sur-lobsolescence-programmee-ne-panique-pas-lindustrie, March 26, 
2018. 
44  UNITED NATIONS, Sustainable Development Goals, un.org/sustainabledevelopment/develop-
ment-agenda, March 26, 2018.
45  AHMED, Syez Farad, The Global Cost of Electronic Waste, theatlantic.com/technology/ar-
chive/2016/09/the-global-cost-of-electronic-waste/502019, March 26, 2018; UNEP, Waste crime 
- waste risks, Gaps in meeting the global waste challenge, 2015, europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/25575/
download?token=WAWKTk7p, March 26, 2018.
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 2.2 European initiatives
In 2002, the Council and European Parliament adopted the Directive on 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE Directive) which obliged 
Member States to establish a system for the collection of e-waste. Reuse, reco- 
very, recycling, and correct disposal of the remaining waste should be provi- 
ded for by August 2005. This Directive made the collection, re-use and recycling 
targets part of the producer’s obligations. At the same time the Directive on the 
Restriction of the Use of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) was adopted to ban ha- 
zardous substances from electronic equipment to facilitate recycling and to re-
duce emissions when the remaining e-waste is landfilled or incinerated.46 These 
rules were said to be the first initiatives to fight printer producers that used coun-
ter chips, blocking printing beyond a programmed number of sheets.47 Some ink 
cartridges were equipped with a chip counting the number of prints, indicating 
a false ink level in the printing software, which leads to the disposal of cartridges 
that still contain ink. 
In recent years, obsolescence and product quality gained more attention 
in the journey towards a circular economy. In 2013, the European Economic and 
Social Committee voted on an opinion by Thierry LIBAERT and Jean-Pierre 
HABER against planned obsolescence.48 In the years thereafter, the ‘Ecodesign 
Working Plan’ emerged. In 2017, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee evaluated the Ecodesign Working Plan in the light of the Circular Economy 
Action Plan.49 It concluded that the Ecodesign Working Plan is too limited to 
be a strong driver for wholesale change in behaviour through the supply chains 
of goods and services. The focus should be on the full lifecycle of products, in-
cluding their durability, ease of maintenance and repair, potential for sharing 
46  Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on waste 
electrical and electronic equipment, as amended by Directive 2003/108/EC, Directive 2003/108/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 December 2003 amending Directive 
2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and Directive 2002/95/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on the restriction of the use of 
certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment.  
47  CLOVER, Charles, Printer giants fight EU move to ban ‘clever chip’, telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/northamerica/usa/1390150/Printer-giants-fight-EU-move-to-ban-clever-chip.html, March 
26, 2018.
48  LIBAERT, Thierry & HABER, Jean-Pierre, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee on ‘Towards more sustainable consumption: industrial product lifetimes and restoring 
trust through consumer information’ (own-initiative opinion), 2014/C 67/05, OJEU 6.3.1024, 
C 67/23, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013IE1904&from=en, 
March 26, 2018.
49  EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, «Opinion of the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission Ecodesign Working Plan 
2016-2019’», OJEU 13.10.2017, C 345/97 (COM(2016) 773 final).
Fighting planned obsolescence or ‘the lightbulb conspiracy’ as an unfair commercial practice: 
for a circular economy
R. Koolhoven/E. L. Heerema
41
and digitisation, reuse, upgradeability, recyclability and actual uptake after use 
in the form of secondary materials in products entering the market. The ESSC 
advised to incorporate the principles of the circular economy in the context of 
digitisation, sharing and the functional economy, in order to have consistency 
across the various strategies that are intended to deliver a new economic model. 
Furthermore, component parts of a product should be easily recoverable for re-
use and/or remanufacture and drive the creation of a strong secondary market 
for raw materials. It also noted that labelling requirements about life expectancy 
- as were also suggested by the French ADEME - can drive improved eco-design 
strategies and help consumers in decision-making, thus becoming a driver for 
behavioural change.50 
The question that rises from these visions, for example the point that 
consumers should be informed about the lifespan of products, is whether not 
informing consumers about the influence that the producers took over the pro- 
ducts expiry date should already been seen as a misleading omission as men-
tioned in Article 7 of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive?  Alternatively, 
if a more commonly shared opinion is that these practices of planned obsoles-
cence are unfair behaviour of a producer vis-a-vis the consumer, the problem 
could be addressed as an unfair market practice in the sense of Article 5 UCPD? 
In essence, the French legislator also found planned obsolescence tortious, frau- 
dulent behaviour. Is the existing legal framework of the UCPD not sufficient? 
3. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive was adopted by the European 
parliament on May 11, 2005 and needed implementation by the Member States 
before June 12, 2007. The aim of the directive is to create a level playing field of 
competition between producers within the internal market of the Union. Recital 
8 of the UCPD mentions that the UCPD’s side effect is that it will protect the 
interests of producers already adhering to the rules. The other aim is to protect 
consumer’s economic interests by restraining producers in the practices they uti-
lise in their course of business. The consumer should not be persuaded to make 
economic (purchase) decisions for the wrong reasons. Overall, these measures 
lead to increased consumer faith in the market. 
Article 3 of the UCPD defines the scope of applicability: the directive 
applies to all unfair commercial practices, which take place before or during 
a business-to-consumer transaction. The directive faces the difficult task of 
50  About the information model: STRAETMANS, Gert, «Misleading practices, the consumer infor-
mation model and consumer protection», Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 5, 2016, 
p. 199-211.
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discerning between actual unfair commercial practices and common market 
practices as Recital 6 exempts common market practices such as ‘product place-
ment’ and ‘brand differentiation’ from the scope of ‘unfair practices’. Within the 
realm of planned obsolescence, the Apple-example proves to be a good example 
of this difficult distinction: under what circumstances does the use of a tech-
nique (slowing down the operating system of a phone) prevent a product from 
being damaged and under what circumstances is that same technique seen as an 
unfair commercial practice because it persuades consumers to make a purchase 
decision? 
 3.1 The UCPD in overview
The directive can be divided into three standards that tackle unfair prac-
tices: 1. a general clause of unfair commercial practice; 2. a more specific clause 
of misleading or aggressive practices; 3. a blacklist of practices that are to be 
regarded as unfair practices under any circumstance.
When assessing a practice within the realm of the UCPD, there is a speci- 
fic order to adhere to which is mostly due to practical reasons. The most efficient 
thread to follow is to first search for the practice on the blacklist of aggressive 
commercial practices mentioned in annex 1 of the UCP. Article 5 sub 5 UCPD 
writes ‘Annex I contains the list of those commercial practices which shall in 
all circumstances be regarded as unfair. The same single list shall apply in all 
Member States and may only be modified by revision of this Directive.’ There is 
a large variety of aggressive practices, such as displaying a quality mark without 
having the authorisation to do so, or creating the impression that the consumer 
cannot leave the premises until a contract is formed. An analysis of the blacklist 
shows that the practice of using a technique to shorten the lifespan of a product 
is not mentioned. Therefore, there is the need to assess whether it is an unfair 
commercial practice within the general clause or within the misleading and ag-
gressive practices.
The second question one should address is whether the practice is aggres-
sive or misleading in the sense of Article 6 to 9 of the UCPD. Article 8 - further 
explained in Article 9 - mentions a.o. the use of harassment, coercion, physical 
force and undue influence. This Article is related to the context in which a con-
tract was concluded and therefore does not focus on the practice of research and 
development or design which took place before the product was sold. We can 
therefore conclude that Article 8 and 9 cannot be applied to qualify and tackle 
planned obsolescence as an unfair commercial practice. 
Article 6 and 7 address the misleading of consumers, either by actions (6) 
or omissions (7). Taking into consideration that planned obsolescence is to be 
discerned from normal wear-and-tear by active manipulation, the first self-evi-
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dent question is whether the use of a lifespan shortening technique is seen as a 
misleading action. If we take into account that the consumer is usually not in-
formed about the use of lifespan shortening techniques, the second self-evident 
question is: ‘Is not informing the consumer about the use of a lifespan shortening 
technique to be regarded as an unfair practice - e.g. a misleading omission - as 
in Article 7 of the UCPD?’ 
 3.2 The active, misleading information provision
A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading under Article 6 
UCPD if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful or even likely 
to deceive the average consumer. The deception is seen in relation to several 
elements under which: the composition of the product and the need for a ser-
vice, part, replacement or repair.51 The provision of information about these ele-
ments should either cause or be likely to cause the average consumer to make a 
transactional decision that he would not have made otherwise.  
The first question is under which element one could range the use of 
lifespan shortening techniques. In the example cases we mentioned, printer 
manufacturers and Apple used chips and software updates to shorten the lifespan, 
which are related to the composition of the products. Also, these techniques in-
fluence the need for services, parts, replacement or repair. 
Furthermore, the provision of the information should be actively mis-
leading. This requires the producers to have informed the consumer about the 
composition of the product and the (lack of) need for services, parts or repair in 
a more ‘positive’ way than the shortened lifespan justifies. It seems to us, that the 
required active deceit of the producer, lies more in the nature of the information 
provided, than in the use of lifespan shortening techniques. This becomes even 
clearer when one takes into account the wording of Article 7, about not-men-
tioning information concerning the composition or need for services, parts or 
replacement. This shows that the practice of planned obsolescence is not covered 
by the active misleading practice of Article 6, as this requires an active deed in 
the sphere of information provision.52 This Article only comes into consideration 
when Apple would for example promote its iPhone with slogans and commer-
cials expressing the thought that iPhones are made to last a lifetime. It would 
51  There is a clear relation between unfair commercial practices and pricing: DUIVENVOORDE, 
Bram, «The CJEU decision in Citroën/ZLW: Ready for REFIT?», Journal of European Consumer 
and Market Law, 2, 2017, p. 77-79.
52  STRAETMANS, Gert, «Misleading practices, the consumer information model and consumer 
protection», Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 5, 2016, p. 199-211.
Law & Technology - E.Tec Yearbook
p.027 - p.055
44
come into consideration if the printer manufacturers would advertise about their 
printers as the most sustainable, long-lasting printers, for example.
 3.3 The misleading omission
The Article which seems likely to tackle the use of lifespan shortening 
techniques as a consumer problem in an indirect way, seems Article 7 of the 
UCPD: ‘A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual con-
text, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the 
communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer 
needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and 
thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional 
decision that he would not have taken otherwise.’
a) Omission of information
As noted under 3.2 both Article 6 and 7 cover not the use of the lifespan 
shortening technique, but the way the producer deals with informing the con-
sumer about it. Whereas the provision of information should be actively mis-
leading under Article 6, Article 7 explicitly addresses the situation in which pro-
ducers do not inform the consumer about the composition of the product and 
the need for services, parts, replacement or repair. The required omission - again 
- lies more in the nature of the information provided, than in the use of lifespan 
shortening techniques as such. This Article does come into consideration when 
Apple would actually use software updates to slow down the use of the iPhone 
without informing the consumer.
Other than Article 6, Article 7 does not elaborate on the elements that 
the misleading information can be about. It does not mention the composition 
or nature, or benefits of the product, or the need for services, parts, replacement 
or repair. It only refers to ‘material information’. In paragraph 4 it is written what 
material information is in the case of an invitation to purchase, in short summa-
rised: the main characteristics of the product, to an extent appropriate to the 
medium and the product; the identity of the trader, the price, freight, delivery 
charges, arrangements for payment, delivery, performance, the existence of a 
right of cancellation etc.. However, the UCPD does not give a precise definition 
of material information which is to be given about the product for example in the 
later stage of the decision-making process. In paragraph 1 of Article 7, one reads 
that material information is the information that the average consumer needs, 
according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision. 
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This leads to the difficult question whether a consumer would have deci- 
ded otherwise, if he/she would have been informed about the lifespan shortening 
techniques.53 
b) Another transactional decision?
How to assess whether the omission about the use of a lifespan shortening 
technique causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactio- 
nal decision that he would not have taken otherwise? The transactional decision 
of an average consumer is based on numerous factors, such as the price, nature of 
the product, reputation of the producer and so forth. Whether omitted informa-
tion about planned obsolescence influences the transactional decision may differ 
from one case to another.54 To answer the question, it is interesting to understand 
the reasoning in the case in which Volkswagen was fined for unfair commercial 
practices. When Volkswagen was caught using software that altered the settings 
of car-engines in testing environments to meet environmental standards, the 
Dutch Consumer and Market Authority accused the company of using unfair 
commercial practices because the consumers would have taken other transac-
tional decisions if they would have known about the practices. Volkswagen ar-
gued that less than 2% of consumers would make transactional decisions solely 
based on the environmental impact their vehicle would make.55 The Dutch Con-
sumer and Market Authority reasoned that even when environmental impact is 
not a leading cause for consumers to make transactional decisions; it still plays 
53  It is easier if the ‘material information’ as in Article 7(5) is required based on Community law. 
Information requirements established by Community law in relation to commercial communi-
cation are found in sector-specific EU legislation, as the Energy Labelling Directive (Directive 
2010/30/EU), the Eco-design Directive (Directive 2009/125/EC) or the Fuel economy Directive 
(Directive 1999/94/EC). Such information requirements are more specific than the information 
requirements of the UCPD.  
54  The term average consumer, even though the European Court of Justice has defined it as ‘the rea-
sonably informed, reasonably observant, circumspect consumer’ (Directive 2005/29/EC, recital 
18), still remains a very complicated subject. This is demonstrated in the lengthy PhD-thesis of 
DUIVENVOORDE: DUIVENVOORDE, Bram, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive, diss., Amsterdam, Springer International Publishing, 2014. We will 
not go into detail on this term as it would pass the purpose of this article, besides this we are also 
convinced that this term should be carefully assessed with each individual case.
55  HAFNER, Rebecca, WALKER, Ian & VERPLANKEN, Bas, «Image, not environmentalism: A 
qualitative exploration of factors influencing vehicle purchasing decisions», Transportation Re-
search Part A: Policy and Practice, 97, 2017, p. 89-105.
Law & Technology - E.Tec Yearbook
p.027 - p.055
46
a role in the process of transactional decision-making.56 In other words, if infor-
mation about the environmental damage caused by vehicles has the capacity to 
influence a consumer, this information should be regarded as material informa-
tion. The difference we acknowledge though is that based on Directive 1999/94/
EC relating to the availability of consumer information on fuel economy and 
CO2 emissions in respect of the marketing of new passenger cars requires the 
display of a fuel economy label next to all new passenger cars at the point of sale 
containing, in particular, the official data on fuel consumption. This is an exam-
ple of information that is material based on Community law. By analogy of the 
reasoning though, the information about the use of techniques to shorten the 
lifespan of a product has the capacity to influence the decision making of a con-
sumer - he might expect more, given the price, or he might want to search for a 
comparable product which is more expensive but lasts longer - this information 
should be regarded as material information as in Article 7 of the UCPD.57 
Even though WRBKA makes short mention of it, he seems to support 
this viewpoint. When the Commission58 regards the failure to mention the de-
liberate shortening of the lifespan of a product as an unfair commercial practice, 
he specifies that this practice is to be regarded as a misleading omission as in 
Article 7 of the UCPD.59 It is however clear why one of the initiatives discussed 
on both the French and European level is the introduction of a specific labelling 
requirement: an information obligation will lead to the legal fact that an omis-
sion is the omission of material information. It will take away all doubt regarding 
this question. 
c) No prevention of the practice
This route, we find it important to distinguish, will not primarily prevent 
the use of lifespan shortening techniques in consumer goods. It will force pro-
ducers to make consumers aware of the techniques that have been used, but does 
56  CONSUMER AND MARKET AUTHORITY (ACM), Decision on Volkswagen (AG), 
ACM/17/003870, October 18, 2017, par. 87-88, acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/2017-12/
besluit-acm-beboet-volkswagen-ag-voor-oneerlijke-handelspraktijken-2017-12-01.pdf, May 8, 
2018. In general, about the administrative enforcement of legislation by this ACM: TIGELAAR, 
Leonieke, Sanctionering van de informatieplichten uit de Richtlijn consumentenrechten, diss. 
Zutphen, Uitgeverij Paris, 2017, p. 194-196.
57  Judgement of 8 Februari 2017, Carrefour Hypermarchés SAS v ITM Alimentaire International 
SASU, C-562/15, EU:C:2017:95, par. 30.  
58  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission reply to parliamentary questions, questions Nos. 
E-001284/2011, E-002875/2011 and E-004273/2011, europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.
do?reference=E-2011-004273&language=EN, March 23, 2018.
59  WRBKA, Stevan, «Warranty Law in cases of planned obsolescence – The Austrian situation», 
Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2, 2017, p. 67-76.
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not prohibit this practice. It merely makes consumers ‘informed’. The rationale 
- one can imagine - is that consumers are at liberty to compare price, producer, 
characteristics, and so on and decide for themselves whether they support this 
practice because they are free to choose another product. This rationale can be 
ranged behind the suggested labelling-policy that has been discussed as a solu-
tion before. On an individual level, this will strengthen the consumer’s rights, 
process of decision-making and faith in the honesty of a producer. 60 Another 
advantage of using this route, is that an unfair commercial practice such as the 
misleading omission can occur before, during and after the purchase decision, 
so that also updates for phones or products for the internet-of-things which are 
delivered later and cause obsolescence, are governed by it.61 More in particular, 
using the misleading omission could be proven to be most effective as it does 
not involve the extensive interpretation of the general clause that we will address 
in the next section. On the other hand, taking into consideration that planned 
obsolescence is an environmental problem which one wants to ban rather than 
condone upon an information requirement, this route is a weak solution. 
 3.4 The general clause of unfair commercial practice
The fact that one rather wants to stop these practices altogeher, leads to 
the question whether planned obsolescence could be tackled within the realm 
of consumer rights, yet addressing producer behaviour. That is, not on the con-
sumer information side, but on the other - producer -  side of the same relation. 
This is where assessing planned obsolescence in the light of the general clause of 
Article 5 UCPD comes into play, because paragraph 1 states ‘Unfair commercial 
practices shall be prohibited’. 
Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Directive explains that a commercial practice 
shall be unfair if: (a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and 
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour 
with regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it 
is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a commercial practice is 
directed to a particular group of consumers.
The practice described here is a specified tort. The consequence of the un-
fair commercial practice is that the individual consumer may claim the damage 
suffered from the producer if the two conditions are met cumulatively. 
60  STRAETMANS, Gert, «Misleading practices, the consumer information model and consumer 
protection», Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 5, 2016, p. 199-211.
61  TIGELAAR, Leonieke, Sanctionering van de informatieplichten uit de Richtlijn consumenten-
rechten, diss. Zutphen, Uitgeverij Paris, 2017, p. 28-30.




Professional diligence is defined in Article 2 section h of the Directive: 
‘professional diligence’ means the standard of special skill and care which a trader 
may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with 
honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s 
field of activity;
The term professional diligence consists of two elements: the reasonably 
expected standard of (1) special skill and (2) care. 
The reasonably expected standard of special skill refers to the competence 
that is necessary in fulfilling professional duties. The standard rises above the 
competence of an ordinary person. For example, the baker may be expected to 
know how to bake a loaf of bread and the dentist may be expected to be profi-
cient in dentistry. Problematic according to PAVILLON is the question whose 
reasonable expectations are to be regarded as leading, given the fact that reaso- 
nable expectations are not defined in the UCPD.62 Here the ‘average consumer’ 
comes into play (see 3.3.2). With regard to the use of lifespan shortening tech-
niques, one could argue that an average consumer does not expect and should 
not reasonably expect a producer to deliberately make its product bad. We note 
that this rationale can be found in the French legislator’s definition of planned 
obsolescence as ‘fraud’ and not an honest market practice that an average con-
sumer may reasonably expect.
The average standard of care, the second element of professional dili-
gence, can be found in market practices in a certain field of activity or a code of 
conduct. Article 1 (f) specifies a ‘code of conduct’ as ‘an agreement or set of rules 
not imposed by law, regulation or administrative provision of a Member State 
which defines the behaviour of traders who undertake to be bound by the code 
in relation to one or more particular commercial practices or business sectors’. 
Codes of conduct are self-imposed and employed by the majority of producers 
in an industry. A code of conduct can be guiding (see recital 20 of the UCPD), 
but the standard market practice can be hard to define. The dissertation of 
HUISMAN about market ethics, governing the difference between good and bad 
behaviour, shows that ruling values within a firm and within an industry are hard 
to establish. Understanding the weight different personal, industrial and societal 
values have and the influence of the different actors on the production process 
has been subject of sociological studies.63 To understand the commonly shared 
va-lues of several firms in one field of activity is even harder, as was shown in 
62  PAVILLON, Charlotte, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht, diss., Deventer, Kluwer, 
2011, p. 297-302.
63  HUISMAN, Wim, Tussen winst en moraal, diss., ‘s Gravenhage, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2001, 
p. 9-18.
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the ‘Lightbulb conspiracy’. Until today, it is not clear whether the planning of the 
lifespan of lightbulbs was the expression of an unfair - unethical - commercial 
practice, or of the normal - ethical - market practice in which producers search 
for a way to make innovative products financially accessible for the greater pu- 
blic, offering a product of a lower quality for a more affordable price.
To compensate this ‘open norm’, the definition of professional diligence 
was given a more normative direction, mentioning the ‘honest market practice’. 
A practice therefore cannot be seen as ‘in line with professional diligence’ on the 
sole basis that it is endorsed through a detrimental - however commonly used - 
code of conduct. A common market practice that is morally unacceptable (such 
as cartels together lowering the average quality to the detriment of the consu- 
mer) shall not be a ‘fair commercial practice’ merely because all producers ope- 
rate under the same low level of skill and care. This ‘standard level’ therefore 
offers guidance, but cannot provide the standard norm of ‘professional diligence’ 
when it is dishonest.64 In this respect, it is interesting that ABBAMONTE com-
pares professional diligence to the common law concept of ‘duty of care’.65 Also 
TJONG TJIN TAI emphasises that professional diligence consists of duties: ‘Di- 
ligence is therefore a general manner of specifying the actions that a debtor has 
to undertake in the performance of the contract, whereby the precise actions have 
to be determined by the debtor during the performance (possible independently 
without clear instructions from the creditor), taking into account the concrete cir-
cumstances’.66 
HARTLIEF warns for the continuous broadening of duties of care that 
leads to an expansion of tort liability (of which unfair commercial practices are 
a species) moving away from the parties own responsibility to protectionism.67 
Banking, medical treatment, and building law are obvious examples of areas in 
which the duties of care have extended. The rationale at the basis of this exten-
sion of professional liability is, in HARTLIEF’s opinion, that ‘bad luck’ appa- 
rently should not exist anymore. He debates whether this has gone too far and 
whether a consumer should have a heavier duty to inform himself and investi-
gate the product instead.
64  LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATORY COMMENTS (Toelichting), NvW II, Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 
30 928, 10, p. 3.
65  ABBAMONTE, Giuseppe, «The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: An Example of the New 
European Consumer Protection Approach», Columbia Journal of European Law, 3, 2006, p. 695-
712.
66  TJONG TJIN TAI, Eric, «Professional diligence as a standard in European private law», Tilburg 
Private Law Working Paper Series, 1, 2015, ssrn.com/abstract=2565877, May 9, 2018. 
67  HARTLIEF, Ton, «Autonomie en solidariteit. Beweging in het verbintenissenrecht», Weekblad 
voor Privaatrecht en Notarieel Recht, 6564, 2004, p. 106-108.  
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We oppose to this reasoning and believe that it is righteous to make an 
appeal to the duty of care of the producer, which derives from an honest practice. 
Using techniques to shorten the lifespan is usually done secretly and an average 
consumer does not have to expect that producers act like that. When engaging 
in stock exchange HARTLIEF’s argument holds true: a consumer should realize 
he may win or lose. However, when buying a product the planned deterioration 
cannot be called ‘bad luck’ or a ‘risk’ the consumer is bound to take. In support of 
our vision, we note that consumer products are becoming more and more com-
plex especially when software is a component; even the average well-informed 
consumer cannot be expected to fully understand their functioning anymore 
and is surrendered to the goodness of the producer. The skill - which is lacking 
on the side of the consumer - present at the producer’s side causes expectations, 
and the fact that all parties to a contract should take into account the legitimate 
interest of the other party, the fact that the producer is the one who has full in-
fluence over the situation and can reasonably be expected to reduce the chance 
of negative effects, costs of measures etcetera, are reasons to impose on the pro-
ducers this duty.  
The producer that functions on a higher than average level of skill and 
care is professionally diligent.68 
b) Material distortion of the economic behavior of the average consumer
The general clause of Article 5 UCPD requires not only the practice being 
contrary to professional diligence, but also the possible distortion of economic 
behavior of the average consumer.
How to assess whether the omission about the use of a lifespan shortening 
technique causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transac-
tional decision that he would not have taken otherwise? Similarly to the criteria 
concerning the misleading omission with regard to transactional decisions, the 
transactional decision of an average consumer is based on numerous factors, 
including the price, nature of the product, reputation of the producer and so 
forth.69 The reasoning in the Volkswagen-case again forms an answer. When 
Volkswagen argued that less than 2% of consumers would make transactional 
decisions solely based on the environmental impact their vehicle would make70, 
the Dutch Consumer and Market Authority reasoned that even when environ-
68  LEGISLATIVE EXPLANATORY NOTES, (Memorie van Toelichting), Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 
30 928, 3, p. 13.
69  See footnote 53.
70  HAFNER, Rebecca J., WALKER, Ian & VERPLANKEN, Bas, «Image, not environmentalism: A 
qualitative exploration of factors influencing vehicle purchasing decisions», Transportation Re-
search Part A: Policy and Practice, 97, 2017, p. 89-105.
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mental impact is not a leading cause for consumers to make transactional deci-
sions, it does play a role in the process of transactional decision-making. By ana- 
logy, knowing or realising that a producer uses techniques in a product to shor- 
ten the lifespan - one can imagine - has the capacity to influence the decision 
making of a consumer. He might not condone of these practices either and wish 
to search for a comparable product of a producers that produce according to ‘fair 
market practices’. In this respect the Fairtrade-example is relevant. It has been 
shown that consumers pay $1-2 billion a year extra to buy Fairtrade certified 
goods in the belief that the money goes to farmers in third world countries.71 
Fairtrade is a certification brand, assuring the consumer that the product has 
been produced and marketed according to the standards of Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International. There are several ‘ethical’ brands with smaller mar-
ket shares as well72, altogether showing that ethics and fairness in trade are a 
factor on which consumers base their choice of products.73 By analogy one could 
reason that (information about) fairness has the capacity to influence consumer 
decision making. The UCPD does not limit the material distortion test to as-
sessing whether the transactional decision has been distorted, taking into ac-
count the facts and circumstances in concreto. It also requires an assessment as 
to whether a commercial practice is ‘likely’ (i.e. capable) to have such an impact 
on the average consumer in abstracto.74 
Another step is identifying (the expectations of) the average consumer. 
HARTLIEF describes a trend in which the legislator tries to protect a consumer 
who is rather naïve and quickly impressed. He also notes that this kind of pro-
tection does not have any regard for the plurality that exists within the group 
of consumers. Which may lead to the unfair designation of a smaller or lesser 
party in an agreement. Furthermore, the scope of protection is also expanded. 
There are more and more types of contracts that are now subject to consumer 
protection regulations, HARTLIEF mentions travel, time-sharing, medical treat-
71  If one primarily considers wages, there is no difference in fact between certified and non-certified 
plantations. There are differences in terms of in-kind benefits that generate savings for workers. 
Links to several research projects online: wur.nl/en/newsarticle/Is-a-Fairtrade-banana-better-
than-a-regular-banana.htm, April 22, 2018.
72  BALLET, J & CARIMENTRAND, «Fair Trade and the Depersonalization of Ethics», Journal of 
Business Ethics, 92, 2010, p. 317–330.
73  GRIFFITHS, Peter, «Unlawful conduct, ethics and Fairtrade: controlling the public discourse», 
griffithsspeaker.com/Fairtrade/Unlawful%20behaviour%20and%20control%20of%20dis-
course%20Trading%20Standards.docx, April 22, 2018; MOHAN, Sushil, Fair Trade Without the 
Froth - a dispassionate economic analysis of ‘Fair Trade’, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 
2010.
74  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance on the implementation/application of Directive 2005/29/
EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, COM(2016) 320 final, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0163&from=EN, p. 36.
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ment, investing on the stock market, and more.75 His critical assessment of this 
development will continuously be part of the debate in which consumer rights or 
producer obligations are reset. We imagine that within the field of planned obso-
lescence this open norm - ‘the average consumer’ - will be used by producers to 
limit the legitimate lifespan expectancy that a consumer may have; or as Brooks 
STEVENS put it in the 1960s: ‘planned obsolescence results from the consumer’s 
desire to own something a little newer, a little better, a little sooner than is ne- 
cessary’.76 In other words: the average consumer does not expect long lifespans.
c) Prevention?
What will this course of enhanced producer duties, opposed to the 
strengthening of consumer right, lead to? 
Defining planned obsolescence as a practice contrary to professional di- 
ligence that is able to influence economic consumer decisions, has as its conse-
quence that such a practice will be outlawed according to Article 5 paragraph 1 
UCPD. It seems like an understandable choice, because the grounds for liabi- 
lity are present: the liable party is the party that is able to factually control the 
situation and can - for reasons of fraud prevention or environmental sustaina- 
bility - reasonably be expected to act accordingly. The damages occurring from 
the practice can be prevented by the producer. 
Defining the use of lifespan shortening techniques as contrary to profes-
sional diligence, implies in contract law that a producer is no longer allowed to 
use the practice. If he uses it, the consequence in contract law is that a contract 
for the sale of such a product is void. The contracting parties will therefore be 
limited in their autonomy by tort law defining a duty of care and level of skill, or 
as one can also put it: the consumer is freed from being taken advantage of and 
regains his autonomy in the sense that the comparing of prices has become easier 
because a distorting element is taken away. Even though contracting is an area in 
which the parties have considerable liberty and autonomy, some contracts and 
practices are not accepted by the legislator.
This route will - in our view - not necessarily lead to an easier instrument 
for the individual consumer in an individual case, because it can be hard to es-
tablish for the individual what the standard levels of care and skill and profes-
sional diligence are. Here we wish to remind the reader of the thin line between 
making an affordable product and making a misleading product. Secondly, even 
75  HARTLIEF, Ton, «Autonomie en solidariteit. Beweging in het verbintenissenrecht», Weekblad 
voor Privaatrecht en Notarieel Recht, 6564, 2004, p. 106-108.
76  STEVENS, Brooks, «Planned obsolescence - Is it Fair?’», The Rotarian, 1960, p. 12; JONKER, Jan, 
STEGEMAN, Harry & FABER, Niels, De circulaire economie - Denkbeelden, ontwikkelingen en 
business modellen, Nijmegen, Whitepaper, 2016, p. 7-9.
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if the standards are laid down in a code of conduct, an individual consumer 
should still prove that the producer acted contrary to it. The French Code de la 
Consommation shows that no individual used the L441-2 yet, in two years time 
due to this. However, the goal in the case of defining planned obsolescence as an 
unfair commercial practice, is beneficial: the tort route will allow the consumer 
access to redress by means of a claim to compensate him for the damages suf-
fered. One should merely conclude it is proven to not be the most effective in 
individual cases.  
A positive effect of expanding tort liability is that it can have a preventive 
effect. It will force producers to stop such practices. In that sense it could be 
proven to be a more effective way than the misleading omission to go about this 
problem from an environmental perspective, taking into account that planned 
obsolescence is a broader issue which also touches upon the consumer’s interest, 
but not solely. 
The next question, on which we will not elaborate here, is whether the en-
forcement of the prohibition of such practices is to be found only within the realm 
of the private consumer law or whether enforcement needs the active part-taking 
of a governmental institution such as a Consumer or Market Authority that can 
impose fines as well. We think there is a task at hand for consumer authorities 
and would like to mention the French road adopted as an example again. 
Even though elements of the general clause of unfair commercial practice 
are only vaguely defined by the Directive - leading to different Member States 
interpretations in national courts, legal uncertainty and different level playing 
fields within competition law77 -  using this general clause will advance legal 
certainty in the sense that the existing literature and jurisprudence are already 
shaping the contours of professional diligence and care. This provides for clearer 
guidelines for producers than a new provision would. In this respect, guidance 
can be given by the European Commission and European Court of Justice to the 
national Member States authorities and legislators. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The answer to our first question, which problem consumers are facing, 
is clear: products are becoming more and more complex and producers have 
the means to persuade consumers to take transactional decisions. These ways 
vary (1.1-1.2) from marketing - psychological obsolescence - to fraud of which 
Volkswagen’s software that manipulated harmful emissions in a testing environ-
ments is an example. Another way to influence consumer transactional decision 
77  Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v 
Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-304/08, EU:C:2010:12, par. 90.
Law & Technology - E.Tec Yearbook
p.027 - p.055
54
making is - as printer producers and Apple allegedly did - to shorten product 
lifespan. We acknowledged that one can debate this on an ethical level. On the 
one hand there is the thesis that prohibiting the practice will lead to more expen-
sive products and less wealth for poorer people and less choice for consumers. 
Moreover, the thin line between fraudulent planned obsolescence and designing 
an affordable product with a matching quality - i.e. between being fined or not 
- could have a chilling effect on producers. On the other hand there is the an-
tithesis that a prohibition will protect the consumer. The synthesis of thesis and 
antithesis is that tackling planned obsolescence will have positive and negative 
effects for both producers and consumers. We think - together with policyma- 
kers and legislators - that the environmental argument should therefore be deci-
sive, emphasising the necessity to stop planned obsolescence (see 2).
The answer to the question how planned obsolescence can be stopped is 
not easy. The first question we addressed (3.1-3.2) was whether the existing rules 
on unfair commercial practices will suffice. We reached the conclusion that the 
misleading omission (3.3) is an option, combined with the  obligation to inform 
about the composition of the product and the need for services, parts, replace-
ment or repair. Establishing that a consumer would have taken another tran- 
sactional decision if he would have been informed about the lifespan shortening 
techniques, is not a barrier. Even when the composition of the products and the 
use of lifespan shortening techniques are not leading causes for consumers to 
make transactional decisions, they still play a role in the process of transactional 
decision-making. This approach matches the proposal of the EESC about label-
ling products reflecting lifespan compared to the requirements of giving material 
information identified by sector specific regulation on eco-design, energy con-
sumption and CO2-emissions in the car-industry: ‘Labelling is critical when it 
comes to consumers and transparency. However, labelling is not a cure-all, and 
may especially not be the most appropriate tool when dealing with business to 
business products/services.’ The disadvantage of the misleading omission-route 
- besides that it does not cover B2B situations - is that it will not primarily pre-
vent the use of lifespan shortening techniques. It might force producers to make 
consumers aware, as a result of which consumers may choose the ‘fairer’ pro- 
duct. Another disadvantage is that it in fact leaves solving what has become an 
environmental issue to the individual consumer. 
The second option we addressed (3.4) was using the general clause of 
unfair commercial practices to tackle producer behaviour. If we define the use 
of lifespan shortening techniques as being not professionally diligent. The legal 
consequence is that the practice will be forbidden, thus having stronger environ-
mental impact. Legitimate questions in this regard are how far-reaching the pro-
ducers’ duty of care is, and whether extended producer liability under consumer 
law for environmental purposes goes to far? Who are addressee and beneficiary 
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of this new norm? How big is the realm of interests protected by the harmo-
nized unfair commercial practices directive? However, without disregarding the 
aforementioned questions, we suggest that it is righteous to appeal to the duty 
of care of the producer given the fact he has full control and influence over the 
situation. Formerly, extended duties of skill and care were justified by the special 
societal function certain professionals have. Today we see that producer liability 
is extended for environmental purposes within the realm of socially responsible 
entrepreneurship. This is a trend as consumers are becoming more and more 
critical regarding the quality of products, their origin, taking into account sus-
tainability, child labour, fair distribution and climate.78 In this regard, the benefit 
of adopting a very precise rule to tackle planned obsolescence, has to be empha-
sised: it will provide for a legal basis which leaves no doubt as to the expected 
behaviour of producers. Based on such a specific rule not only the consumer or 
a market authority can enforce the norm, but also the company directors can 
be held liable by the supervisory board for example based on the principle of 
legality. A precise rule has to be complied with, however whether directors have 
the duty to pursue the Corporate Social Responsibility goals is not clear.79 Fraud 
is a breach of directors’ duties even if it secures beneficial business.80 Adopting a 
specific rule will make enforcement within a company possible, next to environ-
mental or economic criminal enforcement (lex certa and lex scripta), besides pri-
vate law individual consumer claims and market authority enforcement through 
administrative law.
78  See many research areas within this realm on wur.nl/en/Research-Results/Themes/Socially-re-
sponsible-entrepreneurship.htm.
79  ROTT, Peter, «Directors’ Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility under German Law – Is 
Tort Law Litigation Changing the Picture?», NJCL, 1, 2017, p. 11-27; a breach of these duties 
under company law could gives rise to damage claims by the supervisory board on behalf of the 
company. Based on this, the supervisory board of Volkswagen AG is currently considering to sue 
the directors of Volkswagen AG and Audi for at least negligent omission to prevent ‘Dieselgate’. 
GNIRKE, Kristina, Winterkorn und Stadler droht Millionenforderung, Spiegel online, spiegel.de/
wirtschaft/unternehmen/volkswagen-martin-winterkorn-und-rupert-stadler-droht-millionen-
forderung-a-1141287.html, April 26, 2018, see also: NEMETH, Kristin & MORAIS CARVALHO, 
Jorge, «“Dieselgate” and Consumer Law: Repercussions of the Volkswagen scandal in the Europe-
an Union», European Journal of Consumer and Market Law, 1, 2016, p. 35.
80   HENNING-BODEWIG, Frauke, «Corporate social responsibility, the VW scandal and the UCP 
Directive»,  European Journal of Consumer and Market Law, 5, 2016, p. 153.




THE CREWLINK AND RYANAIR 
CASES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Anabela Susana de Sousa Gonçalves 1 
Abstract: The international employment contract is established in the Brussels I 
Regulation through a system of favourable treatment in relation to the employee, 
party which is considered contractually weaker. This system is characterised, in 
general terms, by the restrictive use of agreements conferring jurisdiction and by 
providing the employee with forums designed according to his procedural posi-
tion, benefiting the employee in relation to the employer. One such forum is the 
court for the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his 
work, which has jurisdiction to decide disputes resulting from an international 
employment contract where the plaintiff is the employee. The concept of the 
place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work has been 
the subject of reflection by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
which has pronounced itself through a broad interpretation that allows the de-
termination of the place that has a more significant connection with the dispute. 
The place where the employee habitually carries out his work can be difficult to 
ascertain in those situations where work is carried out in several Member States, 
so the CJEU has developed an evidence-based method which takes into account 
the factual material present in the case, in order to determine that location. In 
the Crewlink and Ryanair cases, which are now commented, the CJEU returns 
to the legal regime relating to international jurisdiction of the international em-
ployment contract, in two situations involving the work of aircraft crews that 
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because of the large relocation they present, constitute a challenge for the inter-
pretation of the rules foreseen in the Brussels I Regulation.
Keywords: International employment contract; place where the employee habi- 
tually carries out his work; international jurisdiction.
Summary: 1. The Ryanair and Crewlink cases; 2. Brussels I Regulation 3. The 
protection of the employee as the weaker negotiating party 3.1. The choice-of-
court agreements 3.2. International jurisdiction 4. Conclusions
1. The Ryanair and Crewlink cases;
On 17 September 2017, the CJEU decided on the joined cases Sandra 
Nogueira, Victor Perez-Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez-Odogherty, José 
Sanchez-Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (hereinafter referred to as the Crewlink 
case) and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company 
(hereinafter referred to as the Ryanair case)2, which concerned an international 
employment contract.
In the Ryanair case, Moreno Osacar celebrates an employment contract 
in Spain with Ryanair, which is an airline whose headquarters are in Ireland. 
The functions to be performed by Moreno Osacar would correspond to those of 
the cabin crew, including, but not limited to, security, handling, assistance and 
control of passengers, airport boarding duties, on board sales, cleaning of the 
airplane interior and safety checks.
The contract was written in English, containing an agreement conferring 
jurisdiction in favour of the Irish courts and a choice-of-law agreement setting 
the Irish law as the law applicable to the employment contract. The contract also 
indicated that Moreno Osacar’s work would occur in Ireland, since his duties 
were carried out on board Ryanair aircraft registered in Ireland. In the contract, 
the Charleroi airport, in Belgium, was designated as the employee’s home base 
and established that the employee must reside less than one hour away from that 
base, which meant Moreno Osacar had to change his residence to Belgium. 
It should be noted that under the terms of article 17 of the Chicago Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944, in force in all Mem-
ber States, aircraft are nationals of the State in which they are registered, which 
means that the aircraft on board of which Moreno Osacar performed his cabin 
crew duties had Irish nationality. In addition, the need to designate a home base 
for a crew member on the civil aviation employment contracts resulted from 
2  Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José San-
chez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair 
Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Joined cases (C168/16) and 
(C169/16), of 17 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:688.
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Regulation No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonisation of techni-
cal requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation3, as 
amended by Regulation No 1899/2006 of 12 December 20064. The home base 
would be «the location nominated by the operator to the crew member from 
where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of 
duty periods and where, under normal conditions, the operator is not responsi-
ble for the accommodation of the crew member concerned»5.
On 16 June 2011, Moreno Osacar quit and brought proceedings before 
the Belgian courts, based on Belgian law, in order to obtain compensation from 
Ryanair for failure to comply with its obligations under that law. Ryanair contests 
the jurisdiction of Belgian courts to assess the action by invoking the jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of the Irish courts, established in the employment contract. 
It also refers to a number of circumstances which it considers to reveal a close 
connection between the dispute and the Irish courts, as an element of the attri-
bution of jurisdiction to these courts, namely: the electio iuris in favour of Irish 
law; in matters of taxation and social security, Moreno Osacar was subject to Irish 
law; the employment contract was performed on board registered Irish aircraft 
and, therefore, subject to Irish law; although the contract was signed in Spain by 
Moreno Osacar, it was only signed by Ryanair at its seat in Ireland.
It was also apparent from the action that the Charleroi airport was the 
place where Moreno Osacar started and ended his working days, and that it was 
also the place where he had to remain in order to substitute absent crew mem-
bers.
Following an initial decision by the Belgian court, stating the lack of juris-
diction to assess the dispute, the Mons Higher Labour Court, to which Moreno 
Osacar appealed, in light of the doubts raised by the case, suspended the pro-
ceedings and approached the CJEU in order to clarify the doubts regarding the 
international jurisdiction of Belgian courts to assess this labour dispute.
The Crewlink case was attached to the Ryanair case because of the simi-
larities between the two. Again, we have an international employment contract, 
where the work is performed on board an aircraft, namely Ryanair aircraft. Be-
3  Annex III (Common technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable to com-
mercial transportation by aeroplane), subpart Q (Flight and duty time limitations and rest require-
ments), OPS 1.1090, point 3.1.
4  The Annex III to Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 was repealed by Regulation No 216/2008 of 
20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European 
Aviation Safety Agency, under the terms foreseen in article 69.
5  According to OPS 1.1095, point 1.7, of subpart Q, of Annex III, of Regulation No 1899/2006 
of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of 
technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation.
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tween 2009 and 2010, Nogueira and others, of Portuguese, Spanish or Belgian 
nationality, concluded an employment contracts with a company with a seat in 
Ireland – Crewlink. Although the contracts were signed with Crewlink, these em-
ployees would be assigned to serve as cabin crew members on board Ryanair 
aircraft.
The employment contracts, written in English, had a choice-of-law agree-
ment in favour of the Irish law to regulate the contract and an agreement confer-
ring jurisdiction to the Irish courts. It was stipulated in the contract that remu-
neration should be paid to an account in an Irish bank and that the tasks should 
be carried out on board Ryanair aircraft, registered in Ireland, considering the 
employment seat in Ireland. Although the employer could transfer employees to 
another airport, the employees’ home base was the Charleroi airport, in Belgium, 
and employees were required to reside one hour away from the home base.
In 2011, due to dismissal or resignation, the abovementioned employ-
ment contracts are terminated and the employees approach the Belgian labour 
court, claiming the payment of compensation. Following the declaration of 
incompetence by the court of first instance and subsequent appeal, the Mons 
Higher Labour Court addresses the CJEU, once again, with doubts regarding the 
establishment of jurisdiction in this case.
The action reveals that the employees systematically started and ended 
their work day at the Charleroi airport, the home base for the service they per-
formed, and where they waited to substitute potentially absent crew members. 
In addition, it was clear from the employment contracts that the employees were 
required to abide by Ryanair’s aviation security policy, the presence of employees 
at the Charleroi airport at a place shared by Ryanair and Crewlink was proved 
and Ryanair’s exercise of disciplinary power over Crewlink employees, which in-
dicated a work community between employees of both companies.
2. Brussels I Regulation
In the present case, there is a question of international jurisdiction, and 
therefore, it is necessary to call upon the existing regulations on jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In this domain, 
the most recent legal instrument is Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels I bis), which governs international jurisdiction and 
the recognition of foreign decisions, replacing Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I), 
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pursuant to article 806. In turn, the latter replaced the 1968 Brussels Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters between the Member States, adopting its structure and, to a large extent, its 
text. There is an interpretative continuity between these three legal texts, which 
has been adopted by the CJEU, seeing as the most recent legal instruments are an 
update of the previous ones7.
The Brussels I bis Regulation is one of the reference legal instruments 
in the European Union’s (EU) policy of judicial cooperation in civil matters8, 
including the unification of international jurisdiction rules, rules for the recog-
nition of judgments made by the courts of the Member States and for the recog-
nition of authentic instruments drawn up or registered in a Member State and 
court settlements from a Member State. This Regulation repealed the Brussels I 
Regulation (article 80 of Brussels I bis) and is applicable as of 10 January 2015 
(article 81 of Brussels I bis), to legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instru-
ments drawn up or registered or court settlements approved or concluded on 
or after that date. At an earlier date, the Brussels I Regulation shall apply, which 
entered into force on 1 March 2002, pursuant to its own article 76, being deter-
mined, in its own article 66(1), that the Regulation legal framework shall apply 
to legal proceedings instituted or authentic instruments after the entry into force 
thereof. The present case concerns precisely the legal framework relating to the 
employment contract and, in light of its territorial scope, the application of the 
Brussels I Regulation.
The Brussels I Regulation governs civil and commercial matters (article 
1), excluding the issues listed in article 1(1), in fine, and article 1(2): the status 
or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimo-
nial relationship, wills and succession; bankruptcy; social security; arbitration; 
revenue, customs or administrative matters. In addition, the application of the 
6 Regarding the main amendments made by the Brussels I bis Regulation to the previous text, v. 
Gonçalves, Anabela Susana de Sousa, «A Revisão do Regulamento Bruxelas I Relativo à Com-
petência Judiciária, ao Reconhecimento e à Execução de Decisões em Matéria Civil e Comercial», 
in Estudos em Comemoração dos 20 Anos da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, Mário 
Monte et al. (coord.), Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2014, 39-59 ff.
7  In this sense, v. the CJEU rulings: Reisch Montage AG c. Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels Gmbh, 
of 13 July 2006, case C-103/05; Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v. Gisela Weller-Lind-
horst, cit.; Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG (C-585/08) and Hotel 
Alpenhof GesmbH v. Olivier Heller (C-144/09), of 7 December 2010, joined cases C-585/08 and 
C-144/09, consulted on http://eur-lex.europa.eu [27/10/2011].
8  Regarding the policy of judicial cooperation in civil matters, v. Gonçalves, Anabela Susana de 
Sousa, «Cooperação judiciária em matéria civil e Direito Internacional Privado», in Direito da 
União Europeia, Coimbra, Almedina, 2016, 339-391 ff.
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Brussels I Regulation requires that the situation in dispute contains an interna-
tional element, since the Regulation does not apply to purely internal situations9.
In regards to spatial scope, the rules of international jurisdiction of the 
Brussels I Regulation apply in situations where the defendant is domiciled in 
a Member State, pursuant to article 2(1) and 3(1)10. Article 4(1), in fine, how-
ever, exempts certain situations in which the courts of the Member States may 
have jurisdiction, independently of the defendant’s domicile, such as situations 
of exclusive jurisdiction or the existence of agreements conferring jurisdiction 
(articles 22 and 23). In turn, the rules of jurisdiction apply to judgments given by 
the courts of the Member States, within the material scope of Brussels I, pursuant 
to article 32 of the Regulation. The Regulation also applies to the enforceability 
in the Member States of authentic instruments drawn up or registered in ano- 
ther Member State and also enforceable within the Member States in its material 
scope, pursuant to article 57. Finally, it also governs, under the same conditions, 
the enforcement in a Member State of court settlements which have enforceable 
value in the Member State of origin (article 58).
3. The protection of the employee as the weaker negotiating 
party
The general rule of international jurisdiction, establishes in article 2(1) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, confers jurisdiction to the court of the defendant’s 
domicile. In addition to the general rule, the Regulation contains rules of spe-
cial jurisdiction which establishes alternative forums in relation to the general 
rule and which were designed in light of the dispute’s proximity with the court 
(articles 5 to 7), as well as in matters relating to contractual or extra-contractual 
liability, which are inspired by the principle of proximity and are intended to 
safeguard the parties’ legitimate expectations and to promote the sound admi- 
9  This was stated in the Jenard Report and in the Schlosser Report, as well as in a wide range of 
CJEU jurisprudence: JENARD, Paul, «Report on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on juris-
diction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters», OJ C 59, 1979, f. 8; 
SCHLOSSER, Peter, «Report on the Convention of the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on ju-
risdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol 
on its interpretation by the Court of Justice», OJ C 59, 1979, 81 f.; CJEU, Andrew Owusu v N. B. 
Jackson, trading as «Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas», Case C-281/02, of 1.3.2005, § 25, still concer- 
ning the Brussels Convention, among others.
10  It also results from the argument 8 of Brussels I Regulation.
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nistration of justice11. However, the rules of international jurisdiction, establishes 
in the Regulation that seeks to protect the weakest negotiating party, have pri-
ority.
The Brussels I Regulation has a set of rules of international jurisdiction 
aimed at protecting the weaker party in the legal relationship, which is charac-
terised by an increase in the number of forums to which the weaker party may 
resort, compared to the counterparty, which is limited practically to the court 
of the defendant’s domicile, establishing some norms, including a forum actoris, 
and setting more rigorous requirements for the valid conclusion of a choice-of-
court agreements. This list includes the rules of jurisdiction relating to the insur-
ance contract, the consumer contract and the employment contract12.
Originally, in the Brussels Convention, the employment contract did not 
have this protective treatment in relation to one of the parties, which was only 
introduced in Convention 89/535/EEC13 in the then article 5(1), 2nd part. Subse-
quently, the Brussels I Regulation introduces into the legal regime of the employ-
ment contract, a treatment similar to consumer and insurance contracts, both on 
11  Regarding the rules of special jurisdiction and the justification of the forums in question, v., v.g., 
Carbone, Sérgio, Il nouvo sapazio giudiziario dalla Convenzione di Bruxelles al Regolamento CE 
44/2001, 4th Ed., Torino, G. Giappichelli Editore, 2002, 81 ff.; Real, Manuel Desantes, 1986, La 
Competencia Judicial en la Comunidad Europea, Barcelona, Bosch, 1986, 287 ff.; Droz, Georges A. 
L., La compétence judiciaire et l´effet des jugements dans la communauté économique européenne 
selon la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968, Université de Droit, d’Economie et des 
Sciences Sociales Oaris II, Paris, 1971, 71 ff.; Gaudemet-Tallon, Hélène, Compétence et Exé-
cution des Jugements en Europe, Matières Civiles et commerciale, 5th Ed., L.G.D.J., Issy-les-Mou-
lineaux, 2015, 195-340 ff.; SALERNO, Francesco, 2006, Giurisdizione ed efficacia delle decisioni 
straniere nel regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 (La revisione della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968), 3rd 
Ed., Cedam, 2006, 154-155 ff.; Sousa, Miguel Teixeira de, Vicente, Dário Moura, Comentário à 
Convenção de Bruxelas, Lex, Lisbon, 1994, 93-94 ff.
12  Regarding these rules aimed at protecting the weaker party, v., v.g., HEISS, Helmut, «Jurisdic-
tion in matters relating to insurance», in Brussels I Regulation, Ulrich Magnus, Peter Mankowski 
(coord.), 2nd Ed., Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 331-362 ff.; NIELSON, Peter 
Arnt, «Jurisdiction over consumer contracts», in Brussels I Regulation, Ulrich Magnus – Peter 
Mankowski (Coord.), 2nd Ed., Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 363-391 ff.; Es-
plugues Mota, Carlos, Palao Moreno, Guillermo, 2012 «Jurisdiction over individual contracts 
of employment», in Brussels I Regulation, Ulrich Magnus – Peter Mankowski (Coord.), 2nd Ed., 
Munich, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 391-412 ff.; PINHEIRO, Luís de Lima, Direito 
Internacional Privado, Competência Internacional e Reconhecimento de Decisões Estrangeiras, Vol. 
III, 2nd Ed., Coimbra, Almedina, 2012, 136-164 ff.; STONE, Peter, EU Private International Law, 
Harmonization of Laws, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham – UK, 2008, 113-132 ff.
13  Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the Convention 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol 
on its interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to them by the Convention 
on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Hel-
lenic Republic, published in OJ L 285, 3.10.1989, 1-98 ff.
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the systematic plan, for its treatment in an autonomous section, and by clearly 
assuming the need for a more favourable treatment for the weaker contractual 
party (argument 13). This legislative option is maintained in the current Brussels 
I bis Regulation, which is assumed in Recital 18 that establishes the need for 
more favourable rules of international jurisdiction for the weaker negotiating 
party.
The view of the employee as the weaker contractual party results from the 
configuration of the legal employment relationship itself, since it implies a situa-
tion of legal subordination in «(...) in which one person is constituted before the 
other (the employer), and that it is analysed within the existence of a duty of obe-
dience towards him and in the acceptance of a disciplinary power to be exercised 
by him.»14 Due to the situation of legal subordination, because it is a contract 
of indefinite duration that is being determined in a phased manner according 
to the employer’s orders, to which the employee is subjected, the employee is 
considered to be the weaker negotiating party in several legal systems. This «(...) 
led legislation to attempt to compensate the unfavourable starting situation by 
means of an employment relationship regime which, by treating both parties of 
the relationship unequally, would compensate the imbalance in which the em-
ployee finds himself/herself initially»15. This attempt by the legislator to reba- 
lance the legal relationship, through a more favourable treatment to the weaker 
negotiating party, was also verified in the legal regime of international employ-
ment contract: both regarding the scope of the rules of international jurisdiction; 
and in the scope of conflict of laws, initially in article 6 of the Rome Convention 
of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and, more recently, in 
article 8 of Regulation No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).
The legal regime of the international employment contract is found in 
section V of the Brussels I Regulation, where the rules of international jurisdic-
tion that are more favourable to the employee can be found16. It was the inter-
pretation of the rules contained therein which led to CJEU’s preliminary ruling 
by the Belgian courts.
14  RAMOS, RUI MOURA, Da Lei Aplicável ao Contrato de Trabalho Internacional, Coimbra, 
Almedina, 1991, 723 f. (author’s translation).
15  Idem, ibidem, 725 f. (author’s translation).
16  Among others, v. CJEU, Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, case C154/11, 
of 19 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:491, § 44; idem, Glaxosmithkline, Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v 
Jean-Pierre Rouard, case C462/06, of 22 May 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:299, § 17; Sandra Nogueira, 
Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink 
Ireland Ltd  (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, 
formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 49.
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Before proceeding, clarification should be given regarding the interpre-
tation of the rules foreseen in the Regulation, taking into account CJEU indica-
tions.
Conflict of laws, rules of international jurisdiction and rules on recog-
nition have a complementary connection among themselves when it comes to 
regulating private international issues, which is evident in the European Union 
various legal acts which address this matter. This complementarity results from 
the identity of objectives between the rules in question, from rationality and the 
systematic functioning of the EU legal order, which argue in favour of an au-
tonomous interpretation in relation to the Member States’ national laws, as well 
as an articulated interpretation between legislative acts in the scope of judicial 
cooperation17.
The CJEU has stated its position through an autonomous interpretation 
of the concepts, both in the Brussels Convention and in the Brussels I Regula-
tion, taking into account their respective spirit, objectives and principles, as a 
means of ensuring the consistent application of those instruments18, and is reaf-
firmed in the case being commented at the moment19.
The articulated interpretation is acknowledged, on the one hand, in the 
preamble of various legal acts, such as Recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation, which 
emphasises the need to apply the rules established in that Regulation, pursuant 
to the rules of the Brussels I Regulation, taking into account the need for joint 
implementation of both and the sharing of common objectives. This articulated 
interpretation between the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation 
with the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation has already been stated, 
17  Regarding this autonomous and articulated interpretation, v. Gonçalves, Anabela Susana de 
Sousa, «Cooperação judiciária em matéria civil e Direito Internacional Privado», in Direito da 
União Europeia, Almedina, Coimbra, 2016, 330-291 ff.
18  V., v.g., Rulings (CJEU), LTU Lufttransportunternehmen Gmbh & Co. KG v Eurocontrol, of 
14 October 1976, case 29/76; État néerlandais c. Reinhold Rüffer, of 16 December 1980, case 
814/76; Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl, of 3 July 1997, case C-269/95; Roche Nederland 
BV and others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, of 13 July 2003, case C-539/03; Ge-
sellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, of 
13 July 2006, case C-4/03; and Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lind-
horst, of 23 April 2009, case C-533/07.
19  Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José San-
chez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair 
Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 47.
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on several occasions, by the CJEU20 and is once again emphasised in the case 
commented21.
3.1. The choice-of-court agreements
The protection of the weaker party in the employment contract is verified, 
from the start, in relation to the choice-of-court agreements.
The possibility of the parties celebrating an agreement conferring juris-
diction results from the recognition of the principle of party autonomy in this 
domain and the interests of the contracting parties. The reasons that may deter-
mine the author’s translation s may be of a diverse nature and include the ease 
in determining the competent jurisdiction in the event of a dispute, increasing 
the procedural speed in resolving the dispute; the need to produce evidence 
and proximity to the possible dispute; the possibility of coincidence forum-ius, 
choosing the court according to the applicable law, with advantages in the sound 
administration of justice; the ease in recognising and executing the decision; the 
concentration of related disputes in the courts of the same State, with the con-
sequent reduction of costs. Thus, in addition to the recognition of the sphere 
of freedom of the contracting parties, the choice-of-court agreements allow for 
certainty, security and predictability in relation to the competent court, reducing 
tactic delays regarding court jurisdiction22, with gains in the swift resolution of 
the dispute.
The protection of the weaker party is expressed in the context of the 
choice-of-court agreements, since there was a concern that resorting to them 
could not undermine the protection conferred to the weaker contracting party. 
Therefore, certain cautions can be found in the Brussels I Regulation, in order to 
20  CJEU ruling, Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, case C-29/10, of 15 
March 2011, consulted in http://eur-lex.europa.eu [27/10/2011]; CJEU, Peter Pammer v Ree-
derei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG (C-585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Olivier Heller 
(C-144/09), cit.; CJEU, Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA, case C-384/10, of 15 December 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:842.
21  CJEU, Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José 
Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair 
Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 47.
22  Note, as referred by Ulrich MAGNUS, «Art. 23» in Brussels I Regulation, Ed. Ulrich Magnus/
Peter Mankowski, 2nd Revised Edition, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 444 f., a choice-
of-court agreement shall not prevent a court from examining its jurisdiction when one of the 
parties, in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, proposes to take action in that court.
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prevent the stronger contracting party from manipulating the formation of will 
and the consent of its co-contractor23.
In these terms, and pursuant to article 21 of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
rules of jurisdiction foreseen in the Regulation can only be derogated by agree-
ments conferring jurisdiction in two situations.
The first is established in article 21(1) and consists in the fact that the 
choice-of-court agreements are subsequent to dispute. Once the dispute has ari-
sen, it is considered that the employee is already aware of the interests and rights 
he is entitled to, and his consent to an agreement conferring jurisdiction can be 
presumed to be conscious and in his interest.
The second situation is foreseen in article 21(2), which establishes the 
possibility that the agreement conferring jurisdiction can be established at a time 
prior to the dispute, as long as it allows the extension of the range of jurisdictions 
to which the employee can resort to, in addition to those indicated by the rules of 
the Regulation. In the latter case, the increase in the number of courts to which 
the employee, as the plaintiff, can resort to is considered to be of his benefit. It 
should be noted that, in this second situation, the forums resulting from the 
choice-of-court agreements are added to those resulting from articles 18 and 19 
of the Regulation, not excluding the jurisdiction of the latter, as already stated by 
the CJEU24. Taking into account the protective purpose of article 21, it concludes 
that even if there is a choice-of-court agreement, the employee may ignore its 
content and resort to the courts resulting from articles 18 and 1925.
The clause conferring jurisdiction to the Irish courts was the result of the 
employment contract and had been stipulated before the dispute arose. Thus, it 
would have to respect article 21(2), and would only be substantially valid if the 
list of courts to which the employee could bring proceedings in the event of a dis-
pute with the employer was extended. What happened in the case was precisely 
the opposite. The jurisdiction clause was restrictive and limited the employees’ 
possibilities of appealing to courts besides the Irish ones, in breach of the pro-
visions of article 21(2). In this sense, and according to the best interpretation, 
the choice-of-court agreement was considered not applicable to the employees26.
23  V. Ramos, Rui Manuel Moura, «Remarques sur les développements récents du droit international 
privé portugais en matière de protection des consommateurs», in Estudos de Direito Internacio-
nal Privado e de Direito Processual Civil Internacional, Coimbra Editora, 2002, 33 f.
24  CJEU, Ahmed Mahamdia v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Case C-154/11, of 19 July 
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:491, § 62.
25  Idem, ibidem, §63.
26  CJEU, Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José 
Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair 
Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 54.




The Brussels I Regulation determines rules of international jurisdiction 
for the individual employment contract, which establishes a procedurally fa-
vourable treatment for the employee, as results from Recital 13 of the Regulation.
Pursuant to article 19, an employer domiciled in a Member State may be 
sued by the employee: in the courts where the employer is domiciled (1); or in 
the Member State in which the employee habitually carries out his work or in 
the courts for the last place where he did so (2)(a)]; or in the Member State in 
the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or 
was situated, if the employee does or did not habitually carry out his work in any 
one country (2)(b)]. In turn, the employer may bring proceedings against the 
employee only in the courts of the Member State in which the employee is domi-
ciled (article 20). An analysis of the listed rules shows that there is a difference in 
the tools available to each one of the contracting parties, seeing as the employee 
has several courts to choose from, and the employer is already sentenced to the 
courts of the Member State where the employee is domiciled.
It is precisely the interpretation of the rule set in article 19(2)(a) which 
justified the reference for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian court, and the ques-
tion was referred to the CJEU, if the habitual place of performance of the em-
ployment contract could be equated with the concept of home base established 
in Regulation No 3922/91 as «the location nominated by the operator to the crew 
member from where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or 
a series of duty periods and where, under normal conditions, the operator is not 
responsible for the accommodation of the crew member concerned»27.
 First of all, it is important to look at the interpretation made by the 
CJEU in relation to the concept place where the employee habitually carries out 
his work. This concept is also used as a subsidiary connecting factor in the con-
flict-of-laws rule concerning the international employment contract. In the ab-
sence of a chosen law, the law of the country where the employment contract is 
habitually carried out (lex loci laboris) will be applied, pursuant to article 6(2)(a) 
of the Rome Convention and article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation. Therefore, it 
is also, pursuant to article 6(1) of the Rome Convention and article 8(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation, the law that establishes the standard for the employee pro-
tection, since the law chosen by the parties will be rejected if the mandatory rules 
of the subsidiary applicable law are more protective of the employee. 
27  According to OPS 1.1095, point 1.7, of subpart Q, of Annex III, of Regulation No 1899/2006 
of 12 December 2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of 
technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation.
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The advantages resulting from this connection in determining the appli-
cable law are several. First of all, the subordination of all the employer’s employ-
ees who work in the same place to a similar legal framework, which is beneficial 
to the employer in terms of organisation and management of his human resour- 
ces28. In addition, the economic and social consequences of work have a primary 
impact on the country in which the work is carried out, which will be interested 
in having the rules governing these working conditions applied and subjecting 
those working in its territory to the same legal regime. This means the employee 
will have some information about the law applicable, right from the start, thanks 
to the activity of the unions representing the employees. In addition, the place 
where work is carried out represents the centre of gravity of the employment 
contract, presenting advantages over other possible connecting factors29. The Eu-
ropean Union interest also justifies the adoption of this connection: to those who 
work within the EU territory, the labour law in force in Europe will be applied, 
originating mainly from the EU and done to facilitate the free movement of 
workers within the EU (article 45 TFEU), to assist freedom of establishment (ar-
ticle 49 TFEU) and to reduce the competitive advantages between States based 
on their labour legislation.
Now, article 19(2)(a), adopts the same jurisdiction factor to the inter-
national employment contract, achieving the coincidence forum-ius, which is 
justified for several reasons. The legal regulation of the employment contract is 
constituted by a set of internal rules, some of public nature, imperative, some 
belonging to the public policy of the forum State and others assuming the na-
ture of overriding mandatory provisions. The nature of these provisions aim to 
assign certain rights to the employee, based on the principle of favor laboris. 
Consequently, there is also interest in the territorial application of these laws 
regarding working conditions, working hours, holidays, among others, for rea-
sons of peace and social stability. All employees who perform their work in the 
same State should benefit from the protective status granted by that State to the 
28  In this sense, among others, corrao, Maria Ersilia, «I Rapporti di Lavoro nella Convenzione Eu-
ropea sulla Legge Applicabile alle Obbligazioni Contrattuali», RDIPP, Anno XX, 1984, pp. 104-
105; siMon-dePitre, Marthe, «Travail», in Répertoire de Droit International, Dalloz, direction Ph 
Francescakis, T. II, 1969, 970 f.; villani, Ugo, La Convenzione di Roma Sulla Legge Applicabile 
ai Contratti, Bari, Cacucci Editore, 1997, 159 f.
29  V. the comparison made in relation to nationality or residence done by raMos, Rui Moura, Da 
Lei Aplicável ao Contrato Individual de Trabalho, Da Lei Aplicável ao Contrato de Trabalho 
Internacional, Coimbra, Almedina, 1991, 910 f.
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employee, so traditionally, many of these standards have territorial application30. 
This is because there are rules that assign rights to the employee in relation to his 
employer; others assign rights to the employee according to the State in which 
he performs his employment contract. Therefore, the coincidence forum/ius al-
lows the avoidance of problems inherent to the extraterritorial application of 
standards of labour law. From this coincidence forum/ius will also result a sound 
administration of justice, seeing as the competent court will apply the forum law, 
the one it knows best, which facilitates the determination of its content, reduces 
situations of judicial error, with gains also in the realm of speed in the resolution 
of the dispute.
In addition, the court of the place where the employee habitually carries 
out his work will be the court closest to the labour dispute, which makes it easier 
to produce evidence. Furthermore, it is also considered that this jurisdiction al-
lows the employee to bring proceedings against the employer or defend himself 
with less costs associated31, which is a reasonable argument, taking into account 
those situations where the employee is domiciled in the country where the em-
ployment contract is performed or the legal support that can be given to the 
employee working in a certain territory by the unions established there. 
As already pointed out, it is necessary to refer to the content of the con-
cept place where the employee habitually carries out his work through an articu-
lated interpretation between the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regula-
tion with the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation32.
According to the CJEU case law, the notion of place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work must be interpreted broadly, taking into account 
30  V. on GaMillscheG, Franz, «Labour Contracts», IECL, vol. III, 3 ff.; KnaPP, Blaise, «La protec-
tion des travailleurs des sociétés membres du groupe», in Colloque International sur le Droit 
International Privé des Groupes de Sociétés, org. Le centre d´Études Juridiques Européennes de 
la Faculté de Droit de Genève, Genève, May 1974, 151 ff.; KnaPP, Felice Morgenstern-Blaise, 
«Multinational Enterprises and Extraterritorial Application of Labour Law», ICLQ, vol. 27, 1978, 
774 ff. 
31  CJEU, Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd., case C-37/00, of 27 February 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:122, § 49; idem, Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd. Rutten, Case 
C-383/95, of 9 January 1997, § 22 and 24; idem, Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie 
Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), 
and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd 
(C169/16), Cit., § 58.
32  CJEU, Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Cit., § 33; idem, Jan Voogs-
geerd v Navimer SA, Cit.; idem, Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria 
Sanchez Odogherty, José Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José 
Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 
56.
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the factors characterising the employee’s activity33, and the court of the habitual 
place of work maintains jurisdiction, even when the work is carried out in se- 
veral States «(...) if it is possible, for the court seised, to determine the State with 
which the work has a significant connection (...)»34. In this interpretation, the 
principle of proximity emerges to help determine the concept of habitual place of 
work, extending its scope, in order to determine the place that has a more signi- 
ficant connection to the dispute, avoiding the proliferation of competent courts35.
The place where the employment contract is normally performed is 
where the employee actually carries out his activities, which can be difficult to 
determine in those situations where work is carried out in several States, and 
it is necessary to refer to the CJEU case law to determine the applicable law. 
In the Rutten decision, the CJEU found, in a case where the employee worked 
in several countries, that the habitual place of work is to be interpreted as the 
place where the employee establishes «(...) [the] effective centre of professio- 
nal activities from which an employee performs the essential part of his duties 
vis-à-vis his employer»36. In order to determine the place from which the em-
ployee fulfils the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer, in that de-
cision, the CJEU tested a set of factors that would help the judge establish that 
place, taking into account the circumstances of that specific case, such as: the 
State where the employee spends most of his working time; where his office is 
located; where he plan his professional activity; the place where he returns after 
33 And restrictive interpretation of article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, which determines the 
subsidiary application of the law of the place of business which engaged the employee is situated, 
if it is not possible to lex loci laboris: «Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg», 
cit., § 47. A broad interpretation of article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention, and the restrictive 
interpretation of paragraph b of the same rule was subsequently reaffirmed by the CJEU: «Jan 
Voogsgeerd v. Navimer SA», cit., § 35; «Anton Schlecker v. Melitta Josefa Boedeker», cit., § 31.
34  «Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg», cit., § 43.
35  CJEU, Herbert Weber, Cit., § 49; idem, Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten, Cit., § 22 and 24; idem, Sandra 
Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José Sanchez Na-
varro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated 
Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 58.
36  «Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd», case C-383/95, 09.01.1997, CJ 1997, I-57 f., 
§ 27. In the previous ruling «Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels», case C152/92, 13.07.1993, CJ 
1993, I-4075 f., § 24, the CJEU stated that when work is performed in more than one State, the 
place where or from which the employee primarily fulfils his duties vis-à-vis his employer would 
be relevant. This notion has been affirmed by the CJEU in other cases: v.g., «Herbert Weber v 
Universal Ogden Services Ltd», case C-37/00, 27.02.2002, CJ 2002, p. I-02013, §44; «Heiko 
Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg», cit., § 39, in which the CJEU specifically 
analyses the conflict rule in article 6 of the RC; «Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA», case C-384/10, 
15.12.2001, CJ 2011, 00000 f., §41 also regarding article 6 of the Rome Convention.
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each business trip abroad37. The option of using a factor-based method for deter-
mining the place of habitual performance of the employment contract was also 
used in the case of Heiko Koelzch, which concerned an employment contract 
related to an international transport activity. In this case, the CJEU listed as fac-
tors to consider: the place from which the employee carried out his transport 
tasks; from which he received instructions concerning his tasks and where his 
work was organised; the place where his work tools were situated; the places 
where transport was usually carried out; the places where the goods were loaded 
and unloaded; the place where the employee returned after completion of his 
tasks38. As is apparent from the cited case law, the factors to be considered vary 
according to the activity in question and the factors which characterise it39. If the 
employee does not have an office which can constitute the effective centre of his 
professional activities (in the sense of the place where the essential part of his 
duties vis-à-vis his employer is fulfilled), the habitual place of work will be the 
place where the employee has completed most of his working time, according to 
the Weber case40 or the place where the employee carries out most of his tasks, as 
stated in the Heiko Koelzch case41. This factor-based method is assumed by the 
CJEU as able to reflect the underlying contractual legal relationship and the set 
of elements that characterises the place where the work is carried out, preventing 
«(...) a concept such as that of ‘place where, or from which, the employee habitu-
ally performs his work’ from being exploited or contributing to the achievement 
of circumvention strategies»42. 
37  «Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd», Cit., § 27. This evidence also stemmed from 
the Mulox IBC ruling where it was suggested that the location of the employee’s office in a 
contracting State where he had established his residence and from which he performed his work 
and to where he returned after each business trip should be taken into account, as a criterion for 
determining where the employee habitually carries out his work: «Mulox IBC Ltd v. Hendrick 
Geels», cit., § 26.
38  «Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg», cit., § 49.
39  Idem, ibidem, § 50.
40  «Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services Ltd», cit., § 50. It concerned an employee who 
worked as a cook for the same employer in several places, and the CJEU chose to give relevance 
to a temporal criterion based on the relative duration of periods of time spent working in the va- 
rious States, is that «(…) all of an employee’s term of employment must be taken into account 
in establishing the place where he carries out the most significant part of his work and where, 
in such a case, his contractual relationship with his employer is centred»: idem, ibidem, § 52. 
However, this temporal criterion which implies considering the entire duration of the employment 
relationship is dependent on the consideration of the circumstances surrounding the specific case: 
idem, ibidem, § 53.
41  «Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg», cit., § 45.
42  CJEU, Sandra Nogueira, Victor Perez Ortega, Virginie Mauguit, Maria Sanchez Odogherty, José 
Sanchez Navarro v Crewlink Ireland Ltd (C168/16), and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair 
Designated Activity Company, formerly Ryanair Ltd (C169/16), Cit., § 62.
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The application of the factor-based method in the present case would 
imply the determination of the place from which the employee carried out his 
transport-related tasks; received instructions concerning his tasks and organised 
his work; the place where his work tools were to be found; where the aircraft 
aboard which the work was habitually performed were stationed43. The CJEU 
refuses to connect the concept of place where the employee habitually carries out 
his work for the purposes of the Brussels I Regulation to the concept of the home 
base, pursuant to Regulation No 3922/91, since both instruments have different 
objectives, with the latter focusing on technical and administrative harmonisa-
tion in the safety field44.
Nonetheless, the CJEU acknowledged that the concept of the home base 
would be relevant in the application of the factor-based method, in order to 
determine the concept of the place where the employee habitually carries out 
his work, seeing as the home base allows the identification of the place from 
which the employee carried out his work, since that concept refers to the place 
where the employee normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty 
periods, the place where the employee organizes his daily work, where he is at 
the disposal of the employer, having to reside in a place nearby for that reason, 
being determined by the air carrier, within the scope of its power of direction45. 
The concept of the home base would therefore be a significant indication for the 
determination of the place where the employee habitually carries out his work.
It should be noted, however, that the CJEU admitted that, as a result of 
the application of the factor-based method to the specific case being assessed by 
the judge, the factual elements may present closer connections with a place other 
than the home base, constituting this other place as the one from which employ-
ees habitually carries out his work46.
In addition, in order to determine the place from which employees ha-
bitually carries out his work, the CJEU devalued the Member State of the na-
tionality of the airline aircrafts47, which seems to be a correct option because the 
aircraft’s nationality can be easily manipulated by the airline in its favour, since, 
pursuant to article 17 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
aircraft are nationals of the State in which they are registered.  The airline can 
more easily manipulate the place of registration, in order to influence the acqui-
sition of a nationality for the aircraft that is more favourable to it so, if this ele-
43  Idem, ibidem, § 64.
44  Idem, ibidem, § 66.
45  Idem, ibidem, § 70-71.
46  Idem, ibidem, § 72.
47  Idem, ibidem, § 75.
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ment had relevance for determining the law of the place of habitual performance 
of the employment contract, the employer could easily exploit this element in 
order to achieve a more favourable position in the resolution of labour disputes. 
Thus, the main objective of article 19 of the Brussels I Regulation would be un-
successful, which is the protection of the employee as the weaker party, and the 
broader interpretation of the concept of place where the employee habitually 
carries out his work, which is the resolution of the labour dispute by a court close 
to the employment relationship.
4. Conclusions
In the Crewlink and Ryanair cases, the CJEU returns to the legal frame-
work regarding international jurisdiction of the international employment con-
tract, in two situations involving the work of crew members on board of aircrafts, 
which because of the large relocation they present, constitute a challenge for the 
interpretation of the provisions set in the Brussels I Regulation.
The first question to be answered concerned the material validity of a 
choice-of-court agreement established in the employment contract and which 
limited the jurisdiction of any disputes which could arise from that contract to 
the Irish courts. Having been previously agreed upon before the dispute arose, 
this agreement conferring jurisdiction would only be valid if it extended the list 
of courts to which the employee could bring proceedings in the event of a dis-
pute with the employer, pursuant to article 21(2), which did not occur in this 
specific case.
In view of the invalidity of the jurisdiction clause, the second question to 
be answered would be the competent court to judge the dispute, and there is a 
doubt regarding the interpretation of article 19(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, 
which establishes the jurisdiction of the court as the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work. The referring court questioned the CJEU whe-
ther the place where the employee habitually carries out his work could be trea- 
ted in the same way as the concept of the home base set in Regulation No 3922/91.
According to the CJEU case law, the concept of habitual place of work 
must be interpreted broadly, taking into account the factors which characte- 
rise the employee’s activity, maintaining the jurisdiction factor habitual place of 
work, even when it occurs in several States, provided that it is possible to deter-
mine to which State does the work present a more significant connection. To 
this end, and in situations where work is carried out in several States, as was the 
case in the cases analysed, the CJEU developed a factor-based method where the 
court uses a set of factual evidence, to be applied according to the circumstances 
of the specific case, in order to determine the habitual place of work. It was this 
method that the CJEU re-affirmed in the Crewlink and Ryanair cases and that 
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has proved to be an effective method in determining the habitual place of work in 
the more delocalised international employment contracts, such as those involved 
in the cases assessed. Although the CJEU refused to automatically assimilate the 
concept of habitual place of work to the home base, it considered that this would 
be a significant evidence of that place and, consequently, the competent inter-
national jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. In addition, in order to establish the 
competent court, it devalued elements which can be easily exploited by the em-
ployer to achieve a more favourable position in the resolution of labour disputes, 
which seems to be a consistent interpretation with the objective of protecting 
the weaker negotiating party within the regime of the international employment 
contract, established in the Brussels I Regulation.





TRANSPARENCY, COSTS AND 
PROCESS PENDENCY REDUCTION 
ENHANCING TRUST IN JUSTICE 
Irene Portela1, Miguel Matos2
Abstract: The Portuguese Justice Ministry has made a remarkable effort in in-
formation, communication, and transparency as far as the procedural data is 
concerned. Despite the profound digital reforms promoted in the last five years, 
the OECD reports keep indicating weaknesses in the functioning of the judicial 
system. The time spent to solve civil, commercial and other cases, and the rate 
of the unsolved cases in civil and commercial courts (per 100 inhabitants) in 
Portugal continues to be in the final places on the ranking of European countries. 
The most distressing obstacles that prevail over the final results of the process 
at court are their cost and duration, with effects that can be devastating. Among 
all the damages that may result from the delay in obtaining the result sought 
through the process is the deny of the effectiveness of the judicial protection. 
Exemption demonstrates the unacceptability of the injury suffered by the party 
who, even winning, cannot practically enjoy the result of the process, due to 
the irremediable loss of his right, resulting from the delay in the jurisdictional 
rendering. The TESTOR project consists of improving legal certainty, expedi-
tious dispute resolution, costs reduction, and flow pending. The objective is to 
simplify the production of evidence in advance to be used for legal purposes. 
For that, the evidence (any type of digital document/file) is digitally signed by 
1  Polytechnic Institute of Cávado and Ave, Barcelos, Portugal, iportela@ipca.pt.
2  Minho University, Portugal.
78
all the stakeholders (include a solicitor) and submitted to an online platform that 
creates a proof of evidence, stores and manages permissions access to the evi-
dence. The material facts must be proven and this activity is crucial to establish 
the proof of value - the value of what is provable.  
Keywords: proof of evidence, archive, digital signatures 
Summary: 1. Introduction 2. Proof of Concept 3. Related Work 4. Project 4.1. 
Architecture 5. Future Work
1. Introduction
The Portuguese Justice Ministry with a presentation of the “Plano de 
Ação Justiça + Próxima” [Plane of Action + Close Justice] wants to mark the 
founding moment of the changes that the Government intends to introduce in 
the area of justice3 .
Article 38, number 1, of the Decree-Law No. 76-A/2006, of 29 March, 
comes to assign responsibilities to solicitors performing “simple recognition and 
special mentions, in person and by similarity, authenticate private documents 
and certify translations of documents pursuant to notarial law.” The same article, 
under number 2, confers probative force to acts of recognition, endorsements, 
and certifications held by solicitors, since, as explained in article 38 number 3, is 
carried out by registration in the computer system4.
In this context, the Ordem dos Solicitadores e dos Agentes de Execução 
(OSAE) - the Portuguese Chamber of Solicitors -, has developed an application 
of “Online Register of Solicitors” called ROAS5 , which allows these professionals, 
the registration of acts of recognition, authentication and certification, through 
platform authentication for a user/password authentication mechanism assigned 
by the Chamber of Solicitors. 
The legality and certification of documents deposited in the ROAS are en-
sured by the use of paper-based Authentication seals sticker (vignettes/number 
of vignette), which are issued to each solicitor and sent to the solicitor’s profes-
sional domicile, by registered letter. 
In accordance with the provisions of the “Regulamento de Publicidade 
e Imagem dos Solicitadores e Agentes de Execução” (Regulation 786/2010), the 
3  MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA, Plano de Ação + Justiça. https://publicacoes.mj.pt/. [Online; ac-
cessed 2-May-2018].
4  Decreto Lei nº 76-A/2006, Diário da República nº 63/2006, 1º Suplemento,  Série I-A, de 2006-
03-29. 
5  https://www.solicitador.org/roas2/login.jsp
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authentication of documents composed of more than one page, is performed 
using a single seal, placed on a staple that unites the pages in the document. In 
the authentication process, the solicitor must also sign or initial the seal, put-
ting the date on which the signing or initialing was affixed. This procedure turns 
“private” document in a “particular authenticated” document, but does not have 
the force of “public document” as for example with the notarial deed. The docu-
ment signed by solicitor/lawyer can be fraudulently altered, that is, without the 
consent of its author or the parties involved (in the case of legal transactions) are 
here concerned the values of authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation. On the 
other hand, there is the possibility of the  document being destroyed or damaged 
and this possibility increases over time,  and can also have a corrosive effect 
and an irreparable damage in its form and content. The digital information is 
presented in a number of formats, mapped into binary code in computer storage 
media, and their access and preservation places to the new “curators” of con-
tracts/wills/statements for future memory, the challenge of “irreversibility and 
their incorruption”. This information, encrypted, secure and verifiable comes 
to convert the action of Solicitors and agents of enforcement to authenticators 
agents, and plenipotentiaries certifiers of the powers that the legislature assigned 
to them, the role of real justice auxiliaries. The main objective of TESTOR6 is 
to provide a proof of evidence for any type of digital document which can be 
legally accepted and indisputable. The digital document is stored on an online 
platform with access restrictions, working TESTOR as a trusted archive service. 
In this paper it is discussed the proof of concept, the related work and presented 
the project.
 2. Proof of Concept
This proof of concept is to build and develop the prototype with the use 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) from an online registra-
tion platform digital documents with probative legal value, to be in the future 
managed by the OSAE – Order of the Solicitors in the eJustice System, within the 
civil procedure law judicial cases or in a vast “digital data certification” with all 
the security and privacy data warranties, and in respect with the constitutional 
and human rights. 
Research impact relates to the successful application of the idea and its 
recognition by qualified end-users (OSAE, Judges and Courts and other stake-
holders). The eJustice Community (the Lawyer Order, the Justice Ministry, the 
citizens) engagement will be important for the validation of this proof of con-
cept’s quality and impact. Because of its position at this applied end of the re-
6  Project co-financed by PORTUGAL 2020, TESTOR - The production and simplification of evi-
dence SAICT-POL/26167/2016.
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search spectrum, proof of concept is an intermediate measure of the conversion 
rate of ideas into a set of “Justice and legal services”. It provides immediate feed-
back on the Justice service (Courts, Judges, lawyers, solicitors, citizens).
The adding value of this project is:  
• Relative value, in the case of an authenticated private document;  
• Absolute value, in the case of a document that is full proof; 
• Admitting all kinds of digital files - regardless of its format and 
its content (the existing platform only allows the registration of 
documents in PDF format with a maximum size of two megabits). 
 
Respecting four functional prerogatives:  
1 Originality/ authoring/authenticity of the document in its origin: an-
swering the question, who is the author of this document?  
2 The continuation or document eternity in conditions that allows their 
use or access. The passage of time on the document without it perishes, 
spoil, disappear or become unreadable;  
3  The document size - although the document can be compressed, re-
gardless of size can be stored on the platform;  
4  Document security to prevent their appropriation - or access to them 
without an electronic key preventing any violation of preventing any 
violation of correspondence or professional or trade secret. 
 
The main results expected from the project are:
1 The implementation of the project provides valuable contributions to the 
scientific and technological knowledge. In addition to scientific publica-
tions and conferences on changes in justice and evidence, are considered 
important technological results because they concern the production 
of evidence (judicial or non-judicial) to obtain a resistible unshakeable 
proof to time and incorruptibility and integrity. Publications and resul- 
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ting articles are the first inputs par excellence of a project of this nature. 
Consisting of a measure of e-Justice framed a resource rationalization 
logic (effectiveness/efficiency and economy) there are several aspects 
related to costs/risks and time to perform tasks that are relevant to the 
study and should be underlined. The promotion and promoting science 
and technology also result in knowledge sharing and training for the 
entire universe of solicitors and Enforcement Agents members OSAE. 
Research quality includes intrinsic merit and academic impact. Aca-
demic impact includes peer recognition and the impact of the research 
on the same or related discipline area. The prototype will differ from the 
creation of the final product “the platform TESTOR” because the materi-
als that will be used in the final product may be expensive, and fabrica-
tion processes will change; 
2 The production of a prototype to be used by the Solicitor OSAE eJustice 
system in Portugal through or as a recommendation of OSAE, de- 
monstrating that we can effectively reduce the backlog and to expedite 
the processes involving the justice sector. The results of the application 
of the prototype will be very important to enable the transparency and 
reduce the costs of proceedings. Portuguese law officers must adopt a 
new way of working quickly - more or at least using more resistant to 
erosion means of procedural dilatory incidents. Solicitors and bailiffs 
may be the first impetus to the simplification and redefinition of legal 
certainty around the production of evidence. In the first instance, as the 
main users of this system of open doors to the “deposits, records and 
documents of deposits encrypted” no limit on their shape, size or sup-
port. On the other hand, any citizen may request a “certificate/self-rea- 
lization” at very small price to use for any purpose to make sure that the 
value of the legal security is guaranteed and absolutely incorruptible.  
The OECD study about the cost of Justice show “well-functioning judi- 
ciaries are a crucial determinant of economic performance”. Judicial systems serve 
important purposes in up-holding social values but also in determining eco-
nomic performance. Well functioning judiciaries guarantee the security of pro- 
perty rights and enforcement of contracts. Security of property rights strengthens 
incentives to save and invest, by protecting returns from these activities. A good 
enforcement of contracts stimulates agents to enter into economic relationships, 
by dissuading opportunistic behaviour and reducing transaction costs. This has 
a positive impact on growth through various channels: it promotes competition, 
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fosters specialization in more innovative industries, contributes to the develop-
ment of financial and credit markets and facilitates firm growth7.
The vision for the project “Testor - simplified proof production” is emi-
nently practical, useful to the country, whose job is on the one hand, simplify, 
providing security, speed, prevent and avoid legal conflicts. On the other hand, 
revive the economy, giving credit / reliability, protection of commercial, industrial 
and guarantees for consumer goods and online services, efficiency and effective-
ness in fulfilling negotiation / contract, national and international obligations, 
to prevent improper conduct by the network (www), protect the relationships 
of fair competition, prevent counterfeiting of products, works, misappropriation 
of content, plagiarism. Building trust in trade relations, through the possibility 
of ensuring compliance with the quality criteria, deadlines, technical and sci-
entific characteristics, conservation, etc., contribute to increase exports, reduce 
conflicts, create new levels of confidence and bring considerable benefits to the 
Portuguese payments balance. At the internal level, the possibility of having an 
expedient means, almost free, to ensure the fulfillment of obligations assumed 
because it is the proof that shows without doubt (or very little doubt where the 
truth of the facts) that the seller or provider of service (or buyer) is liable, will 
give a confidence boost to consumption and deterrent to fraud or counterfei- 
ting. Safety on trade and commercial relations, guaranteed by this instrument of 
“compulsion to fulfill” (because the facts are revealed) is a value-creating source 
for the Portuguese economy. In an environment wherein 2015 there was a rate 
of 207.8% of cases pending in the Portuguese courts, this will be a cleaning tool 
for many processes that are clogging up the eJustice system in the strict sense.  
As for the scientific merit of the research team, members’ qualifications 
are more than sufficient to adequately carry out the proposed project. To note 
that University researchers do not only compose the team, but OSAE members 
are also on the team and will be part of the implementation of the final product 
(not only the prototype). We do not allow us to be victims of some gap between 
the prototype and the final product – we have to do an applied research in the 
real world with the real persons who need this, the platform “TESTOR”. 
7  OECD. “OECD Economic Surveys”. 35.
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3. Related Work 
Digital document certification services are an enabler of e-Government 
and are present in some countries e.g. Hungary 8 and Estonia9. These services 
make use of digital signatures and require a public key infrastructure for digitally 
sign files/documents, working as an e-Notary. Although electronic notarizations 
have been legally available in many states for more than a decade, the state of 
Virginia (USA) expanded electronic notarizations to allow their notaries to also 
legally perform remotely based notarizations through a secure webcam session10. 
Allowing notaries to be able to electronically notarize documents from virtually 
anywhere at any time.  
On TESTOR project is allowed not only certify documents (as a notary) 
but also follow and connect the proof, that can be audio, video or any other 
digital content, with the civil process. The aggregation of the document with a 
time stamp is a core functionality and the timestamp needs to be preserved for 
an undetermined long time. 
4. Project 
The scope and objectives of “TESTOR, for the production and simpli-
fication of evidence” are the design and the development of a digital prototype 
about the e-Justice vision and management of the rules and legal principles that 
govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding (a civil procedure) or as a digi-
tal document, out the civil law procedure. The proposed project is relevant and 
has originality. It aims to demonstrate to internal stakeholders (at the strategic 
level of management, operational and technical – the OSAE Solicitor Order and 
the Courts, in particular, the Judges) and external (at the level of prevention 
and prophylaxis cost reduction, legal certainty, expeditious dispute resolution 
and flow pending) that the Portuguese justice system has the ability to improve 
“substantially” considering the implementation of the various attempts at re-
forms that they have failed – we can see the PORDATA statistics 208% of pen- 
8  KISS, P. J., KISS, J. K., and KLIMKÓ, G."Electronic document certification service: An enabler 
of e-government uptake in hungary", in International Conference on Electronic Government and 
the Information Systems Perspective 2016, Springer, pp. 276–286.
9  ERIK. Estonia e-Notary. http://www.rik.ee/en/other-services/e-notary, 2018. [Online; accessed 
24-April-2018].
10  SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH KELLY THOMASSON, Virginia Electronic No-
tary. https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/official-documents/notary-commissions/enotary/. [On-
line; accessed 27-April-2018].
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ding process at Portuguese Courts. One the other hand, the view that an e-justice 
system feeds on digital technology of last generation (ICT) programmed with 
“eminently electronic ratio of legislation” is not easy. 
The state sector and public administration (PA) have been in the last 
30 years, stressed by reforms based on assumptions of the model of New Pub-
lic Management (NPM), whose fundamental elements were characterized by 
Hood11: professional management; focus on performance measures, focusing on 
results and accountability for results - accountability; organizational decentra- 
lization, competition among agencies; adoption of business management styles; 
increased levels of efficiency, effectiveness and economy; and the “insistence on 
doing more with less money”12. More than ever there is talk of the justice sys-
tem crisis and the need for a new approach to the management of the same. 
In particular, it called for the introduction of managerial models that aim to 
promote, not only for users of the courts, citizens and businesses, but also with 
the own economy and society, an increase in quality, efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability13.
It is observable that information systems have a direct impact on the 
management of the justice system, and therefore the administration and access 
to justice by citizens and organizations: 
1 The implementation of office automation systems and process manage-
ment; 
2 Applications to support the activity of judges and prosecutors; 
3 Video conferencing and other technologies used in the courtrooms;
4 The integration of various national or systems interoperability among 
different cross-border systems.
In the eJustice study context there are areas or categories “sensitive” that 
have the effect of promoting mimicry through benchmarking, aligning strategi-
11  HOOD, C., “The ’new public management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a theme”., Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 20, 2-3 (1995), 93–109.
12  ROCHA, J., “Quadro geral da evolução da gestão de recursos humanos na administração públi-
ca”, (2005),10. http://hdl.handle.net/1822/2902. [Online; accessed 24-April-2018].
13  BILHIM, J., “A construção da função qualidade nos tribunais portugueses: uma abordagem à luz 
da teoria institucional”, Scientia Jurídica ,315 (2008), 517–540.
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cally the various justice agencies and the counties of management bodies, crea- 
ting the possibility to be a network of “best practice” in various public institu-
tions with better performance indices. For example, in “eJustice system” there 
would be a report on the performance of services as in the United States, increa- 
sing transparency and accountability of managers to the citizens, and the 
Mayors follow this practice with communication and publication of reports with 
the expense local public as in the UK with the council tax that is updated de-
pending on the expense blaming all the inhabitants. 
When we use the term ejustice we use it –in a broad sense with a lot of 
actors (in or out the courtrooms):
1 Notarial Acts and Records Endorsements: Central Registry 
2 Notary Public; 
3 Central Registry- certification; 
4 All contracts; 
5 Document attestation; 
6 Processes:
 » Appeal, completed and pending: Polícia Judiciária (PJ) [Judiciary 
Police];
 » Appeal, completed and pending: Polícia Segurança Pública (PSP) 
[Public Police]; 
 » Appeal, completed and pending: Tribunal Judicial (TJ) [Court of 
Law];
 » Investigation procedures: Ministério Público (MP) [Public Ministry]
7 Judicial network, courts;
8 Human Resources; 
9 Lawyers/Solicitors; 
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10 Persons employed in Courts; 
11 Magistrates; 
12 Persons employed in the police; 
13 Enforcement Agents.
The Judicial organizations see ICT as a guarantee of effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the justice system, investing in this type of information infrastructure 14 
as data shows a different reality. The PORDATA statistic – pending process with 
the judge, with lawyer, at the court – “Portuguese congestion rate”: ratio of pen- 
ding and completed cases in 201515 took five or ten years to dictate a sentence, 
or to have a judgment. The actual platform (ROAS) is not functional at this mo-
ment, because it’s impossible to store digital documents and metadata ensuring 
levels of scalability, reliability and availability of “evidence” in the system. 
In a civil action, the requisite degree of proof is a preponderance of the 
evidence. The plaintiff must show that more probably than not the defendant 
violated his or her rights. However, each alleged fact must be proved separately, 
as must all the facts necessary to reach a judgment for the plaintiff (the person 
filing a lawsuit) or for the prosecution (the “people” or “state” represented by the 
prosecutor). The defendants in both civil suits and criminal trials need not pro-
vide absolute “proof ” of non-responsibility, since the burden is on the plaintiff. 
An adequate evidence, adequate proof legally presented at trial, or not, 
fulfilling a legal responsibility is a sufficient corroboration.
4.1 Architecture 
The trier of fact, whether a judge must review the evidence presen-
ted, evaluate it, and determine if it meets the standard of proof. The weight of 
evidence is based on the believability or persuasiveness of evidence. As figure 1 
14  CONTINI, F., and Cordella, A., “Information System and Information Infrastructure Deploy-
ment: The Challenge of the Italian E-Justice Approach”, Draft. 43–52
VELICOGNA, M. “Justice systems and ICT-What can be learned from Europe”. Utrecht L. Rev. 3 
(2007), 129.
VELICOGNA, M., and CONTINI, F., Assemblage-in-the-making: Developing the e-services for the 
Justice of the Peace Office in Italy. Springer, 2009.
15  www.pordata.pt
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describes, paper documents should be scanned. Using a smartcard (Citizen’s 
Card), the solicitor digitally signs the document. Any documents in digital 
format, including videos, may be signed. The documents received by the plat-
form, which are accompanied by descriptive metadata, are re-signed (with a 
time stamp) by the platform itself. After the signature procedure, the documents 
(the original and the signed by the platform) and their metadata are stored in a 
database. The Solicitor, as well as other entities of the judicial system (who are 
granted access to the document), may access the metadata and its documents 




TESTOR will make use of: smartcards, for stakeholders sign digital docu-
ments; digital signatures, the online platform TESTOR signs each submited digi-
tal document; and an external service for a long term validation signature which 
includes the timestamp. The signature with smartcard also may be done with 
the portuguese public service Chave Móvel Digital (CMD)16, this service allows 
the signer to not have the smartcard when performing a signature, CMD needs 
a previous adhesion where the smartcard is registered and when a signature is 
needed a message with a secure token in sent via SMS that is needed to sign the 
document on CMD service.
16  AUTENTICAÇÃO.GOV, Chave móvel digital. https://www.autenticacao.gov.pt/a-chave-movel-
digital, 2018. [Online; accessed 24-April-2018].




The vision for the project TESTOR is eminently practical and aims to 
simplify procedures, providing transparence, security, speed, prevent and avoid 
legal disputes in court. 
The TESTOR prototype will be used in a proof of concept. We hope that 
this project will generate new opportunities for social and professional applica-
tions in the field, with significant consequences in the economy, in the e-Justice 
and finance. 
The OSAE is committed to ensuring the full exploitation of the prototype 
as a public service, a service of e-Justice, innovative and with a professional and 
social focus. 
The e-Justice system of OSAE in Portugal will be a pioneer, and its use will 
be the basis for a new phase of the justice.
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The law in the 21st century: a Sisyphean 
struggle to keep up with technological 
evolutions? 
J. De Bruyne1 & C. Vanleenhove2
Abstract: Society has changed tremendously in the last decade. It still is in a 
transitional phase because of different technological developments. These evo-
lutions affect our way of thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction 
and the work/life balance. Some argue that the legal framework will need a fun-
damental make-over as well. The question that arises is whether some of the 
existing long-standing legal principles are compatible with technological evolu-
tions or whether new legislation will need to be adopted. The article will try to 
provide an answer to these fundamental issues through a case-study of recent 
evolutions in two different fields of law, namely the use of social media in court 
proceedings for procedural law and the introduction of self-driving cars in traffic 
for liability law. 
Keywords: Law and Technology – Service of Process – Social Media – Self-Dri- 
ving Cars
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Summary: The article examines whether existing legal principles are compatible 
with technological evolutions or whether new legislation will need to be imple-
mented. We will examine two evolutions more thoroughly, namely the use of 
social media for service of process and the commercialisation of autonomous 
vehicles. A new phenomenon has arisen in a number of common law jurisdic-
tions around the world. In Australia, the United States, New Zealand, Canada 
and England there are examples of cases in which social media platforms were 
used to notify the defendant of the commencement of civil proceedings (this 
is called service of process). In civil law nations, effecting service of process 
through social media is completely unknown. This is remarkable in light of the 
obvious importance of this topic for the continental EU Member States, given 
the digital reality and the continuous objective to increase the functionality of 
dispute resolution. Although it is difficult to predict whether the legislator in ci-
vil law countries will endorse social media service, it is argued that social media 
service could be valuable as an additional method in Belgium when the defen- 
dant does not have a known address in order to strengthen the likelihood of ac-
tual notice. Another technological evolution relates to the commercialisation of 
autonomous vehicles. The increased use of self-driving cars has several benefits. 
However, legal challenges will come to the surface as well. One of these relates 
to the question who should be held liable for damage caused by autonomous 
vehicles. At the present time, things are quite clear. The manufacturer of (parts 
of) the vehicle or its driver can in most cases be held liable under national or 
supranational law for the damage caused by the accident. The article will show 
that things are more complex with self-driving cars and that the existing legal 
framework might need some changes.  
1. Introduction 
Society has changed tremendously in the last decade. It still is in a transi-
tional phase because of different technological developments. These evolutions 
affect our way of thinking, doing business, communicating, interaction and the 
work/life balance. It is, therefore, not surprising that several aspects related to 
those technological evolutions are increasingly being studied in academia3 and 
3  See in general: BROWNSWORD, Roger, SCOTFORD, Eloise & YEUNG, Karen, The Oxford 
Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology, 1st ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017; 
CALO, Ryan, FROOMKIN, Michael & KERR, Ian, Robot Law, 1st ed., Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
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addressed by policymakers.4 The question that arises from a legal point of view is 
whether some of the existing long-standing legal principles are compatible with 
technological evolutions or whether new legislation will need to be adopted. In 
this regard, it is often argued that the law lags behind technological develop-
ment.5 Technological evolutions may expose gaps in the existing legal frame-
work or may give rise to undesirable conflicts and call for changes.6 We will try 
to provide an answer to these fundamental issues through a case-study of recent 
evolutions in two different fields of law, namely the use of social media for notice 
of court proceedings in the area of procedural law (part 2) and the introduction 
of self-driving cars (SDCs) or autonomous vehicles in the area of liability law 
(part 3). We will conclude by giving some (general) recommendations that can 
be taken into account by policymakers, judges and lawyers when creating or 
applying the law in the “society of tomorrow” (part 4). 
2. The Use of Social Media in Service of Process
After some preliminary considerations on the use of social media in ser-
vices of process (part 2.1), we will describe the current common law trend of 
effecting service of process through social networking sites (part 2.2). We then 
give a short overview of how service of process is effectuated in Belgium, as an 
example of a civil law country (part. 2.3). Finally, having taken note of the service 
of process framework in Belgium and the absence of social media as a form of 
acceptable notice, we reflect on the possible introduction of such service within 
that jurisdiction (part 2.4).
4  Reference can be made to the working of the EU High Level Group GEAR 2030. The Group 
discussed the main challenges for the automobile industry in the next fifteen years and made 
recommendations to ensure that the relevant policy, legal and public support framework is in 
place for the roll-out of highly automated and connected vehicles by 2030 (High Level Group on 
the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European Union 
(GEAR 2030), “Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative and sustainable au-
tomotive industry of the 2030s and beyond”, October 2017). The European Parliament has also 
adopted a resolution on the 16th of February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on 
civil law rules on robotics (European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommen-
dations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103INL)). 
5  See for example: MOSES, Bennett, “Agents of Change: How the Law “Copes” with Techno-
logical Change”, Griffith Law Review, no. 20, 2011, 763-794, 764; MARCHANT, Gary, AL-
LENBY, Braden & HERKERT, Joseph, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and 
Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing Problem, 1st ed., New York, Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2011. 
6  LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, Law, Innovation 
and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 1-44, 7. 
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2.1. Preliminary Considerations 
Imagine you open the Facebook Messenger app and you see the new mes-
sage notification. It is a message informing you that you have been sued and 
that you are to appear in court as defendant in a family law case involving proof 
of paternity. Or: you are browsing through Instagram when you suddenly re-
ceive a DM (Direct Message). There is a lawsuit pending against you. You have 
been served in an insurance matter through the DM. Or: you often use LinkedIn 
to keep track of your contacts’ occupations and achievements. One day your 
LinkedIn inbox indicates that you have a new message. The LinkedIn message 
contains a summons and a claim form. A foreign company is taking you to court 
for trademark infringement. Futuristic scenarios? Think again! These situations 
have actually taken place in the last decade in Australia7, Canada8 and the United 
States9 respectively. 
In a number of common law jurisdictions around the world courts have 
allowed plaintiffs to notify the defendant of the commencement of legal pro-
ceedings (i.e. service of process) through the use of social networking platforms. 
The list of social media is long but the ones most often used for service of process 
are Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Instagram. When mentioning this relatively 
recent line of private law cases to lawyers with civil law backgrounds, reactions 
ranging from mild amused surprise to utter shock and disgust can be observed. 
In civil law nations effecting service of process through social media is com-
pletely unknown.10 Whereas the use of e-mail for service purposes seems to have 
become increasingly more well established, the use of social media as an avenue 
for notification of the commencement of proceedings appears to be in a whole 
different ballpark. As such, scholars in continental EU Member States (by which 
we refer to those EU countries that belong to the civil law tradition) have not yet 
addressed this relatively new development within the common law world. This is 
unfortunate as getting insight into the practice might prove valuable for enhan- 
cing our own service rules. This contribution, therefore, undertakes an analysis 
7  Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Byrne & Howard, 21 April 2010, [2010] FMCAfam 509.
8  A report of the case is available here: ROBINSON, Alex, Toronto lawyer serves claim with Ins-
tagram, 2 February 2018, http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/author/alex-robinson/
toronto-lawyer-serves-claim-with-instagram-15294/, read on 2 May 2018.
9  United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, WhosHere, Inc. v. 
Gokhan Orun, 20 February 2014, 2014 WL 670817.
10  There is, to our knowledge, only one example where social media were used in the transmission 
of judicial documents. In order to initiate Dutch court proceedings Stichting BREIN (Bescherm-
ing Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland) served the Pirate Bay (a website registered 
in Sweden) through Twitter and Facebook, in addition to the conventional methods of service 
(Rechtbank Amsterdam, 30 July 2009, no. 428212 / KG ZA 09-1092 WT/RV).
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of the reported cases to subsequently contemplate on a general level whether 
social media service will ever form part of the service methods on the EU con-
tinent. 
2.2. Social Media Service in Common Law: State of Play
As mentioned, common law countries are the laboratory in which service 
through social media platforms has been allowed to flourish. After a brief dis-
cussion of the origin of the use of social media in service of process (part A), we 
will examine the conditions laid down by the case law more thoroughly (part B). 
A. Origin 
The actual cradle of social media service is to be situated in Australia (at 
least judging by the reported cases). The ball begun rolling with a case between a 
mortgage provider and a couple that no longer made its repayments.11 In MKM 
v. Corbo & Poyser the defendants had taken out a home refinancing loan with 
MKM Capital but had failed to keep up with payments. They not respond to 
e-mails from MKM’s attorneys and did not appear in court. MKM obtained a 
default judgment permitting seisure of the property. Before the judgment could 
be executed it had to be served on the defendants. However, defendants had 
moved away, had switched jobs and had changed their phone numbers. Repeated 
efforts at personal service as well as service by mail and publication did not lead 
to the desired result. MKM therefore made the ground-breaking move of see- 
king permission to effect service through the defendants’ Facebook accounts. 
The lawyers had handily located both defendants on the biggest social networ- 
king site. To that end they used the personal information the couple had supplied 
themselves during the loan application process. They were able to link the de-
fendants’ date of birth and their e-mail addresses to the Facebook profiles (which 
were, fortunately for the plaintiff, not protected by stringent privacy settings). 
Furthermore, they found that both defendants were friends on Facebook. Master 
Harper of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory therefore gave 
plaintiff MKM the green light to inform defendants of the entry and terms of 
the default judgment via a private Facebook message. In addition, the order had 
to be served via e-mail and by leaving a sealed copy at their last known address.
Although the germ of social media service lies Down Under, the cur-
rent centre of gravity for this rather contentious method of service has arguably 
11  Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, MKM Capital Pty Ltd. v. Corbo & Poyser, 16 
December 2008, case no. SC 608, text on file with the authors.
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shifted to the United States. The first approval by an American court came in the 
case of Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe.12 A wife wished to divorce her husband 
but it was believed he had left the territory of the United States.13 She had a sus-
picion that he had moved back to Ivory Coast. As she had no physical address for 
her soon-to-be ex-husband, she petitioned the court for approval to send notice 
by general delivery, where the post office holds mail until the recipient comes 
to the post office to pick it up.14 Judge Kevin S. Burke noted: “While the Court 
considered publication in a legal newspaper, it is unlikely that Respondent would 
ever see this. It is more likely that Respondent could receive notice on the internet. 
The traditional way to get service by publication is antiquated and is prohibitively 
expensive. Service is critical, and technology provides a cheaper and hopefully more 
effective way of finding Respondent.”15 The judge is further quoted as stating that: 
“Nobody, particularly poor people, is going to look at the legal newspaper to notice 
that their spouse wants to get divorced.”16 He ordered service to include, but not 
be limited to, contact via any Facebook, Myspace, or other social networking site, 
contact via e-mail and contact through information that would appear through 
an internet search engine such as Google.17
B. Conditions 
State court litigation is governed by state law provisions whereas the Fe- 
deral Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) determine the service regime for federal 
cases. For domestic service Rule 4(e)(1) FRCP refers to state provisions as it per-
mits following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 
of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where 
service is made. Under state law more unconventional methods of service are 
12  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
13  VAN HORN, Hans, “Evolutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using 
Facebook to Serve Process on International Defendants”, Global Business & Development Law 
Journal, vol. 26, 2013, 555-576, 566; EISENBERG, Alyssa, “Keep Your Facebook Friends Close 
and Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases 
Involving Domestic Defendants”, San Diego Law Review, vol. 51, 2014, 779-822, 790.
14  WARD, Stephanie, “Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites 
to Notify Defendants”, American Bar Association Journal, vol. 97, no. 10, 2011, 14-16, 14.
15  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
16  WARD, Stephanie, “Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites 
to Notify Defendants”, American Bar Association Journal, vol. 97, no. 10, 2011, 14.
17  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
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available in comparison to the federal rules. In some states catch-all provisions 
are in place. §308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (N.Y. CPLR), 
for instance, states that the court may order service in any manner, if the other 
(traditional) methods of service provided by § 308 N.Y. CPLR are impracticable. 
Impracticability however “does not require proof of due diligence or of actual prior 
attempts to serve a party under the other provisions of the statute”.18 For service 
abroad, Rule 4(f)(3) FRCP gives the judge the possibility to order any method 
he deems appropriate, as long as the method is not prohibited by international 
agreement. The provision offers this option without any need for the plaintiff to 
first attempt service via the other methods listed in Rule 4(f) FRCP.19   
A scrutiny of the available cases reveals that the majority of courts have 
approved of social media service in combination with another form of service. 
In Mpafe v. Mpafe, for example, service through social networking platforms was 
ordered together with inter alia e-mail service.20 In Ferrarese v. Shaw plaintiff 
begun proceedings against his ex-wife who had disappeared with their daughter. 
The woman remained elusive and could not be served. The federal court deci- 
ded that service on the ex-wife should be effected via e-mail, Facebook message 
and certified mail on defendant’s last known address and on defendant’s sister.21 
In Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247 Inc. the Federal Trade Commission 
brought suit against five foreign defendants who were involved in a fraudulent 
organisation trying to extract money from American citizens by deceiving them 
into believing that their computers were infected. On the basis of Rule 4(f)(3) 
FRCP the New York District Court granted the FTC’s request for permission to 
serve documents on the defendants via e-mail and Facebook.22 The Family Court 
decision in Noel Biscocho v. Anna Maria Antigua is an excellent example of the 
judicial hesitance to completely step away from traditional methods of service 
in favour of the newly discovered service channel offered by social media. A 
father who was seeking to modify an order of child support for his son based on 
the alleged emancipation of the boy was allowed to serve the mother via Face-
book. However, he also had to follow up with a mailing of the summons and the 
18  District Court for the Southern District of New York, Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 7 June 2012, 
2012 WL 2086950; District Court for the Southern District of New York, S.E.C. v. HGI, Inc., 8 
November 1999, 99 Civ. 3866, 1999 WL 1021087.
19  United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, 
20 March 2002, 284 F.3d, 1007, at 1015.
20  Fourth District Family Court of Minnesota (Hennepin County), Jessica Mpafe v. Clarence Mpafe, 
10 May 2011, No. 27-FA-11-3453.
21  United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Giovanni Ferrarese v. Vinda Shaw, 19 
January 2016, 164 F.Supp.3d 361 (2016).
22  District Court for the Southern District of New York, FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 7 March 2013, 
2013 WL 841037.
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petition to the mother’s last known address, even though the court recognised 
that prior service at that address had been unsuccessful (the mother had moved 
without leaving a forwarding address) and her physical whereabouts uncertain.23
This cautious attitude is, however, not shared by all courts. Baidoo v. 
Blood-Dzraku appears to be the first reported case in which the court approved 
service by Facebook message as the sole method of service. The plaintiff was a 
married woman who wanted to divorce her husband. She had no physical ad-
dress for him and he could not be served in person. Therefore, the wife peti-
tioned the court for service via Facebook. The court did not require service via 
publication as a backup method to Facebook, deeming the former to be “essen-
tially statutorily authorized non-service”.24 Similarly, in St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait 
Finance House the matter to be decided was whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to damages from a number of defendants in connection with the financing of 
terrorist organisation ISIS and the subsequent slaying of Assyrian Christians 
in Iraq and Syria. The plaintiff attempted to serve one of the defendants, a Ku-
waiti-born Salafi sheikh, but came up empty. It, therefore, turned to the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking permission 
to effect service via Twitter, the American social networking platform used by 
the defendant to collect money to fund terrorist activities. The court agreed with 
service through Twitter as the only method to be used.25 
The available case law tends to impose two requirements regarding the 
social media account to be served. First, the plaintiff has to provide the court 
with evidence that the account actually belongs to the defendant (authentica-
tion requirement). Second, the plaintiff needs to demonstrate that the defen- 
dant makes regular use of his account (evidence of use requirement). Both are 
logical conditions given the fact that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes that notice should be “reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”.26 
In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku the plaintiff was aided by the existence of con-
versations between her and her husband on Facebook. She submitted an affidavit 
23  Family Court of the State of New York (County of Richmond), Noel B. v. Anna Maria A., 12 
September 2014, case no. F00787-13/14B, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4708; COLEMAN, Kristina, 
“Beyond Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku: Service of Process Through Facebook and Other Social Media 
Platforms Through an Indiana Lens”, Indiana Law Review, vol. 50, 2017, 645-671, 660.
24  Supreme Court of New York County, Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 27 March 2015, 48 Misc 3d 316.
25  United States District Court for the Northern District of California, St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait 
Finance House, et al., 30 September 2016, 2016 WL 5725002.
26  U.S. Supreme Court, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 24 April 1950, 339 U.S. 314 
(1950).
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to which she annexed copies of the exchanges between her and the defendant 
on Facebook and in which she identified the defendant as the subject of the 
photographs on the Facebook page in question. While such statements do not 
constitute absolute proof, the court was satisfied that the account did belong to 
the untraceable defendant. As to evidence of regular use, the court was equally 
satisfied as the exchanges between the plaintiff and the defendant indicated that 
the latter regularly logged into his account, countering the risk of him not seeing 
the summons until the time to respond had passed.27 Conversely, in Fortunato 
v. Chase Bank the defendant wanted to bring the plaintiff ’s daughter into the 
litigation. The request for service through the Facebook account of the daughter 
was denied for reasons of uncertainty regarding the authenticity of said account. 
The court argued that: “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or 
incomplete information, and thus, there is no way for the Court to confirm whether 
the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found is in fact the third-party defendant to 
be served.”28 
2.3. Short Overview of Service of Process in Belgium
In Belgium civil proceedings are initiated either by a writ of summons 
or by means of a petition. The most common method is the delivery of the writ 
of summons to the defendant by the bailiff.29 The Belgian Judicial Code lists a 
number of methods to effect this service of process (art. 33 et seq.). The bailiff 
will respect a certain order and will try to serve the defendant in person first. 
Service in person means that the bailiff hand delivers the writ of summons to the 
defendant. It can take place wherever the defendant can be found. If the defen- 
dant refuses to accept service, this refusal will not prevent service in person from 
being accomplished. The bailiff makes a note of this refusal on the writ.30
If service in person is not possible, service can be effected at the domicile 
or, in absence of a domicile, the place of residence of the defendant, by leaving a 
copy of the writ with a relative, servant or agent, provided that the person is 16 
years old or above.31 If the previous method of service is not possible, the bailiff 
27  Supreme Court of New York County, Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 27 March 2015, 48 Misc 3d 314-
315.
28  District Court for the Southern District of New York, Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 7 June 2012, 2012 
WL 2086950.
29  TAELMAN, Piet & VAN SEVEREN, Claudia, Civil procedure in Belgium, 1st ed., Mechelen, 
Wolters Kluwer, 2018, 89. 
30  Art. 33 Belgian Judicial Code.
31  Art. 35 Belgian Judicial Code.
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can leave a copy of the writ in a sealed envelope at the domicile or, in absence 
of a domicile, the place of residence of the defendant. The next business day at 
the latest the bailiff will send a letter to the defendant via registered mail, infor- 
ming him of the date and time of the bailiff ’s visit and of the possibility to obtain 
a copy of the writ at the bailiff ’s office during a period of three months.32 The 
sending of the registered letter is a precautionary measure, without any effect on 
the service.33
Since 31 December 2016, the date of the entry into force of the so-
called Potpourri III Act of 4 May 2016, the possibility for the bailiff exists to 
serve through e-mail. In civil matters the bailiff may choose the method of ser-
vice (personal service or electronic service via e-mail) depending on the cir- 
cumstances specific to the case.34   
The bailiff can either use the “gerechtelijk elektronisch adres” (a unique 
e-mail address, issued by the government35) of the defendant or, for people who 
do not have such an address, the “adres van elektronische woonstkeuze” (a re- 
gular e-mail address, not issued by the government)36. In the latter case explicit 
consent needs to be obtained from the defendant each time the bailiff wishes 
to serve him through that e-mail address.37 To that end the bailiff will send a 
request for consent to the “adres van elektronische woonstkeuze” of the defen- 
dant.38 In both cases the e-mail sent by the bailiff does not contain the actual do- 
cument to be served. Rather, the content of the documents can only be consulted 
on the digital platform (the Registry) created for that purpose. The defendant 
can only gain access to the content of the document after having identified and 
authenticated himself using his electronic id card (eID) and pincode or a techni-
cal equivalent method. 
Within 24 hours of sending the service or the request for consent, the 
bailiff will receive a confirmation message from the Registry, indicating that ser-
vice has actually been effected. If no such confirmation is received within that 
time frame, electronic service is not possible and needs to be effected in person.39 
When the defendant opens the e-mail message, the Registry notifies the bailiff. If 
no notification of opening is received within 24 hours of sending the service or 
32  Art. 38, §1 Belgian Judicial Code.
33  Cass. 17 December 1998, Arr. Cass. 1998, 1155.
34  Art. 32quater/3, §2 Belgian Judicial Code.
35  Art. 32, 5° Belgian Judicial Code.
36  Art. 32, 6° Belgian Judicial Code.
37  Art. 32quater/1, §1, second sentence Belgian Judicial Code.
38  Art. 32quater/1, §2, first sentence Belgian Judicial Code.
39  Art. 32quater/1, §2, first and third sentence iuncto art. 32quater/3, §3 Belgian Judicial Code.
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the request for consent, the bailiff will notify the defendant the next business day 
through regular mail that electronic service has been effected.40
In case the defendant does not have a known domicile or place of resi-
dence in Belgium, service abroad will have to take place. Service in another EU 
Member State will be regulated by the EU Service Regulation.41 For service in 
non-EU states that are a member of the Hague Service Convention, that Con-
vention will apply. If the non-EU country where the defendant is domiciled or 
resides, is not bound by the Hague Convention, service is effected by registered 
letter through air mail.42
If the defendant does not have a known domicile or place of residence at 
all (neither in Belgium nor abroad), the bailiff will serve the writ on the public 
prosecutor of the jurisdiction of the court which will deal with the claim.43
2.4. Looking into the Crystal Ball: Social Media Service in 
Belgium? 
In this part, we will not attempt to forecast whether the Belgian legislator 
will ever decide to incorporate social media service as a service method. We will, 
however, set out which choices can be made and will signal some of the issues 
that will have to be dealt with. 
First of all, one can wonder which advantages social media offer. One 
distinct advantage of social media service lies in the fact that it is able to achieve 
a high likelihood of actual notice. Users of social media platforms typically ac-
cess their accounts on a regular basis.44 A recent press release by Facebook, for 
instance, showed that there were 1.32 billion daily active users on average world-
wide for June 2017 and 2.01 billion monthly active users as of 30 June 2017.45 
Social media are oftentimes accessed on mobile devices. On these devices users 
run applications that push instant notifications alerting the account holder of 
40  Art. 32quater/1, §2, in fine Belgian Judicial Code. 
41  Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, 
OJ L 324. 
42  Art. 40, first paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
43  Art. 40, second paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
44  KNAPP, Keeley, “#serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Pro-
cess in the 21st Century”, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 74, no. 2, 2014, 547-579, 564
45  See in this regard: https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2017/Face-
book-Reports-Second-Quarter-2017-Results/default.aspx
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activity on his profile.46 Besides, if service is performed via a private Facebook 
message or via a post on the defendant’s Facebook wall, the likelihood of actual 
notice is even amplified. Under the default settings, the defendant will receive 
a notification through e-mail of the message or of the post and any subsequent 
comments.47
Compared to the second-newest kid on the block, e-mail service, social 
media holds a few trump cards. In case of service via e-mail there is no possi-
bility to determine whether the e-mail address belongs to the defendant unless 
the defendant states so himself.48 A social media account, on the other hand, can 
be scrutinised to verify the identity of the holder if the privacy settings allow it. 
Additionally, e-mail is more prone to spam attacks.49 In that regard, social media 
networks fare better.50 Spam messages are less common on social media plat-
forms and malicious messages are less problematic because users can often view 
the sender’s profile without opening the message or they can adjust their settings 
to disallow messages from individuals who they have not added as “friends”.51
Having argued that service through social media platforms can have an 
added value, a subsequent question would be whether there is a need for this 
type of service to be implemented in Belgium. It is unlikely that the Belgian le- 
gislator will introduce social media service as a self-standing independent me- 
thod. For Belgium, where e-mail service is still in its infancy, this would be too 
radical and controversial. In our opinion, there could nevertheless be a place for 
this innovative method in the Belgian system. 
In part 2.3 it was explained that service on defendants who do not have a 
known domicile or place of residence is replaced by service on the public pro- 
secutor of the jurisdiction of the competent court.52 In Belgium the “Nationale 
46  UPCHURCH, Angela, “”Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social Media to Provide Constitu-
tionally Sufficient Notice of Process”, UALR Review, vol. 38, 2016, 559-625, 601.
47  District Court for the Southern District of New York, FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 7 March 2013, 
2013 WL 841037, 5. 
48  KNAPP, Keeley, “#serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Pro-
cess in the 21st Century”, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 74, no. 2, 2014, 569.
49  WOLBER, Jeffrey, “Opening a Can of Worms and Viruses: The Impact of E-Service on E-Mail 
Users Everywhere”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 61, 2016-2017, 449-470, 450, foot-
note 1. 
50  SHULTZ, Andriana, “Superpoked and Served: Service of Process via Social Networking Sites”, 
University of Richmond Law Review, vol. 43, 2009, 1497-1528, 1525, footnote 205 (statement 
made in the context of Facebook).
51  WOLBER, Jeffrey, “Opening a Can of Worms and Viruses: The Impact of E-Service on E-Mail 
Users Everywhere”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 61, 2016-2017, 450, footnote 1.
52  Art. 40, second paragraph Belgian Judicial Code.
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Kamer van Gerechtsdeurwaarders” (the National Chamber of Bailiffs) does not 
keep statistics on the number of times service is in that regard effected on the 
public prosecutor. In the Netherlands, on the contrary, such figures are available. 
The Dutch service rules also require that a defendant without a known domicile 
or place of residence be served through the office of the public prosecutor at the 
court where the claim will be heard. In addition, an abstract of the writ must 
be published in the “Staatscourant”.53 The “Staatscourant” is an official online 
gazette containing inter alia different types of judicial announcements.54 An Act 
of 11 February 2015 made the use of this online tool compulsory since 1 July 
2015.55 Before that date these so-called “public writs” were published in daily 
newspapers. According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Act 
45.000 public writs are served each year.56 Additionally, it is stated that bailiffs 
receive little or no response to public writs published in newspapers.57 The Dutch 
legislator considered that the publication of these writs on a public site on the 
internet would increase the odds that the defendants would see it, leading to the 
putting into use of the “Staatscourant”.58 
There is no reason why these findings cannot be transposed to Belgium. It 
is extremely likely that the “artificial” service on the prosecutor does not inform 
the persons in question, given the results in the Netherlands where service on 
the prosecutor is even combined with service by publication. It is here that social 
media service could play a role. Belgian lawmakers could make it obligatory for 
plaintiffs to undertake a reasonable attempt to serve the elusive defendant via 
his social media channels, if any. In the Netherlands this idea has already been 
suggested by the “Adviescommissie Burgerlijk Procesrecht” (Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Procedural Law) in the build-up to the adoption of the Act of 11 
February 2015.59 It can be expected that such a subsidiary place for social media 
service will prompt less resistance than embracing it as a full-blown mechanism. 
Furthermore, because social media service is deployed as a supplement to an 
established method, it will alleviate at least some of the sceptical concerns raised 
53  Art. 54.2 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
54  See for more information: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/staatscourant.
55  Wet van 11 februari 2015 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en 
enige andere wetten in verband met bekendmakingen aan personen zonder bekende woon- of 
verblijfplaats, Stb. 2015, 82.
56  Memorie van Toelichting, 4.
57  Memorie van Toelichting, 2.
58  Memorie van Toelichting, 2.
59  Letter of 19 September 2013 concerning consultatiedocument Wijziging van het wetboek van 
burgerlijke rechtsvordering en enige andere wetten in verband met bekendmakingen aan personen 
zonder bekende woon- of verblijfplaats, 2, no. 3.
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by its opponents. In that way, the policy choice would correspond to the U.S. 
example where social media service is, in most instances, offered in combination 
with another more conventional method (see part 2.2.B).   
As to the concrete organisation of social media service, the Belgian le- 
gislator will face further issues. Certain safeguards relating to the authentication 
and regular use of the account will need to be construed. The American expe- 
rience might serve as a source of inspiration. A further specific difficulty that can 
be identified relates to the bailiff who has to effect the service. Does the bailiff 
have to use an official account or can he use the account of the plaintiff or can he 
even send the notice via a fake account?60 In case social media service is used as 
a supplementary method for defendants without a known address, service could 
perhaps be entrusted to the plaintiff (or his lawyer). Time will tell to what extent 
Belgium will “connect” with social media, if at all. 
3. Case Study: Autonomous Vehicles and Liability 
Another example we will discuss are autonomous vehicles. The increased 
use of such vehicles needs to be seen in a broader perspective of robots and ar-
tificial intelligence (part 3.1). Once some preliminary considerations have been 
discussed, we will proceed with an analysis of aspects related to the liability for 
damage caused by self-driving cars (part 3.2).  
3.1. Preliminary Considerations on Robots 
Finding an appropriate definition of a ‘robot’ is not straightforward due 
to its “a-technical nature, both from an engineering and a legal point of view”.61 
Calo concludes that a robot is a machine with three qualities: (1) a robot can 
sense its environment, (2) a robot has the capacity to process the information it 
senses, and (3) a robot is organised to act directly upon its environment.62 Defi- 
ning artificial intelligence (AI) might be even more challenging as there is no 
60  In the United States a similar discussion exists in relation to the ethical rules governing the 
conduct of lawyers performing social media service. See for example: VAN HORN, Hans, “Evo-
lutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using Facebook to Serve Process on 
International Defendants”, Global Business & Development Law Journal, vol. 26, 2013, 570-574. 
61  BERTOLINI, Andrea, “Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Appli-
cations and Liability Rules”, Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 5, no. 2, 2013, 214-247, 219. 
62  CALO, Ryan, Robots in American Law, University of Washington School of Law Research 
Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 6, read on 15 
April 2018; CALO, Ryan, “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw”, California Law Review, vol. 
103, no. 3, 2015, 513-563, 529.
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consensus on this concept.63 Artificial intelligence has been the subject of much 
discussion and has caused a lot of confusion.64 AI is an umbrella term comprised 
of many different techniques65 and is best understood as a set of techniques 
aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition by using 
machines. In this regard, the concept of machine learning is important. Machine 
learning implies that a system does not only rely on predefined instructions to 
determine its behaviour but also on the independent analysis of large amounts of 
collected data. It refers to the capacity of computer algorithms to automatically 
learn or improve in performance on a task over time.66
Regardless of the precise definition of both concepts, human activities are 
increasingly being replaced by robots.67 Robots are becoming prevalent in our 
daily, social and professional life.68 Several examples can be used as an illustra-
tion. Collaborative robots or ‘CoBots’ have been designed to physically interact 
with humans in a shared workspace.69 Prototypes of robots such as Riba can be 
used in the health sector to perform heavy physical nursing care tasks requiring 
human contact (e.g. lifting a bedridden patient from the bed to a wheelchair and 
63  See for more information: TURING, Alan Mathison, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, 
Mind, no. 49, 1950, 433-460; RUSSELL, Stuart & NORVIG, Peter, Artificial Intelligence: A 
Modern Approach, 3rd ed., New Jersey, Pearson New International, 2010. 
64  KOK, Joost Nico, Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed., Oxford, EOLSS Publications, 2009, 2. 
65  CALO, Ryan, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap”, U.C. Davis Law Review, 
vol. 51, 2017, 399-435, 405. 
66  CALO Ryan, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap”, U.C. Davis Law Review, 
vol 51, 2017, 405; SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Pre-
dictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 121-181, 147. 
67  HALLEVY, Gabriel, “The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities - From Science 
Fiction to Legal Social Control”, Akron Intellectual Property Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, 2010, 171-
201, 172. See for an overview: IVANOV, Stanislav Hristov, “Robonomics - Principles, Benefits, 
Challenges, Solutions”, Yearbook of Varna University of Management, vol. 10, 2017, 283-293. 
68  LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, Law, Innovation 
and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 7. 
69  See for more information: PREIMESBERGER, Chris, Why CA Technologies is Moving into Col-
laborative Robotics, eWeek, 17 January 2018, http://www.eweek.com/innovation/why-ca-tech-
nologies-is-moving-into-collaborative-robotics, read on 20 April 2018. 
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back).70 Robots have been used to run a hotel71 or sell coffee in stores.72 There 
are also growing concerns in the international community regarding so-called 
“killer robots” that might be used in armed conflicts.73 Robots are increasingly 
used in the legal profession as well. Lawyers will eventually be replaced by algo-
rithms,74 while cases might in the future be adjudicated by an artificial intelli-
gence judge.75 A more prominent example is the rise of self-driving cars or au-
tonomous vehicles.76 According to recent predictions, fully autonomous vehicles 
could already be available within five to twenty years.77 One could, therefore, say 
that the challenges posed by robots will only become more acute in light of the 
explosive growth of the robotics industry over the next decade. In sum, we “are 
70  MUKAI, Toshiharu et al., “Development of a Nursing-Care Assistant Robot RIBA That Can 
Lift a Human in Its Arms”, 2010 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and 
Systems, 18-22 October 2010, 5996-6001, 5996. 
71  RAJESH, Monisha, Inside Japan’s first robot-staffed hotel, The Guardian, 14 August 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2015/aug/14/japan-henn-na-hotel-staffed-by-robots, read on 
19 April 2018. 
72  X, Nestlé employs fleet of robots to sell coffee machines in Japan, The Guardian, 1 December 
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/01/nestle-robots-coffee-machines-ja-
pan-george-clooney-pepper-android-softbank, read on 19 April 2018.
73  See for example: CROOTOF, Rebecca, “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Im-
plications”, Cardozo Law Review, no. 36, 2015, 1837-1916; SMITH, Mark, Is ‘killer robot’ 
warfare closer than we think?, 25 August 25 2017, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/busi-
ness-41035201, read on 30 April 2018.
74  See for example: X, Ready for robot lawyers? How students can prepare for the future of law, The 
Guardian, 31 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jul/31/ready-for-robot-lawyers-
how-students-can-prepare-for-the-future-of-law, read on 22 April 2018. See, however: REMUS, 
Dana & LEVY, Frank, “Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law”, 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. 30, 2017, 501-558. 
75  ALETRAS, Nikolaos, TSARAPATSANIS, Dimitrios, PREOTIUC-PIETRO, Daniel & LAMPOS, 
Vasileios, “Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: a Natural Lan-
guage Processing perspective”, PeerJ Computer Science, no. 2, 2016, https://peerj.com/articles/cs-
93/, read on 15 April 2018. See in this regard also: CALO Ryan, Robots in American Law, Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law Research Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 25-32, read on 18 April 2018. 
76  See for more information: SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opaci-
ty, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 121-181; ZOHN, 
Jeffrey, “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving cars that cause damages”, 
University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, no. 2, 2015, 461-485. 
77  ANDERSON James, KALRA Nidhi, STANLEY Karlyn, SORENSEN Paul, SAMARAS 
Constantine & OLUWATOLA Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle Technology – A Guide for Policymak-
ers, California, RAND, 4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html, read on 17 
April 2018.  
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in the midst of a robotics revolution”,78 which is poised to be the next transfor- 
mative technology.79 
This increased use of robots will have several advantages. Robots are 
more accurate and efficient because they are faster and can process information 
better than humans.80 As a consequence, they can perform many tasks better 
than their human counterparts.81 Companies from various economic sectors al-
ready rely on robotics and artificial intelligence to decrease costs, generate reve-
nues, enhance product quality and improve their competitiveness.82 In addition 
to these general benefits, robots can also have more specific advantages for the 
sector where they are used. Take the example of self-driving cars. Transport will 
become more time efficient with autonomous car technology.83 Human passen-
gers can occupy themselves with other professional or leisure activities - as they 
do no longer have to pay attention to the road. The use of SDCs will also lead 
to a better flow of traffic and less accidents, which results in fewer traffic jams. 
All these factors have a positive influence on productivity and the work/life ba- 
lance.84 One of the most important advantages of autonomous vehicle technolo-
gy is that traffic will become much safer with software operating the vehicle. The 
78  CALO, Ryan, Robots in American Law, University of Washington School of Law Research 
Paper no. 2016-04, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598, 3, read on 15 
April 2018.
79  CALO, Ryan, “Open Robotics”, Maryland Law Review, vol. 70, 2011, 571-613, 571.
80  TZAFESTAS, Spyros, Roboethics: A Navigating Overview, 1st ed., Athens, Springer, 2015, 147. 
81  DEITEL, Harvey & DEITEL, Barbara, Computers and Data Processing: International Edition, 
1st ed., Orlando, Academic Press, 2014, 434. 
82  IVANOV, Stanislav Hristov, “Robonomics - Principles, Benefits, Challenges, Solutions”, Year-
book of Varna University of Management, vol. 10, 2017, 283-285, 283-293 with further referenc-
es.   
83  See for example: ZOHN Jeffrey R., “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving 
cars that cause damages”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, 
no. 2, 2015, 471; DUFFY, Sophia & HOPKINS, Jamie, “Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Auton-
omous Car Liability”, SMU Science & Technology Law Review, vol. 16, 2013, 453-480, 475 & 
479.
84  DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehi-
cles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 325 with further 
references.
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number of accidents will reduce as computers are generally much better drivers 
than their human equivalents.85
At the same time, however, the introduction of robots also poses many 
challenges. Robots and artificial intelligence will have implications on various 
facets of our society. For instance, different studies illustrate that robotisation 
will affect the labour market.86 SDCs might replace persons nowadays employed 
in the transportation sector or other related industries.87 Experts also predict a 
decline in the so-called ‘crash economy’ once autonomous cars are commonly 
used. Involved in that economy are inter alia  garages, lawyers, insurance compa-
nies, physical therapists and, ironic as it is, the car industry itself.88 The increased 
use of robots will also pose several challenges from a legal or regulatory point of 
view.89 Without going into further detail, robots might affect human rights such 
as privacy or the freedom of speech,90 influence court proceedings or decision 
85  See for example: ZOHN, Jeffrey, “When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving 
cars that cause damages”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2015, 
no. 2, 2015, 471; GURNEY, Jeffrey, “Sue my car not me: products liability and accidents involv-
ing autonomous vehicles”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, vol. 2013, 
no. 2, 2013, 247-277, 250-251; DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage 
Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, 
no. 3, 2018, 325 with further references.
86  See for example: ACEMOGLU, Daron & RESTREPO, Pascual, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from 
US Labor Markets, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 17-04, 17 March 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941263, read on 28 April 2018; FREY, 
Carl Benedikt & OSBORNE, Michael, “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to 
computerisation?”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 114, 2017, 254-280, 254. 
87  DE BRUYNE Jan & TANGHE Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: 
a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 326-327 with further 
references.
88  ANDERSON James, KALRA Nidhi, STANLEY Karlyn, SORENSEN Paul, SAMARAS 
Constantine, OLUWATOLA Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle Technology – A Guide for Policymakers, 
California, RAND, xvii & 38-40, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html, 
read on 17 April 2018; DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused 
by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 
2018, 326-327 further references.
89  See in general: LEENES, Ronald et al, “Regulatory challenges of robotics: some guidelines”, 
Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 2. 
90  See for example: BALKIN, Jack, “Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation”, UC Davis Law Review, vol. 51, 2018, 1149-
1210; MASSARO, Toni & NORTON, Helen, “Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial In-
telligence», Northwestern University Law Review”, vol. 110, 2016, 1169-1194. 
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making processes91 and raise questions of corporate law.92 More importantly, 
liability issues will also become important in the future as robots will inevitably 
cause damage. In 2015, for instance, it was reported in the press that a robot 
killed a man at a Volkswagen factory in Germany.93 Examples of accidents with 
autonomous vehicles are also interesting in this regard and will be examined in 
the next part. 
3.2. The Liability Framework and Autonomous Vehicles  
Vehicles will not suddenly become fully autonomous or self-driving. 
Instead, technology will gradually take over a user’s control over the vehicle. 
Technology has already partly taken over some of the user’s tasks in controlling 
the vehicle. Examples thereof are adaptive cruise control, lane keeping assistance 
and automatic parking systems. These forms of partial vehicle are covered by 
the umbrella term Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS).94 Vehicles will 
eventually be able to take persons from one place to another without any human 
interference.95 In that case, one can speak of a fully autonomous or driverless 
91  See for example: REMUS, Dana & LEVY, Frank, “Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Law-
yers, and the Practice of Law”, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, vol. 30, 2017, 501; COG-
LIANESE, Cary & LEHR, David, “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the 
Machine-Learning Era”, Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 105, 2017, 1147-1223.
92  See for example: MÖSLEIN, Florian, “Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence and 
Corporate Law”, in: BARFIELD, Woodrow & PAGALLO, Ugo, Research Handbook on the Law 
of Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed., Edward Elgar, 2018, forthcoming. 
93  HUGGLER, Justin, Robot kills man at Volkswagen plant in Germany, The Telegraph, 2 July 
2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11712513/Robot-kills-
man-at-Volkswagen-plant-in-Germany.html, read on 1 May 2018. 
94  See for more information: SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opa-
city, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 134-135; VAN 
WEES Kiliaan, “Vehicle Safety Regulations and ADAS: Tensions Between Law and Technolo-
gy”, in: X, IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, The Hague, 2004, 
4011-4016. 
95  See for an overview of the technology used in autonomous vehicles: SURDEN, Harry & WIL-
LIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo 
Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 129-150; ANDERSON, James, KALRA, Nidhi, STANLEY, Karlyn, 
SORENSEN, Paul, SAMARAS, Constantine & OLUWATOLA, Tobi, Autonomous Vehicle 
Technology – A Guide for Policymakers, California, RAND, 55-74, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR443-2.html, read on 17 April 2018.   
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vehicle.96 Today, only prototypes of such vehicles exist. They are currently being 
tested on the road by companies such as Google and Tesla. 97
Despite the increased safety as a result of SDCs, road accidents will not 
suddenly disappear. Autonomous vehicles will share the road with ‘regular’ 
non-autonomous cars and other road users during a long transition period. Re-
cent accidents show that the technology used in autonomous vehicles is indeed 
not entirely flawless. Technological sensors do not work perfectly in exceptional 
circumstances such as stormy weather or heavy rainfalls. The autopilot sensors 
of a Tesla car, for instance, were not able to distinguish a white tractor-trailer 
crossing the highway from the bright sky above, leading to a fatal crash.98 In 
February 2016, an autonomous vehicle hit a bus because it did not know that 
long vehicles are less inclined to stop and give way.99 More recently, several news-
papers reported an accident with a Tesla autopilot vehicle, which resulted in the 
driver’s death.100 
Against this background, the question arises whether the legal framework 
dealing with the liability for damage caused by SDCs will need a fundamental 
make-over101 or instead minor changes might be sufficient. In other words, one 
has to assess “whether tort liability rules – as they are currently shaped – are suited 
to govern the “car minus driver” complexity, while simultaneously holding on to 
96  SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and 
Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 132-133. 
97  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 324-371; DE BRUYNE, Jan & VANLEENHOVE, Cedric, 
“The Rise of Self-Driving Cars: Is the Private International Law Framework for non-contractual 
obligations posing a bump in the road?”, IALS Student Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2018, 14-26. 
98  See in this regard: Tesla’s Blog, A Tragic Loss, 30 June 2016, https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/
tragic-loss, read on 22 April 2018. 
99  See in this regard: BOWLES, Nellie, Google self-driving car collides with bus in California, ac-
cident report says, The Guardian, 1 March 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
feb/29/google-self-driving-car-accident-california, read on 19 April 2018. 
100  See for example: HULL, Dana & SMITH, Tim, Tesla Driver Died Using Autopilot, With Hands 
Off Steering Wheel, Bloomberg Technology, 31 March 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-03-31/tesla-says-driver-s-hands-weren-t-on-wheel-at-time-of-accident, read on 1 
May 2018; BOUDETTE, Neal, Fatal Tesla Crash Raises New Questions About Autopilot System, 
New York Times, 31 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/business/tesla-crash-au-
topilot-musk.html, read on 1 May 2018. 
101  SURDEN, Harry & WILLIAMS, Mary-Anne, “Technological Opacity, Predictability, and 
Self-Driving Cars”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 38, 2016, 136. 
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their theoretical basis”.102 In any case, some changes to the legal framework will 
be inevitable. The Belgian Highway Code, for example, is not yet adapted to the 
introduction of autonomous car technology as it still requires that each vehicle 
has a ‘driver’.103 The driver must at all times be able to perform the necessary dri- 
ving actions and must have his vehicle under control.104 It is conceivable that the 
situation in other EU Member States will be quite similar. The existing liability 
rules might also need some changes with the commercialisation of SDCs. Re- 
liance on fault-based liability will become uncertain in the context of autono-
mous vehicles. It will, for instance, not be easy to determine who the ‘driver’ is 
in an autonomous vehicle and whether he can be held liable for a violation of 
the law that is actually committed by the vehicle itself (e.g. crossing a red light). 
Research also showed that it is by no means straightforward to hold the user of 
an autonomous vehicle liable for a negligent act in supervising the technology.105
Liability in traffic-related matters will, therefore, evolve from a fault-
based mechanism towards forms of strict liability. This means that victims will 
have to target other parties. There are different alternatives in national law. In 
Belgium, for instance, a party could sue the custodian of a defective object un-
der Article 1384, first paragraph, of the Belgian Civil Code (BCC).  That article 
imposes a strict liability regime for the custodian of a defective object for the 
damage caused by that object.106 Another more interesting possibility is to file 
a claim against the manufacturer of the vehicles or the software under the EU 
102  DAVOLA, Antonio, A Model for Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a 
Framework for the Upcoming Technology, 1 February 2018, 2, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3120679, read on 1 May 2018. 
103  Art. 8.1. Koninklijk besluit van 1 december 1975 houdende algemeen reglement op de politie van 
het wegverkeer en van het gebruik van de openbare weg, published on 9 December 1975 (Highway 
Code). 
104  Art. 8.3. Highway Code. See in this regard also the decision by the Belgian Court of Cassation, 
17 January 1989, Arr. Cass. 1988, 599 & Verkeersrecht-Jurisprudentie 1989, 181. 
105  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 344-347. 
106  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 348-354. 
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Product Liability Directive.107 Article 1 of the Directive stipulates that the pro-
ducer will be held liable for damage caused by a defect in his product.108 The 
question arises whether the Product Liability Directive is adapted to the reality 
of self-driving cars. In this regard, the GEAR 2030 High Level Group concluded 
that the motor insurance and product liability directives are sufficient at least for 
those systems expected by 2020. After that date, however, the application of the 
Product Liability Directive risks to create a number of problems.109 Against this 
background, we will examine whether this framework is inadequate and out of 
tune with the reality of SDCs by focusing on two elements,110 namely whether 
software can be qualified as product (part A) and the moment when the vehicle 
is put into circulation (part B).111
A. Qualification of Software 
Article 2 of the Product Liability Directive defines a product as all mova-
bles, with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even though 
incorporated into another movable or into an immovable. There is a debate on 
the question whether software qualifies as product or not. There are several rea-
sons why software cannot be seen as product. For instance, software might be 
qualified as a service and not as a product. In addition, the Directive only men-
tions ‘movables’. Therefore, it relates to tangible goods only. It would otherwise 
make no sense to explicitly include electricity in the scope of the Directive.112 
This requirement is problematic for software products. Software is a collection 
107  Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 
210. See for a discussion of product liability and self-driving cars in the United States: SMITH, 
Bryant Walker, “Automated Driving and Product Liability”, Michigan State Law Review, vol. 
2017, no. 1, 2017, 1-74; GURNEY, Jeffrey K., “Sue my car not me: products liability and ac-
cidents involving autonomous vehicles”, University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & 
Policy, vol. 2013, no. 2, 2013, 257-277. 
108  Article 1 Product Liability Directive. According to Article 5, a product is defective if it does not 
provide the safety that a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account. 
109  High Level Group on the Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in 
the European Union (GEAR 2030), “Ensuring that Europe has the most competitive, innovative 
and sustainable automotive industry of the 2030s and beyond”, October 2017, 43-44.
110  DAVOLA, Antonio, A Model for Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a 
Framework for the Upcoming Technology, 1 February 2018, 2, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3120679, read on 1 May 2018. 
111  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 355-364; 367-370.
112  Article 2 in fine Product Liability Directive. 
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of data and instructions that is imperceptible for the human eye. A software sys-
tem is thus often regarded as intangible. Accordingly, it might not fall within the 
scope of the Product Liability Act.113 
At the same time, however, there are also some reasons why software 
should fall within the scope of the Product Liability Directive. Software might be 
seen as the object of a service. It is, therefore, covered by the Directive. Software 
can also be qualified as a product because it is captured on a tangible medium or 
device (e.g. CD-ROM or USB). This has been affirmed by the European Com-
mission.114 Software an sich might be considered as a material good as well. The 
Directive could apply to software even if it is qualified as an intangible good. Af-
ter all, the inclusion of electricity clarifies that the drafters of the Directive aimed 
at a wide material scope. Legislators did not think of software in the early 1980s 
as personal computers only became commercially widespread during the second 
half of the 1980s. It is thus conceivable that software, in a teleological interpreta-
tion of the Directive, falls within the scope of the Directive. The European Court 
of Justice might come to a similar conclusion in the future. The inclusion of soft-
ware in the Directive would also reflect the current economic reality in which 
software is a commercial product just as any other product that may entail risks 
for users and third parties.115
B. Putting the Self-Driving Car into Circulation
Pursuant to Article 7(b) of Product Liability Directive, the manufacturer 
of the product can escape liability when he proves that it is probable that the de-
fect causing the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into 
circulation or that this defect came into being afterwards. If software is qualified 
as a product, any update thereof could be considered an act by which the produ- 
cer brings a new product into circulation. However, it becomes more difficult 
with so-called self-learning systems. These systems are not periodically updated 
but continually improve themselves. For defects that are created in this way, a 
moment of putting the product into circulation cannot be indicated as the ma- 
nufacturer did not perform an act to that end. The same reasoning also applies to 
the liability of the manufacturer of the vehicle. The changes made by a self-lear- 
113  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE Jan & TANGHE Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, no. 8, 2018, 355-357. 
114  See in this regard: Written Question no. 706/88 of 5 July 1988 and Answer by Lord Cockfield on 
behalf of the Commission on 15 November 1988, OJ 114/42, 8 May 1989.  
115  See for an extensive discussion and further references: DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, 
“Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehicles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of Eu-
ropean Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 355-357.
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ning system and the updates performed by the software producer can create de-
fects for which the car manufacturer is no longer liable. Indeed, those defects 
did not exist at the time when he put the vehicle into circulation. Although the 
vehicle meets the definition of a product, its manufacturer might thus easily 
escape liability if the damage is caused by a dysfunction in the software. One 
could argue that Article 7(b) Product Liability Directive should be inapplicable 
in those circumstances. This makes it possible for victims to file a claim against 
the manufacturer of the software even when the defect is created through the 
continuous self-development of software.116
4. Concluding Remarks 
The article examined whether some of the existing legal principles in two 
different fields are compatible with technological evolutions. As to service of 
process via social media, the article explored the remarkable finding that some 
courts in common law countries have allowed the notice of the commencement 
of civil proceedings to be effected via one or more social media accounts belon- 
ging to the defendant. In contrast, in continental EU jurisdictions this phenom-
enon does not exist. The article laid the conditions imposed by American courts 
for this type of service bare and subsequently gave an overview of the Belgian 
procedural framework. Even though it remains to be seen whether the Belgian 
legislator will ever be tempted by this novel method of service, it is submitted 
that social media service could be useful as a second layer of subsidiary notice 
when the defendant does not have a known address. With regard to self-driving 
cars, some legal changes at the national level are inevitable. Legislation dealing 
with road safety is not yet adopted to the introduction of autonomous vehicles. 
We have also shown that the application of some of the concepts used in the 
EU Product Liability Directive might become problematic when SDCs will be 
commercialised. For instance, the moment of putting the product into circu-
lation might be incompatible with autonomous systems. In any case, when po- 
licymakers would change the legal framework, they should take into account 
that a minor modification of one aspect (e.g. qualification of software) can have 
major consequences on the liability of the manufacturers of software or of the 
self-driving vehicle. Therefore, we suggest a balanced and well-considered ap-
proach when it comes to adapting the existing legal framework to technological 
evolutions.117
116  DE BRUYNE, Jan & TANGHE, Jochen, “Liability for Damage Caused by Autonomous Vehi-
cles: a Belgian Perspective”, Journal of European Tort Law, vol. 8, no. 3, 2018, 362-363 & 370. 
117  See in this regard also: DE BRUYNE, Jan & WERBROUCK, Jarich, “Merging self-driving cars 
with the Law”, Computer and Security Law Review, vol. 34, no. 5, 2018, forthcoming. 
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ASSURING PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF SMART TOURISM 
DESTINATIONS1
Manuel David Masseno2, Cristiana Santos3
Abstract: Data lies at the core of all smart tourism activities as tourists engage 
in different and personalized touristic services whilst the pre/during/post tra- 
velling or in holidays. From these interactions, a digital data trail is seamlessly 
captured in a technology embedded environment, and then mined and har-
nessed in the context of STD - Smart Tourist Destinations to create enriched, 
high-value experiences, namely those related to eco-responsibility, as well as 
granting destinations with competitive advantages. The perceived enjoyment of 
experiences must be considered within the legal framework of Privacy and Data 
Protection by exposing inherent risks, analysing the available answers given by 
the GDPR – the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union. 
Hence the purpose of this paper is i. to singularize the specificities of Smart 
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Tourism Destinations; ii. to show how the principles of personal data pro- 
tection, as set forth by the GDPR, are allocated within the STD realm; iii. and, 
finally, to derive potential legal implications of this ecosystem. Our approach 
is based on a legal analysis engaged in scholarship research. We have mostly 
denoted the underestimation of the legal implications of technology-enhanced 
tourism experiences, and the marginalization of both informed involvement 
and awareness by the individual in these processes. This study is novel in ha-
ving undertaken an initial exploration of the legal implications of experiences 
taking place by STD. 
Keywords: Privacy and Data Protection, Smart Tourism Destinations
Summary: Introduction 1. Specificities of STD 1.1. Smart Tourism Destina-
tions 1.2. Technology-Enhanced and Empowered Experiences 2. Compliance 
of Smart Tourism Destinations with the privacy and data protection princi-
ples 2.1. Fairness and Transparency 2.2. Lawfulness of Processing: Consent, 
Legitimate Interests, Contract and Public sector 2.3. Purpose Limitation 2.4. 
Data Minimization: Collection and Retention 2.5. Accuracy and Up-to-date 
Processing 3. Reflections and Conclusions
Introduction
Smart Tourism Destinations (hereinafter called STD) are an offspring of 
the technological foundations of Smart Cities, themselves benefiting from the 
interplay with other technological environments based on the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and the Cloud, as enabled by Big Data Analytics. 
However, while these subjects have been examined extensively within 
Privacy literature, their specific context and legal consequences on STD is still 
to be explored. As a matter of fact, this is perceived and pointed out as a missing 
issue by the Tourism Science literature regarding STD4. Given the insufficiencies 
in the literature and these recent claims, this study aims to provide a theoretical 
review of the technology-empowered tourism experiences and its legal implica-
tions to privacy and data protection.  
4 Even being tourism the world’s largest industry, with receipts of almost 1,200 USD Billion in 2017, 
and growth expectations of 4% to 5% for 2018, according to the UNWTO Barometer, notwith-
standing internal tourism. Accessible at http://media.unwto.org/press-release/2018-01-15/2017-
international-tourism-results-highest-seven-years consulted on the 02/05/2018.
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Theoretically and in practice, STD have been designed to enrich tourism 
experiences and to enhance the competitiveness of each destination. 
ICTs embedded within tourism destinations environments allow the 
collecting and analysis of large amounts of tourism data for the identification 
of attitude patterns and to predict behaviours of tourists and travelers. This is 
achieved by addressing their potential needs and desires even at an unconscious 
level of travelers.
Regarding this connection between Tourism and ICTs, we’re facing a 
new relationship between clients-tourism providers which is very context-spe-
cific: i. Short-lived engagement, focused on the pre/during/post travel, which 
makes trust-building and costumer’s loyalty much harder5; ii. Imminent need 
for real-time information in situ, for vacation decision-making, so that tourists 
might be easily persuaded to forego their data; iii. Heightened benefits or “per-
ceived enjoyment” (evoked by the engaging content, discounts, and interactive 
system features)6, suggesting that personal data is traded therewithal for useful 
purposes and hence privacy concerns might be temporarily suspended; iv. Tou- 
rism activities take place in locations outside of the usual realm of the traveler, 
and are often facilitated by unknown local service providers, which decrease 
privacy risk perceptions7, for instance at natural spaces apparently far from ur-
ban invasive surveillance; v. Growing number of connected smart objects and 
wearable devices involved in a network of multiple vendors and interoperating 
systems, where privacy issues are blanked out; vi. Multiple stakeholders’ inte- 
raction making it even harder to identify privacy flaws.
The following illustrative examples provide insight towards the persona- 
lized and smart added-value services that STD can offer:
Full historic immersions through smart optics devices or augmented reality for a 
“happy guest” are services already offered. Further, location-based services (LBS) 
could alert users to the closeness of birds to be watched or to endemic plants. 
Besides, estimated waiting time for the entrance to Natural Parks and other Pro-
tected Sites can be accurately quoted, to the minute, so tourists may reorganize 
their visiting or trail options or get a drink in a bar while waiting. Besides, aware 
on customers’ special dietary circumstances in regard with their medical condi-
tion, as well as religion restrictions, tourism service providers may provide for 
5  NEUHOFER, Barbara; BUHALIS, Dimitrios, et al., «Smart technologies for personalized experi-
ences: a case study in the hospitality domain», Electronic Markets, Vol 25, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 243-
254.
6  NEUHOFER, Barbara; BUHALIS, Dimitrios, et al., «Smart technologies for personalized experi-
ences: a case study in the hospitality domain», cit. 
7  GRETZEL, Ulrike; SIGALA, Marianna et al., «Smart tourism: foundations and developments», 
Electronic Markets, Vol. 25, Issue 3, pp. 179–188.
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meals that suits their preferences. As for transport, real-time information about 
the tourist’s destinations, which direction to get on, and the ability to respond 
(i.e., by suggesting alternatives) to unpredictable events in real-time are envi-
sioned, namely sudden weather changes. RFID tags on their outfit would make it 
easier to locate travelers in case of being lost or in order to identify those liable for 
damages inflicted to natural spaces or protected species.
All these enhanced services allow tourists to get much more from their 
travel and helps them fulfilling the experiential travelling potential of the desti-
nation8. STD experiences are hence achieved through intensive personalization, 
context-awareness and real-time monitoring9-10 processes of information ma- 
nagement which entail legal risks, demanding a careful analysis within the data 
protection framework.
Given the nature of STD and its uses, the application of some of the prin-
ciples of data processing (e.g. the principles of data minimization, purpose li- 
mitation, fairness and transparency, and free, specific and informed consent) 
may be challenging in this technological scenario.
As a large spectrum of user-generated content is tourism data processed 
in a smart tourism environment concern personal data and human interaction, 
there is a direct impact on individuals and their rights with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data. 
As explicitly mirrored in Article 8 (3) of the Global Code of Ethics for 
Tourism11, tourists and visitors should benefit from the same rights as the citizens 
of the country visited concerning the confidentiality of the personal data and 
information concerning them, especially when these are stored electronically. 
Therefore, it should be underlined that Privacy and Data Protection evaluation 
is needed in any tourism environment, balancing the tradeoff value and affor-
dances added by STD and its legal protection. This work therefore provides a 
8  BUHALIS, Dimitrios; AMARANGGANA, Aditya, «Smart Tourism Destinations», XIANG, 
Zheng; TUSSYADIAH, Lis (Eds.), Information and Communication Technologies in Tourism 2014 
- Proceedings of the International Conference in Dublin, Ireland, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014, pp. 
553-564.
9  BUHALIS, Dimitrios; AMARANGANNA, Aditya, «Smart Tourism Destination», cit. 
10  BUHALIS, Dimitrios; AMARANGANNA, Aditya, «STD: Enhancing Tourism Experience 
Through Personalisation of Services», in TUSSYADIAH, Lis; INVERSINI, Alessandro (Eds.), 
Information and Communication Technologies in Tourism 2015 - Proceedings of the International 
Conference in Lugano, Switzerland, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp. 377-389. 
11 Accessible at http://ethics.unwto.org/en/content/global-code-ethics-tourism-article-8, consulted 
on the 02/05/2018.
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study of the principles of data protection, as set forth by the GDPR, within the 
STD context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the background of 
STD, describing briefly its specificities and giving examples of technologically 
enhanced and empowered experiences. Section 2 explains how smart technolo-
gies affect compliance with the principles of the General Data Protection Regu-
lation12, as the current basis of Privacy and Data Protection Legal system in the 
European Union. Section 3 concludes the paper and provides some clues for 
future directions.
1. Specificities of STD
This section describes the constituents of STD, objectives and derived 
added value.
 1.1 Smart Tourism Destinations
In order to characterize more closely the utility functions layered in tou- 
rism destinations, it is worthy to point out that successful destinations are com-
posed by five tourism dimensions: transportation, accommodation, gastrono-
my, attractions and ancillaries services, which can be then structured into six 
axes or “6As” as the literature describes13, namely: i. Attractions, which can be 
natural, like as mountain or a seaside; artificial, as amusement parks or sports 
facilities; or cultural such as music festival or a museum; ii. Accessibility refers 
to the transportation within the given destination; iii. Amenities characterize all 
services, namely accommodation, gastronomy and leisure activities; iv. Available 
Packages; v. Activities; and vi. Ancillary Services (e.g. daily use services such as 
bank, postal service and hospital). 
By applying smartness into tourism destinations, STD are defined as:
 “[…] tourism supported by integrated efforts at a destination, to find innovative 
ways to collect and aggregate/harness data derived from physical infrastructure, 
social connections, government/organizational sources and human bodies/minds 
in combination with the use of advanced technologies to transform that data into 
12  Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the EP and of the Council of 27/04/2016, on the protection of natu-
ral persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), applicable from the 25th 
May 2018.
13  BUHALIS, Dimitrios, «Marketing the Competitive Destination of the Future». Tourism Manage-
ment, Vol. 21, 2000, pp. 97–116.
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enhanced experiences and business value-propositions with a clear focus on effi-
ciency, sustainability and enriched experiences during the trip”14. 
This embracing concept comprises three core elements of destinations15:
i. Reliance on smart technology infrastructures, wireless sensor networks 
(IoT) and integrated communications systems, e.g. sensor technology, ubiquitous 
wifi, near-field communication (NFC), smart mobile connectivity, radio-fre-
quency-identification (RFID), sophisticated data warehouses; data mining al-
gorithms, also considered vital to creating a smart technology infrastructure16. 
IoT provides support in terms of information gathering and analysis as well as 
regarding automation and control. For instance, chips embedded to entrance 
tickets, or a smartphone app, allow tourism service providers to track tourists’ 
locations and their consumption behavior, enabling location-based advertising 
or rescue in case of them getting lost when departing from an usual trail. In 
addition, cloud computing services may provide access to solid web platforms 
and data storage through public electronic communications network. It also en-
courages information sharing, a fundamental feature for STD. For example, a 
sophisticated tour guide system could serve massive number of tourists without 
being actually installed on any personal device, even allowing personalizing ex-
periences;
ii. Built on an infrastructure of state-of-the-art technology, “[…] accessi-
ble to everyone, which facilitates the visitor’s interaction with and integration into 
his or her surroundings, increases the quality of the experience at the destination, 
and improves residents’ quality of life”17; 
iii. Smart business networks, referring to the number of applications at 
various levels supported by a combination of Cloud Computing and IoT.
 1.2 Technology-Enhanced and Empowered Experiences
The shared purpose of all omni-channel actors of a smart tourism ecosys-
tem is to provide enhanced/enriched, high-value, meaningful, memorable tou- 
rism experiences through services and products mediated through technology 
(technology-mediated experiences). 
14  GRETZEL, Ulrike; REINO, Sofia et al., «Smart Tourism Challenges», Journal of Tourism, 2015, 
Vol. 16, Issue 1, pp. 41-47.
15  HÖJER, Mattias & WANGEL, Josefin, «Smart Sustainable Cities: Definition and Challenges», In 
HILTY, Lorenz; B. AEBISCHER, Bernard (Eds.) ICT Innovations for Sustainability, Advances in 
Intelligent Systems and Computing, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp. 333-349.
16  GRETZEL, Ulrike; REINO, Sofia et al., op. cit.
17  HÖJER, Mattias & WANGEL, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, cit.
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Such experiences are rendered enhanced or empowered, according to the 
type and role of technology used. In technology-enhanced experiences, techno- 
logy available in the Web 2.0 plays a supporting role to make consumers actively 
participate and shape the creation of their experiences. Consumers use social 
networking sites and mobile apps to interact with organizations, use review sites, 
comment and use media to share their experiences18. 
On the other hand, “technology-empowered experiences” emerge from 
advanced technological developments, such as interactive environments, aug-
mented reality, near field communications, gaming, etc. At this latter level, tech-
nology is pervasive and allows tourists to interact and engage with the diffe- 
rent service-providers throughout all the stages of travel, service encounters and 
touch-points, either in the physical tourism destination or in the online space. 
These new experiences are predicted to be richer, more participatory. In fact, 
consumers play an active part in co-creating19 their own experiences, recogni- 
zing these way active consumers co-creating their experiences in a quest for per-
sonal growth and value.
It is pertinent to systematize and explore some types of technologies worn 
in practical settings within destinations to enhance and empower experiences. 
Technologies range from:
I. Social networking sites (SNSs);
II. Mobile applications (destination apps) ;
III. Interactive websites;
IV. Interactive ordering systems (eTable technology)
V. Interactive mobile platforms (iPads);
VI. Wearable devices;
VII. Big data analytics;
Social networking sites (SNSs), as referred in i., have already expanded 
their capabilities as build-in apps to meet social media user´s needs; they are 
mostly Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, TripAdvisor, Yelp and have made user-ge- 
nerated content (UGC) such as preferences, needs, interests, profiles, etc.  freely 
accessible online. Such user-input content is reified in social profiles, reviews, 
18  TUSSYADIAH, Lis; & FESENMAIER, Daniel, «Mediating the tourist experiences access to places 
via shared videos», Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 24-40.
19  PRAHALAND, C. K.; RAMASWAMY, Venkat, «Co-creation experiences: the next practice in 
value creation», Journal of Interactive Marketing, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2004, pp. 5-14. 
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ratings, comments, impressions on past experiences, recommendations for fu-
ture purchases, etc.). The travel review website TripAdvisor generates a signi- 
ficant source of tourism-related (open) data given the figures and reviews on at-
tractions/destinations; as a means of illustration, “in 2015, TripAdvisor reached 
320 million reviews and had 6.2million opinions on places to stay, to eat and on 
things to do - including 995,000 hotels and forms of accommodation, 770,000 
vacation rentals, 3.8 million restaurants and 625,000 attractions in 125,000 
destinations throughout the world”20.
Destination mobile applications mentioned in ii. are characterized by 
their “mobiquity” (mobility and ubiquity), and free wifi access to information 
anywhere and anytime have led to a behavioral transformation of tourists from 
‘‘sit and search’’ to ‘‘roam and receive”21.
As an example of iii., the interactive online website PixMeAway22 is a 
picture-based search engine that allows consumers to interact with the inter-
face, select appealing travel motifs, photos, the traveler type, and define their 
travel personality. The website will provide destination suggestions matching 
their criteria. 
As an example of iv. the Inamo Restaurant23 provides an instance in 
which the technology empowers the tourism experience. This restaurant “[…] 
introduces a fully digitalized dining experience and interactive ordering system. 
This system, developed by E-Table, uses a combination of table touchpads and 
overhead projection to allow customers to see the food and drinks menu projec- 
ted onto the table surface. The system further allows customers to change table 
clothes to the current mood and preferences, watch their food being prepared in 
the kitchen through a webcam in real time, manage the waiter and bills, explore 
the local neighborhood for activities afterwards or order a cab home. By doing 
so, the restaurant provides the physical technology (interactive tables) without 
which the unique dining experience could not occur, rendering the technology 
the central element of the experience creation.
20  PANTANO, Eleonora; PRIPORAS, Constantinos-Vasilios et al, «You will like it!’ Using open data 
to predict tourists’ responses to a tourist attraction», Tourism Management, Vol. 60, 2017, pp. 
430-438; and also the TripAdvisor annual report for 2015. Accessible at http://ir.tripadvisor.com/
static-files/a0cc5025-7f78-416f-9643-e863f5e307a5 consulted on the 02/05/2018.
21  PIHLSTRÖM, Minna, Perceived Value of Mobile Service Use and its Consequences, Helsinki: Swe-
dish School of Economics and Business Administration, 2008, accessible at https://helda.helsinki.
fi/bitstream/handle/10227/269/176-978-951-555-977-7.pdf?sequence=2&origin=publication_
detail, p. 1, consulted on 02/05/2018.
22  Accessible at http://www.pixmeaway.com/, consulted on the 02/05/2018.
23  Accessible at http://www.inamo-restaurant.com/, consulted on the 02/05/2018.
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As an example of v., the Hotel Lugano Dante24 provides a case of hotel 
enrichment context where mobile platforms can come into play to facilitate and 
enhance the level of interaction between company and guests throughout the en-
tire hotel experience.  In such hotel, “Guests provide personal information and 
preferences, such as room temperature, favorite beverages, and preferred news-
papers and so on, whereas members of staff retrieve this specific information. 
By accessing the platform on a mobile device, the hotel and guests co-create 
through exchanging information in real time, which are used to facilitate en-
counters on multiple touch points. This leads to more personalized interactions, 
more valuable service encounters and on overall enhanced experience for the 
guest”.
Wearable devices, listed as vi. are body-attached computers and are part 
of the IoT, therefore contributing to ubiquitous computing. Nowadays, there are 
different types of wearables applied to tourism destinations25:
• Smart watches provide notifications such as status updates, com-
ments, photo tags, check-in, etc. Tourists can also receive real-time 
flight alerts, gate changes, and other information on their wrists;
• Bracelets/watches can track guests’ sleeping patterns, as clients wear 
a watch while sleeping and wake them through gentle vibrations;
• Wrist band able to swipe hotel room keys;
• Smart glasses used by tourists in museums, art galleries to see cultu- 
ral artifacts and activate digital contents, such as video, games, pho-
tos, etc. on the glass display screen by simply looking at the collection 
item; visitors can easily switch between real objects and augmented 
reality. 
All wearables have in common the fact they collect and process 
user-specific data. Alongside body-data, many wearables record location-data 
and geo-data, often unnoticed by the users, for they can be used to calculate the 
distance travelled, to determine the user’s location, etc., which poses a challenge 
for present data protection and privacy. Moreover, the use of wearable devices 
does not only involve its user (the owner of the device), but also the manu-
facturer, third-party providers and other intermediaries (insurance companies, 
24  NEUHOFER, Barbara; BUHALIS, Dimitrios et al., «Smart technologies for personalized expe- 
riences: a case study in the hospitality domain», cit. 
25 ATEMBE, Roland, «The Use of Smart Technology in Tourism: Evidence From Wearable Devices», 
Journal of Tourism and Hospitality Management, December, Vol. 3, n. 11-12, 2015, pp. 224-234.
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scientists or advertising companies). Furthering, data is often not stored locally 
or processed by the device itself, but forwarded to a Cloud service (even possi-
bly located outside Europe)26.
Concerning big data analytics, pointed in vii., tourism data is an asset 
being exploited using a multi-modal pipeline of advanced data analysis me- 
thods called big data analytics27 comprising content analytics crawlers (mining 
unstructured content), machine learning (ML) algorithms, natural language 
processing tools (NLP) and data mining techniques (DM). Distinctive aspects 
of big data analytics are briefly mentioned herewith to foresee its implications 
on data protection28: i. Use of large numbers of ML algorithms against data to 
find correlations, inferences between data. Once relevant correlations are iden-
tified (originally unforeseen), a new ML algorithm can be created and deployed 
to specific cases in the future; ii. Tendency to collect and analyze all the data 
that is available; iii. Repurposing of data for which it was originally collected, as 
analytics can mine data for new insights and find correlations between appa- 
rently disparate datasets; and iv. Use of new types of data automatically gene- 
rated and coming from the IOT devices, as sensors. Even though these methods 
endow stakeholders with a fine-grained data to extract value, trends and pat-
terns, thereby enabling them to customize technology-empowered experiences 
through smart products and services, they also increase known risks hampering 
privacy and data protection29.
The implementation of the above mentioned smart ICT enhances tourism 
experience through the offer of products/services that are customized, perso- 
nalized (personalized infotainment services), to meet each of the visitor’s unique 
needs and even implied desires, since understanding travelers’ needs, wishes 
and desires becomes increasingly critical for the attractiveness of destinations. 
Such customization, personalization and profiling is attained by collecting UGC 
from all these technological artifacts, and reusing it to provide meaningful offers 
26  JÜLICHER, Tim; DELISLE, Marc, «Step into ‘The Circle’—A Close Look at Wearables and Quan-
tified Self», In HOEREN, Thomas; KOLANY-RAISER, Barbara (Eds.), Big Data in Context - Legal, 
Social and Technological Insights, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018, pp. 81-91.
27  WATERMAN, K.; BRUENING, Paula, «Big Data analytics: risks and responsibilities», Interna-
tional Data Privacy Law, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 89-95.
28  MANTELERO, Alessandro; VACIAGO, Giuseppe, «The ‘Dark Side’ of Big Data: Private and Pub-
lic Interaction in Social Surveillance. How data collections by private entities affect governmental 
social control and how the EU reform on data protection responds in Social Surveillance», Com-
puter Law Review International, Vol. 14, 2013, pp. 161-169. 
29  COUTURIER, Hervé, At the Big Data Crossroads: turning towards a smarter travel experience. 
Amadeus IT Group Report, 2013, accessible at http://amadeusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/Am-
adeus-Big-Data-Report.pdf, consulted on 02/05/2018.
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fitting perfectly the clients’ needs30 with the ultimate desideratum of achieving 
more satisfaction31 at the experience environment. 
Therefore, tourism-related data has multiplied geometrically32 through 
its varied provenance (SNSs, apps, sensors, etc.). These sources provide a mas-
sive size of volunteered, observed, inferred or collected digital traces, resulting 
in multidimensional sets of data, known as big data33. This massification of re-
al-time tourism-related data, analyzed by IoT industries, has created big pools of 
data to mine. Hence, SDT can be considered both as consumers and producers 
of big data. 
This tourism-related data, inherently cross-border, holds strategic com-
mercial value. It comprises, for example, i. transactional data between tourists 
and transportation/hospitality undertakings (airlines, hotel, restaurants and 
rental car businesses)34 derived from queries/searches, purchases, and other 
exchanges; ii. geographical data; and iii. UGC from client’s profiles, established 
preferences, needs, etc. These data can reveal commercial preferences of its users, 
allows the detection and prediction of future behaviors and trends, rendering 
enormous interest for economic operators, and allow destinations to better plan 
for future tourists in terms of mobility, popular attractions, and other potential 
issues. By managing such big data, tourism organizations can extract valuable 
insight from information that could elevate them to a new dimension of custo- 
mer experience and improve the way they interact with customers, hence gain-
30  EDWARDS, Lilian, «Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: a critical EU law 
perspective», European Data Protection Law Review, Vol. 2, 2016, pp. 28-58.
31  LAW, Rob; LEUNG, Rosanna et al., «Information technology applications in hospitality and tou- 
rism: a review of publications from 2005 to 2007», Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing, Vol. 26, 
Issue 5-6, 2009, pp. 599-623.
32  MANYIKA, James; CHUI, Michael et al., Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, 
and productivity. Report McKinsey Global Institute, 2011, accessible at https://www.mckinsey.
com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/big-data-the-next-frontier-for-innovation, 
consulted on 02/05/2018.
33  HABEGGER, Benjamin; HASAN, Omar, et al. «Personalization vs. Privacy in Big Data Analysis», 
International Journal of Big Data, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 25-35.
34  These activities reveal aspects on destination/origins, way-finding preferences (beach, sports, 
culture, restaurants, etc.), spending capacities, and on behaviours (family tourism, leisure, night 
clubs, events, etc.), etc.
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ing competitive advantage35. Such information is the fabric for companies to 
convert big and open data36 into future preferences and value propositions37. 
However, such processing of personal information (data trails or digital 
footprints) contains the risk of building of a detailed profile of tourists, actually, 
a holistic personal mosaic of the individual users, with imminent implications 
for privacy and data protection38.
2. Compliance of Smart Tourism Destinations with the 
privacy and data protection principles
 2.1 Fairness and Transparency
Article 5(1) (a) states that personal data must be “processed fairly, lawful-
ly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject”. Accordingly, des-
tinations must assess if their processing of personal data is fair and transparent. 
Transparency of automated decision-making is taking an increasingly important 
role with the advent of big data analytics. Whether the data are volunteered, 
observed, or inferred, or collected from accessible sources, individuals are fully 
entitled to know which are they, from where and from whom the controllers 
obtained it, and how automated decisions were taken. 
Denote that big data algorithms (also used in STD scenarios) learn and 
change in a (semi) autonomous way, making them hard to document; further, or-
ganisations often claim secrecy over “how” data is processed on grounds of com-
mercial confidentiality and copyright protecting the software and the trade-se-
cret shield39. Profiling and correlation results are hence invisible and opaque, and 
35  BUHALIS, Dimitrios; AMARANGGANA, Aditya, «Smart Tourism Destination», cit. 
36  We denominate this data as “open data”, as it accomplishes the criteria of i. availability and access; 
ii. reuse and redistribution; iii. Universal participation, i.e., this data can be reused by anyone, 
https://okfn.org/opendata/. It is notable to state that growing amount of tourism-related open 
data is available in machine-readable ways (XML, CSV, or JSON format), PANTANO, Eleonora; 
PRIPORAS, Constantinos-Vasilios et al., «You will like it!’ Using open data to predict tourists’ 
responses to a tourist attraction», cit.
37  MASSENO, Manuel D., «On the relevance of Big Data for the formation of contracts regar- 
ding package tours or linked travel arrangements, according to the New Package Travel Directive», 
Comparazione e diritto civile, Fasc. 4, 2016, pp. 2-14. 
38  RUBINSTEIN, Ira S., «Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning», International Data 
Privacy Law, Vol 3, Issue 2, 2013, pp, 74-87; also, KEMP, Richard, «Legal aspects of managing big 
data», Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 30, 2014, pp. 482-491.
39  SCHWARTZ, Paul; SOLOVE, Daniel, «The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Perso- 
nally Identifiable Information», New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2011, pp. 1814-1894.  
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its results often impenetrable to laymen. Secret-tracking and decision-making 
on the basis of profiles are then hidden from any consumer-tourist, which is left 
without meaningful information about the employed “algorithmic logic”. Still, 
we are attentive to a right to know the “logic of the processing” applied to data 
(Recital 63, and Arts. 13(2) (f), and 15(1) (h)), respectively.
The GDPR defines profiling in Article 4 as: “[…] any form of automated 
processing of personal data consisting of using those data to evaluate certain per-
sonal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects 
concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, 
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements”.
Profiling is an important feature in tourism destinations. Tourism service 
providers are adapting their serviceable approach to meet the personalization 
expectation40.  In fact, data-processing scenarios collect user’s input and feed-
back which are used to build fine-grained premium services and recommender 
systems in the form of trail packages. The richer the user profile, the higher the 
temptation for the operators to target a user with unsolicited advertising or to 
engineer a pricing structure capable to extract as much surplus from the user as 
possible41.
The GDPR prohibits automated individual decision-making that signifi-
cantly affect individuals, Art. 22 (1). Notably, “[…] analytics based on informa-
tion caught in an IoT environment might enable the detection of an individual’s 
even more detailed and complete life and behavior patterns.”42
Indeed, developments on consumer-tourist automated profiles, facilita- 
ted by big data analytics, can significantly affect data subjects43. Covert profiling 
can, in certain cases, lead to unintended consequences:
i. when based on incomplete data, profiling can lead to false negatives, 
depriving individuals from benefits that they would be entitled to;
ii. “filter bubbles” effect44, according to which data subjects will only be 
exposed to content which confirms their own preferences and patterns, without 
any door open to serendipity and casual discovery;
40 EDWARDS, Lilian, «Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: a critical EU law 
perspective» cit.
41  ENISA 2015 Report, Privacy and Data Protection by Design – from policy to engineering.
42 Art. 29 WP Opinion 8/2014, Recent Developments on the Internet of Things.
43 EDPS Opinion 3/2015, Europe’s big opportunity, EDPS Recommendations on the EU’s options for 
data protection reform.
44  PARISER, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You, New York: The Penguin 
Press, 2011.
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iii. isolation and/or discrimination, e.g., including price differentiation, 
without providing the individuals the possibility to contest these decisions. In a 
STD, ML decisions and profiling can lead to promote direct or indirect discri- 
mination decisions through the exclusion/denial of services/goods, e.g. denial 
of insurances, exclusion from the sale of touristic services or high-end products, 
shops or entertainment complexes to certain profiled tourists and even other 
decisions that reflect upon health, creditworthiness, recruitment, insurance risk, 
etc; it even can lead to discriminate essential utilities for those unwilling to share 
personal data45. In this synopsis, tourists might be discriminated against because 
they belong to a particular social group, but also, such ascertainment might be 
based on factors, identified by the analytics, that they share with members of 
that group.
Therefore, in order to ensure a fair and transparent processing, automated 
decisions should account all the circumstances concerning the data and not be 
based on merely de-contextualized information or on data processing results. 
In furtherance of this aim, the controller should find ways to build dis-
crimination detection into their ML systems, to prevent inaccuracies and errors 
assigned to labeled profiles; as referred in Recital 71, the controller should “[…] 
use appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling, implement 
technical and organisational measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that 
factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of 
errors is minimised, secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the 
potential risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that pre-
vents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic 
or health status or sexual orientation, or that result in measures having such an 
effect”.
 2.2 Lawfulness of Processing: Consent, Legitimate Interests, Con-
tract and Public sector
In this sort of intelligent environment, it is dubious to give or withhold 
our prior consent to data collection46, as it seems to be absent by design. The 
awareness that the ubiquitous sensors are so embedded in the destination that 
they literally “disappear” from the users’ sight, so that they will not even be 
45  SCHWARTZ, Paul; SOLOVE, Daniel, «The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Perso- 
nally Identifiable Information», cit. 
46  KITCHIN, Rob, Getting smarter about smart cities: Improving data privacy and data security. Data 
Protection Unit, Department of the Taoiseach, Dublin (2016), accessible at http://eprints.mayno-
othuniversity.ie/7242/, consulted on the 02/05/2018.
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conscious of their presence and hence consent to the collection, can be envisaged 
within STD. We can, at some extent, concede that the obtaining of such consent, 
in STD contexts, would be defined in a mechanical or perfunctory manner, or 
as a “routinization”. 
We note also that as for CCTV, ANPR and MAC whilst tracking and sen-
sing, the notice in the form of information signs in the area being surveilled, or 
on related websites, does not conform to the consent requirements. The issue of 
the IoT embedded in STD is that its sensorization devices are explicitly designed 
to be unobtrusive and seamless, invisible in use and unperceived to users47 and 
thereupon, users do not hold the opportunity give their unambiguous, informed, 
specific, explicit, and granular consent48-49. Therefore, the data controller might 
have difficulty in demonstrating that the consent was given, and the data subject 
is not able to withdraw that consent50.
Still, consent is not yet part of a function specification of IoT devices, 
and thus, they do not have means to display “provide fine-tuned consent in line 
with the preferences expressed by individuals,” because smart roads, trams, tourist 
office devices are usually small, screenless and lack an input mechanism (a key-
board or a touch screen)51. 
Regarding the amount and assortment of these interactions, it is just too 
onerous for each data subject to assess their privacy settings across dozens of 
entities, if any, in order to ponder about the non-negotiable tradeoffs of agreeing 
to privacy policies without knowing how the data might be used now and in the 
future, and to assess the cumulative effects of their data being merged with other 
datasets52. 
Reverting also to other legal grounds, processing personal data relies on 
“public interest”, which can sidestep the need for consent (health, national go- 
vernmental agencies gather data for e. g. e-Government systems, e-Health). Ne- 
vertheless, this possibility should not conceal any eventual “third-party interest”. 
47  SCHWARTZ, Paul M.; SOLOVE, Daniel D., «The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of 
Personally Identifiable Information» cit.
48  Art. 29 WP Opinion 15/2011, Definition of Consent; Art. 29 WP (259 rev. 01) Guidelines on Con-
sent under Regulation 2016/679.
49  MANTELERO, Alessandro, «The future of consumer data protection in the E.U. Re-thinking the 
‘notice and consent’ paradigm in the new era of predictive analytics», Computer Law and Security 
Review, Vol 30, 2014, pp. 643-660. 
50  CAROLAN, Eoin, «The continuing problems with online consent under the EU’s emerging data 
protection principles», Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 462-473.
51 Art. 29 WP Opinion 8/2014, Recent developments on the Internet of Things.
52  HABEGGER, Benjamin; HASAN, Omar, et al., «Personalization vs. Privacy in Big Data Analysis» 
cit. 
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Most commercial systems rely on the “legitimate interests” ground, even 
if they consist in “the vaguest ground for processing”53, and offers a lot of scope 
for industry to process data by claiming any deemed necessary “legitimate inte-
rest”. In fact, the processing must be “necessary” for the legitimate interests and 
not just potentially interesting54. It follows that the processing is not necessary if 
there is any other way of meeting the legitimate interest that interferes less with 
the people’s privacy55. Implicitly, the task of balancing commercial interests and 
user fundamental rights 56 is delegated to the controllers themselves57.
As for the contractual condition, it may be difficult to show that big data 
analytics in STD are strictly necessary for the performance of a contract, since 
the processing goes beyond what is required to sell a product or deliver a service.
 2.3 Purpose Limitation
This principle utters that the purpose for which the data is collected 
must be specified and lawful, Art. 5(1) (b). This principle also prevents arbitrary 
reuse58, calling for a “compatibility assessment of the new purpose”59. As for a 
repurpose, personal data should not be further processed in a way that the data 
subject might consider unexpected, inappropriate or otherwise objectionable60 
and therefore unconnected to the delivery of the service; concretizing, by ex-
posing data subjects to different/greater risks than those contemplated by the 
initial purposes could be considered as a case of further processing of data in an 
unexpected manner. 
In what refers the compatibility assessment, Article 29 WP states that “By 
providing that any further processing is authorized as long as it is not incompati-
ble […], it would appear that the legislators intended to give some flexibility with 
regard to further use. Such further use may fit closely with the initial purpose or 
be different. The fact that the further processing is for a different purpose does not 
necessarily mean that it is automatically incompatible: this needs to be assessed on 
53  EP Study, Big Data and Smart Devices and their Impact on Privacy (2015).
54 ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection, UK, 2017.
55 Art. 29 WP Opinion 06/2014, Notion of legitimate interests of the data controller.
56 EDPS Opinion 7/2015, Meeting the challenges of big data.
57  SCHWARTZ, Paul; SOLOVE, Daniel, «The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Perso- 
nally Identifiable Information», cit. 
58  Art. 29 WP Opinion 03/2013, Purpose Limitation, p. 21.
59  ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,…, cit.
60 Counsel of Europe Guidelines, Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data in a world of Big Data, T-PD (2017).
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a case-by-case basis”. This Opinion sets out an approach to assessing whether any 
further processing is for an incompatible purpose. Moreover, Recital 50 of the 
GDPR states that in assessing compatibility it is necessary to take account of any 
link between the original and the new processing, the reasonable expectations of 
the data subjects, the nature of the data, the consequences of the further proces- 
sing, and the existence of safeguards. 
Yet, automatic capture of tourism data through sensors might be collec- 
ted for potentially secondary unauthorized purposes that had not been initially 
scheduled or still to be discovered, or for profiling, for abusive marketing activi-
ty, undermining this way the purpose limitation principle.
Anyway, in practical settings, companies “[…] repackage data by de-iden-
tifying them (using pseudonyms or aggregation) or creating derived data, with only 
the original dataset being subjected to data minimization. The repackaged data can 
then be sold on and repurposed in a plethora of ways that have little to do with the 
original reason for data generation and without the need to give notice or consent 
to those that the data concerns”61.
 2.4 Data Minimization: Collection and Retention 
The GDPR says personal data shall be “[…] adequate, relevant and limi-
ted to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”, 
Art. 5 (1) (c), and so organizations should minimize the amount of data they 
collect and process, and the length of time they keep the data.
Yet, in substance, smart technology purports the massive collection, ag-
gregation and algorithmic analysis of all the available for various reasons, such as 
understanding customer buying behaviours and patterns or remarketing based 
on intelligent analytics.
Big data analytics may discover unexpected correlations that do not re- 
trospectively justify obtaining the data in the first place, for example, between 
data about people’s lifestyles and their credit worthiness. Therefore, organiza-
tions need to be clear about which data is deemed to be necessary, excessive and 
relevant for the purposes of the processing.
In addition, personal data shall not be kept longer than necessary for the 
purpose for which it is being processed, as prescribed by the storage limitation 
principle, Art. 5 (1) (e). This principle is becoming part of the lifecycle gover-
nance strategy retention policies of companies that defensibly dispose irrelevant 
data instead of keeping data archived forever. Retention schedules allow unne- 
61  SOLOVE, Daniel, «I’ve Got Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy», San 
Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, 2017, pp. 745–772.
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cessary data to be disposed of as it is no longer of business value or needed to 
meet legal obligations.
2.5 Accuracy and Up-to-date Processing
Results drawn from big data analysis may not always be representative or 
accurate as sought (Art. 5 (1) (d)), if sources aren´t accurate as well (i.e. analysis 
based on social media resources are not necessarily representative of the whole 
population at stake) 62. 
Organizations employing ML algorithms to discover associations need to 
consider the distinction between correlations and causations63, i.e., when there is 
no direct cause and effect between two phenomena that show a close correlation. 
In these cases there is a risk of drawing inaccurate, but also – and when applied 
at the individual strata – potentially unfair and discriminatory conclusions64. 
The potential accuracy (or inaccuracy) of any resulting decisions might cause 
discriminatory, erroneous and unjustified decisions, regarding data subject´s 
behaviour on health, creditworthiness, recruitment, insurance risk, etc..
Even exercising the “right to be forgotten” (Art. 17), where data subjects 
will have the right for their data to be erased in several situations, for e.g., when 
the data is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected, or 
based on inaccurate data, it may be difficult for a business to find and erase 
someone’s data if it is stored across several different systems and jurisdictions65.
Further, inaccuracy of data endangers the data quality principle and trig-
gers abstract strict liability for damage66.
The quality of the profiles and the quality of personal data on which they 
are built, again, seem to matter for the prosperity of the industry, yet another 
relevant privacy principle.
62  ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,…, cit..
63  ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,…, cit.
64  EDPS Opinion 7/2015, Meeting the challenges of big data.
65  BARTOLINI, Cesare; SIRY, Laurence, «The right to be forgotten in the light of the consent of the 
data subject», Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 32, 2016, pp. 218–237.
66  HOEREN, Thomas, Big Data and Data Quality, in: HOEREN, Thomas; KOLANY-RAISER, Bar-
bara (Eds.), Big Data in Context - Legal, Social and Technological Insights, Heilderberg: Springer, 
2018, pp. 1-11. 
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3. Reflections and Conclusions
This study is novel in having undertaken an initial exploration of the 
legal implications that technology-enhanced (and empowered) tourism expe-
riences imply to data protection and privacy. The preceding analysis brings out 
that smart tourism is becoming a big contributor and benefactor of ubiquitous, 
always-on data-capture about consumer-tourists towards empowered tourism 
experiences and competitive markets. This data allows the detection and predic-
tion of future behaviours and trends; allows the analysis of development and op-
timization processes of products/services, retention of customers, and ultimately 
is useful for future decision-making. 
Patently, with new forms of ICTs emerging over the coming years, more 
types of technology-empowered experiences are expected to flourish further and 
trigger new challenges to the body of tourism knowledge and wariness there-
with.
As for now, the current assumption is that all captured information is 
extremely valuable and necessary to organizations and will be freely provided by 
the smart tourists who seek enriched tourism experiences67. 
This extensive collection and processing of personal data in the context 
of smart tourism destinations using algorithm-driven techniques has given rise 
to serious privacy concerns, especially relating to the wide ranging electronic 
surveillance, profiling, and disclosure of private data.
Moreover, the lack of privacy and data protection mindset of engineers 
and coders working in IoT/cloud business poses a very large problem for the 
future68. 
In this line, smart technologies used in STD often produce situations of 
imbalance, where data subjects are not aware of the fundamental elements of 
data processing and related consequences, being unable to negotiate their infor-
mation, which leads to a side effect of enhanced information asymmetry69. 
Information asymmetry and inadequate provision of information and 
data sharing to the public about data use can be seen as hampering tourist trust 
in STD. 
67  TALLON, Paul, «Corporate governance of big data: perspectives on value, risk, and cost», Com-
puter, Vol. 46, Issue 6, 2013, pp. 32-38.
68  SCHWARTZ, Paul; SOLOVE, Daniel, «The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Perso- 
nally Identifiable Information», cit. 
69  MASSENO, Manuel D., Personal data circulation from the EU to USA and now what for the Ame- 
rican Tourism Industry with business in Europe? 23rd International Tourism Safety Conference, 
Las Vegas, 2016.
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This scenario is particularly acute with “digital natives” or “millennials” 
tourists who have grown up with ubiquitous internet access and share willing-
ness personal information via social media with fewer concerns for how it may 
be used.
Smart tourism raises big issues with respect to information governance70 
and about correctly deriving the added value from information in an open and 
ubiquitous info-structure. The apprehension here is to understand if the affor-
dances of the technology, the personalized services, and empowered experiences 
can cope with data protection obligations without a micro-targeting and profi-
ling for unintended uses, safeguarding the right to equal treatment, to non-dis-
crimination and the protection of personal autonomy based on a person’s right 
to control his/ her personal data, that may never be the price paid for an en-
hanced awareness.
In the forthcoming future, controllers should adopt a precautionary ap-
proach71 in regulating data protection in this field of STD, such as adoption of 
compliance tools enable STD organizations meeting their data protection obli-
gations while protecting people’s privacy rights in a STD context, and they are: 
anonymization and pseudonymization techniques, privacy policies, data protec-
tion impact assessment (DPIA), personal data stores, algorithmic transparen-
cy, privacy seals/certification, and privacy by design measures to mitigate the 
appointed legal risks and implications. It is suggested that STD are to proceed 
with test prototyping and research before the implementation of new technolo-
gies and services in large-scale real-life environments, such as the Mobile Living 
Lab72. 
As future work, besides addressing related information security issues 
according to the NIS Directive73, future research regarding mobile devices and 
tracking will be needed, following the adoption of the new ePrivacy Regulation74, 
as well as qualifying the roles of data controller and data processer in the context 
of STD. Besides, as stated in the Tourism Science literature, tourism, by defini-
70  HADAR, Irit; HASSON, Tomer et al., «Privacy by designers: software developers’ privacy mind-
set». Empirical Software Engineering, Volume 23, Issue 1, 2018, pp 259–289.
71  ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,…, cit.
72  EDWARDS, Lilian, «Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: a critical EU law 
perspective» cit.
73 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concer- 
ning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across 
the Union.
74 Proposal of a Regulation of the EP and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and 
the protection of personal data in electronic communications, COM/2017/010 final - 2017/03 
(COD).
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tion, is a service-intense industry with a “business network”, since it relies on a 
number of stakeholders for its ability to deliver products and services75. Hence, 
the term business network refers to “[…] a collection of inter firm relationships, 
including alliances, long-term buyer-supplier relationships, and informal colla- 
borations” where each of the actors involved process personal data and therefore 
their legal obligations should abide to the GDPR.
75  ROBERTSON, Peter, «An Assessment of Collaborative Governance in a Network for Sustainable 
Tourism: The Case of RedeTuris», International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 34, Issue 5, 
2011, pp. 279-290.




Levelling the odds? Big data analytics in 
the online gambling industry AND THE 
APPLICATION OF THE GDPR 
Rachel Allsopp1
Abstract: In our big data society, as protection of personal data continues to 
gain ever more prominence in the news, predictive analytics has become ubi- 
quitous in the use of online services, not least in the online gambling industry. 
Gambling operators have access to a wealth of data, which can be used to make 
a whole host of predictions, from when a player is most likely to place a bet to 
the player’s favourite football team. Insights gained from this analysis enable 
operators to provide a more personalised, and arguably commercially effective, 
service.
The law has previously struggled to balance such technological advancement 
with the protection of individual privacy and data protection rights. The new 
General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’), however, purports to provide 
protection to citizens in our increasingly data-driven world by granting addi-
tional rights to individuals and specifically addressing profiling and automated 
decision-making. 
This commentary critically examines those rights to determine whether the 
GDPR succeeds in its goal of protecting individuals from the risks presented 
by profiling and automated decision-making in an online gambling context. 
It is concluded that the rights are overly restrictive, lacking in clarity and in 
actual fact unsuitable for the purpose. More emphasis should be placed on the 
requirements which promote accountability, such as data protection impact 
1 PhD Candidate in Law (Northumbria University). The author is grateful to Dr. David McGrogan 
and Dr. Guido Noto La Diega for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.
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assessments, to counteract the significant power imbalance and help level the 
odds between the individual and the operator.
Keywords: algorithmic decision-making; GDPR; online gambling.
Summary: This paper begins by highlighting the significance of the use of 
big data analytics in the online gambling industry and introduces the GDPR 
to present the novel legal landscape which has emerged in response to such 
technological advancements. The general scope of the GDPR is then illustra- 
ted, followed by consideration of one of the key provisions in relation to big 
data analytics, namely the right not to be subject to solely automated decision- 
-making under article 22. The additional rights which are granted to indivi- 
duals to enable management of their privacy, including the ‘right to an expla-
nation’ are then considered in detail. These rights are evaluated throughout 
the article and it is concluded that there exists a number of limitations which 
undermine their value in real life.  The key issues are that the provisions are 
very unclear, overly restrictive and not suitable for the average individual, who 
lacks the time, expertise and resource, to exercise the rights.  The provisions 
are also applied to the online gambling industry throughout the article, further 
demonstrating their lack of practical value.  It is concluded that more impor-
tance should be applied to the provisions which promote accountability, such as 
the requirement for data protection impact assessments, to counteract the signi- 
ficant power imbalance between the individual and the operator.
Introduction
1.1 The EU General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) has been hailed as “the 
most important change in data privacy regulation in 20 years”.2  This new regula-
tion, enforceable from 25 May 2018, aims to protect and empower all EU citizens 
in relation to their personal data by providing additional rights to individuals to 
enable them to enforce their fundamental right to privacy.3 Unfortunately, the 
lack of clarity in the wording of the regulation combined with the restrictiveness 
of the provisions threatens the practical value of the rights, which leads to the 
question of whether it is feasible to expect individuals to have to enforce their 
rights at all. 
2  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (‘GDPR’).
EU GDPR Portal: Powered by Trunomi – Home Page https://www.eugdpr.org/ Accessed 27 March 
2018.
3  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, as amended) Art. 8.
Levelling the odds? Big data analytics in the online gambling industry 
and the application of the GDPR 
Rachel Allsopp
137
1.2 In our current, technologically complex, digital age, the collection and ana- 
lysis of vast datasets using algorithms to identify correlations and predict out-
comes, known as big data analytics, is commonplace. The insights generated by 
these innovative techniques offer appealing benefits to businesses and consu- 
mers alike, including targeted advertisements, personalised special offers and 
user-friendly interfaces; all of which can ultimately promote customer loyalty. In 
the online gambling industry, where the level of market saturation is high and 
the product differentiation is relatively low, player retention becomes increasing-
ly important.4  As a result, the gambling industry has had to be ‘light years ahead 
of other consumer industries in terms of analytics-driven marketing’.5 
1.3 Being an account-based service, online gambling operators have access to a 
wealth of data about their players covering the basic personal information pro-
vided when an account is opened as well as transactional data collected through 
the player’s use of the site and services.6 Using this data, it is possible to perso- 
nalise marketing initiatives based on player preferences, from the device most 
frequently used to the time of day that the player is most likely to be online. 
There are also third-party companies which offer services to operators providing 
access to player data from additional sources, such as social media. This com-
bination provides an even more granular view of each player enabling in-depth 
profiles to be created, featuring the player’s interests and hobbies, past and cur-
rent locations and even their pay-day.7  
1.4 The gambling industry is arguably unique, however, in that the activity can 
become problematic for a proportion of players who go on to develop a gambling 
disorder.8 There is therefore a fine line to be drawn between customer reten-
tion and encouragement of problematic gambling. This has not gone unnoticed 
4  As at 31/03/2017, the UK Gambling Commission reported that there were 533 remote casino, 
betting and bingo UK licences held by 321 operators. UK Gambling Commission, An introduc-
tion to the Gambling Commission http://live-gamblecom.cloud.contensis.com/PDF/survey-data/
Who-we-are-and-what-we-do.pdf page 2, Accessed 16 April 2018.
5  BRENNAN, Alex – Online gambling’s unique personalisation opportunity http://hudsonsandler.
com/online-gamblings-personalisation-opportunity Accessed 13 April 2018.
6  FINNERAN, Tony - The role of big data and predictive analytics in online gaming and gambling 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/role-big-data-predictive-analytics-online-gaming-toby-finneran/ 
Accessed 23 April 2018.
7  MOTT, Charles - Increase your odds of success, with big data http://hellosoda.com/increase-
odds-success-big-data/ Accessed 13 April 2018.
8  Compulsive gambling is a recognised psychiatric disorder under Diagnostic and Statistical Ma- 
nual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. (DSM-5) American Psychiatric Association. American 
Psychiatric Association Publishing. 2013.
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by industry regulators, including the United Kingdom Gambling Commission 
(‘UKGC’) which, as a licence condition, requires that operators put into effect 
policies and procedures for identifying customers who are at risk of developing a 
gambling problem, making use of all relevant sources of information.9 Operators 
are therefore encouraged to apply the sophisticated use of big data analytics to 
look for markers which may indicate a gambling issue.  
1.5 In addition to the risk of problematic gambling, there remains the general 
threat to the privacy of all customers. At what point does the granular level of 
personalisation achieved through big data analytics become intrusive, compro-
mising the individual’s right to privacy and protection of their personal data?
1.6 The GDPR seeks to specifically address technological advances such as this 
by incorporating specific provisions in relation to profiling and automated de-
cision-making, as well as providing individuals with additional rights to protect 
their personal data.  Unfortunately, the rights are unnecessarily restrictive and 
ambiguous, and as a result they offer little practical use to individuals who lack 
the time, resource and expertise to enforce them. It is questionable, therefore, 
whether the GDPR succeeds in empowering individuals in the way that it aspires 
to. 
1.7 This paper will examine the way in which the new regulation applies to the 
processing of personal data in the context of big data analytics in the online 
gambling industry. It will firstly outline the scope of the application of the GDPR 
before considering the specific provisions regarding automated decision-making 
and the limitations contained therein. The paper will also consider the provi-
sions and individual rights which are applicable generally, again identifying the 
issues that arise. The application of the regulations to online gambling will be 
highlighted throughout, demonstrating the existing limitations to the practical 
application of the rights.  Finally, a more appropriate approach will be suggested 
through the use of data protection impact assessments to shift the accountability 
from the individual to the organisation.  
9  UKGC - Licence conditions and codes of practice (January 2018) (‘LCCP’) http://www.gam-
blingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/LCCP/Licence-conditions-and-codes-of-practice-April-2018.pdf 
SR Code 3.4.1 Accessed 13 April 2018.
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2. Big Data Analytics in Online Gambling
2.1 As discussed above, online gambling operators have access to a large volume 
of data about their players as a result of the account-based nature of the service. 
With this data, operators can use algorithms and predictive analytics to become 
personally acquainted with their players on a granular level. Transactional data 
can reveal player preferences on a multitude of areas, such as type of gaming (e.g. 
sports betting, bingo) betting category (e.g. football, horse racing) a particular 
game, time of day, day of the month, device, and method of communication. 
This can be used to tailor marketing, make relevant recommendations and per-
sonalise website content for each player.10 Third-party services are also available, 
providing access to further customer data from different sources, such as social 
media, allowing acutely detailed player profiles to be generated.11  
2.2 Big data analytics is also used for protective measures, such as identification 
of players who may be underage or players who are susceptible to the develop-
ment of a gambling disorder, and for fraud prevention.12 
2.3 While there are clear advantages of this innovative technology, including 
satisfied customers and a safer gambling environment, there is also a concern 
that this use of data can be too intrusive, jeopardising the rights of individuals 
to privacy and data protection. The potentially harmful impact of algorithms on 
society has been widely commented on, in particular when concealed in a ‘black 
box’ of secrecy apparently beyond any form of scrutiny.13  In recent times, for 
instance with the Cambridge Analytica ‘scandal’ involving the Facebook data 
of over 87 million users being used to potentially influence political elections, 
10  deltaDNA - Gamification marketing with limited data https://deltadna.com/resources/gamifica-
tion-marketing-limited-data/ Accessed 23 April 2018.
11  MOTT, Charles, op. cit.
12  Remote Gambling Association - Behavioural analytics: Good practice guidelines (February 
2018) https://www.rga.eu.com/wp-content/uploads/Final-RGA-Behavioural-Analytics-Guide-
lines-Feb-2018.pdf.   Accessed 13 April 2018.
UKGC - Gambling regulation and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Information note 2018 (‘UKGC GDPR Note’) http://live-gamblecom.cloud.contensis.com/PDF/
Gambling-regulation-and-GDPR.pdf Accessed 23 April 2018.
13  PASQUALE, Frank - The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and 
Information, 1st edn, Cambridge, MA, USA, Harvard University Press, 2015.
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it seems to be becoming more apparent to the public how little people actually 
know about how their data is being used.14  
2.4 Against this backdrop, the GDPR sets out its overarching principles, inclu- 
ding transparency, accountability and fairness, as well as specific provisions re-
garding profiling and automated decision-making, in an effort to directly ad-
dress these technological advancements and protect privacy in this modern, 
data-driven landscape. 
3. Scope of the GDPR
3.1 Application. The territorial scope of the regulation is wide, applying to all 
establishments based in the European Union as well as any processing of the per-
sonal data of EU citizens, regardless of the location of the organisation (provided 
that the processing relates to the offering of goods or services to, or the moni-
toring of the behaviour of data subjects in the EU).15 Moreover, the regulation 
extends the scope of previous data protection laws to cover the actions of data 
processors as well as data controllers.16
3.2 In an online gambling context, this means that as well as applying to all 
operators based in the EU or processing the data of EU citizens, the GDPR will 
also apply to third-party companies who process data on behalf of operators, for 
example: game providers (which create the games that players use to gamble), 
software providers (which provide the technical platform infrastructure to deli- 
ver the gambling websites) and marketing affiliates.  
3.3 Personal data. The definition of ‘personal data’ remains largely unchanged 
from previous legislation, encompassing any information relating to an identi-
fied or identifiable natural person (‘the data subject’) through direct or indirect 
means.17 In an effort to bring the rules up to date technologically, however, the 
14  BROCKES, Emma - Zuckerberg certainly convinced me – to log off Facebook for good that 
is https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/12/mark-zuckerberg-log-off-facebook-
congress Accessed 13 April 2018.
CHEN, Brian - I downloaded the information that Facebook has on me. Yikes https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/11/technology/personaltech/i-downloaded-the-information-that-facebook-has-on-
me-yikes.html Accessed 13 April 2018.
15  GDPR Art. 3.
16  GDPR Art. 3.
17  GDPR Art. 4(1).
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regulation specifically covers online identifiers such as location data, IP add- 
resses, device IDs and cookie identifiers.18 Even where the data alone is not 
enough to identify a person, if it has the potential to identify an individual in 
combination with other data, taking into account all means reasonably likely to 
be used, then it will be categorised as personal data.19
3.4 Personal data may become non-personal data and fall outside of the scope 
of regulation where is has been anonymised. Many businesses, however, sim-
ply remove obvious identifiers, such as the name, and consider the data to be 
anonymised though it is clear that this is not always the case. There often 
exists the potential for re-identification,20 particularly in the increasingly 
popular ‘smart’ environment deriving from the Internet of Things where appa- 
rently mundane, raw data can be easily reconnected to individuals.21 Personal 
data which has been subjected to pseudonymisation will still fall under the re-
mit of the GDPR to the extent that an individual may reasonably be identified 
through use of additional information, though in an effort to encourage the use 
of pseudonymisation as a safeguard it attracts certain incentives, for example 
exclusion from mandatory breach notification to a data subject.22
3.5 Online gambling operators have access to huge volumes of personal data. 
This includes the obvious categories such as name, address and date of birth, 
as well as digital identifiers such as email address, IP address, location data and 
cookie identifiers, where the potential to identify an individual exists in combi-
nation with other information.23 
3.6 This wide interpretation of personal data could be seen to expand the rights 
of the individual in that it confirms the increased scope of protection beyond the 
traditional forms of personal data; however, there remains a lack of clarity in re-
lation to data associated with a group. Where, for example, profiles are generated 
18  GDPR Art. 4(1), Recital 30.
19  GDPR Recital 26.
20  OHM, Paul «Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymiza-
tion», UCLA Law Review, 57 (2010) 1701-1777, p. 1716.
21  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael «Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Expla-
nation’ is Probably Not the Remedy you are Looking For’», Duke Law and Technology Review 
16 (2017) 18-84, p.34.
22  GDPR Art. 25 and 34, Recital 26.
23  See for example: Skybet Cookies Policy and Privacy Notice https://support.skybet.com/s/article/
Cookies-Policy-Privacy-Notice Section: Collecting Information About You. Accessed 23 April 
2018.
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for a collection of individuals with similar interests, there does not appear to be 
any clear protection for that ‘algorithmically assembled’ group under data pro-
tection law.24 The protection under the GDPR will only become applicable at the 
final stage where a decision based on group profiling is applied to an individual,25 
an approach which is arguably unhelpful given that it is often more feasible or 
appropriate for a group to assert its rights.26
3.7 Nonetheless, where data is obviously non-personal, or has been successful-
ly anonymised, it falls outside of data protection law despite having the ability 
to affect individuals. This is evident, for instance, with clickstream analysis; the 
process of collecting and analysing aggregate data tracking the users’ actions on 
a website. Operators can use this data to inform decisions on page layout and 
manipulate the users’ actions in a more profitable way,27 perhaps to encourage 
further spend or discourage the use of responsible gambling tools. It is submitted 
that this use of data holds the ability to adversely affect individuals though there 
is no clear protection against this form of processing in present data protection 
law. Of course, there are countless situations where the processing of non-per-
sonal data holds no potential for harm and it would be too severe to apply data 
protection controls to these situations, though some middle ground would be 
useful to acknowledge that non-personal data has the potential to impact users 
as well.
3.8 What remains clear is that any form of processing of any personal data will 
be subject to the provisions of the GDPR. ‘Processing’ is widely defined as any 
operation which is performed on personal data whether or not by automated 
means and essentially covers anything that an organisation does involving per-
sonal data, from storage to erasure.28 Use of personal data for predictive analy- 
tics, including profiling and automated decision-making, will certainly fall with-
in the definition and these processes are explicitly referred to in the regulation.  
24  MITTELSTADT, Brent «From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics» Philos. Tech-
nol. 30 (2017) 475-494 p. 476.
25  GDPR Recital 26.
26  MANTELERO, Alessandro, «Personal Data for Decisional Purposes in the Age of Analytics: 
From an Individual to a Collective Dimension of Data Protection», Computer Law & Security 
Review 32 (2016) 238–255 p. 245.
27  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 33.
28  GDPR Art. 4(2).
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3.9 Profiling is defined as ‘any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating 
to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning, for 
example, that natural person’s …preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, lo-
cation or movements’.29 Importantly, the profiling need not be solely automated; 
to fall within the definition, the processing must involve some level of automa- 
ted processing, however, human involvement will not necessarily preclude the 
application of the regulation.30  In broad terms, therefore, profiling involves the 
collection of data about individuals and evaluation of characteristics or beha- 
viour patterns in order to analyse the results and make predictions, for example 
in relation to interests or future behaviour.31
a) Example: An operator collects transactional data on each player’s top 3 most 
frequently played games. By cross referencing this data with other players, each 
player is placed into a category of players with interests in the same games. The 
operator uses this to identify a pool of games, which are popular with players 
that have similar interests. 
3.10 Automated decision-making is the ability to make decisions based solely 
on automated, technological means without meaningful human involvement.32 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (‘WP29’), in its guidance, provides 
that automated decision-making is a process, which can be carried out with or 
without profiling, although it stipulates that the two activities are not necessarily 
separate.33 Automated decisions can also be based on any type of data, such as 
that which has been provided by individuals, observed, derived or inferred based 
on existing data.34
29  GDPR Art. 4(4).
30  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making 
and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, last revised and adopted on 6 February 
2018 (‘WP29 Guidelines’), p.7.
31  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 7.
32  GDPR Art. 22; WP29 Guidelines, op. cit.,  p. 8. 
33  The Article 29 Working Party is an advisory body set up under article 29 of Data Protection 
Directive. The body is composed of representatives from the Member States’ data protection 
authorities, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission.
34  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 8.
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a) Example: The operator from the above example uses the data to automatically 
display game recommendations on a personalised home page for each player 
when they log into their account, based on the interests of other players in the 
same category.
3.11 The GDPR recognises the risks to individual privacy that automated deci-
sion-making presents by incorporating the ‘right not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing’ under article 22. Moreover, for profiling 
and decision-making which is not solely automated, there are a number of provi-
sions which operators must adhere to. These provisions are set out below.
4. Solely Automated Decision-making 
4.1 Under article 22, a data subject has the ‘right not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her’.35 This 
amends the existing right under the Data Protection Directive not to be subject 
to a decision based on automated processing which produces legal effects or sig-
nificantly affects the data subject.36 
4.2 There has been discussion as to whether this provision represents a prohi-
bition on automated decision-making or whether it simply provides a right to 
oppose.37 The WP29 has, however, clarified that the provision amounts to a 
general prohibition of solely automated decision-making, rather than a right that 
the data subject must actively invoke.38
4.3 Decision based solely on automated processing. For article 22 to apply, the 
decision must be based solely on automated processing, meaning there must be 
no meaningful human involvement in the decision-making process. A level of 
35  GDPR Art. 22(1).
36  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (‘Data Protection Directive’) Art. 15.
37  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido «Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making. Algorithmic De-
cisions at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information», 
JIPITEC 9(1) (2018)  (forthcoming) Section D.I.
38  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 19,
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human involvement that has no authority or competence to influence the deci-
sion is not sufficient and the decision would be categorised as solely automated.39
a) Example: An operator identifies that players who most commonly bet be-
tween the hours of midnight and 2am present the highest risk of developing a 
gambling disorder and therefore automatically suspends all accounts that are 
active during this time.
4.4 The requirement for the decision to be solely automated arguably results in 
unnecessary narrowing of this protection, given that in reality decisions which 
affect an individual in such a significant way are not usually fully automated.40 
Indeed gambling operators, as in other commercial contexts, are understanda-
bly interested in retaining their customers and so any significant decision which 
would, for example, involve closure of an account is unlikely to be made in an 
automated way. 
4.5 It is also not entirely clear what is meant by a ‘decision’. Recital 71 unhelpfully 
provides that data subjects ‘should have the right not to be subject to a decision, 
which may include a measure’, and provides relatively obvious examples such as 
automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices with-
out any human intervention’. It remains uncertain, therefore, whether this covers 
the product of an algorithmic system, or another interim step in the algorithmic 
process.41 The fact that the decision is required to have a legal or similarly signi- 
ficant effect, however, does suggest that it would be rare for an interim measure 
to qualify under article 22.42 
4.6 Moreover, determining whether the necessary level of human involvement 
has been met is not always going to be straightforward, particularly for a data 
subject. Despite the WP29 guidance, there is still a significant grey area concer- 
ning the required level of human involvement, for example where the decision is 
made in an automated way but subsequently reviewed by a human.43 It would be 
unreasonable to expect a lay individual to navigate this in order to enforce their 
right not to be subject to automated decision-making.
39  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 2.
40  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 45.
41  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p.46.
42  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.I.
43  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.I.
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4.7 Legal or similarly significant effect. The decision must also have a ‘legal’ or 
‘similarly significant’ effect on the individual to be subject to prohibition. The 
decision must therefore affect a legal right, such as cancellation of a contract, or 
have an effect which is similarly significant, for example refusal of a credit appli-
cation.44 This is narrower than the existing provision under the Data Protection 
Directive given that the effect of the decision must be legal or similarly signifi-
cant, whereas previously the decision only had to significantly affect the indivi- 
dual.45 These terms are not defined, though it is suggested that the terminology 
used infers that the provision will only apply to ‘serious impactful events’.46  The 
WP29 guidelines suggest that to have a significant effect, the decision must have 
the potential to:
• ‘significantly affect the circumstances, behaviour or choices of the in-
dividuals concerned;
• have a prolonged or permanent impact on the data subject; or
• at its most extreme, lead to the exclusion or discrimination of indi-
viduals.’
4.8 While on the face of it, the new regulation provides some clarity by expli- 
citly extending the protection to profiling, the undefined terminology results in 
uncertainty as to its application.  It is therefore difficult to see how a data sub-
ject could reasonably avail themselves of the protection against automated deci-
sion-making without further examples or case law. 
4.9 In relation to marketing based on automated decisions through profiling, 
it seems unlikely that the majority of cases would have a sufficiently significant 
impact to be prohibited by article 22, particularly where based on a broader pro-
file. Certain characteristics such as the intrusiveness of the profiling process, the 
expectations and wishes of the individual, the delivery of the advert, and the use 
of knowledge of the data subject’s vulnerabilities may, however, require closer 
consideration.  The guidelines highlight that processes that have an insignificant 
impact on the majority of individuals may still affect some vulnerable groups 
of people in a way which has a significant impact, for example where a person 
44  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 21; GDPR Recital 71.
45  Data Protection Directive Art. 15; NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.I.
46  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p.21.
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with known financial difficulties is targeted with adverts for high interest loans.47 
One of the main criticisms of algorithmic decision-making is that it presents a 
serious risk of discrimination to individuals and there is an abundance of com-
mentary demonstrating the existence of this risk with examples such as denial of 
credit, employment or insurance.48 Article 22 takes steps to prohibit this kind of 
discriminative automated decision-making, though in reality it is likely that this 
type of processing would not meet the key principle of fairness and would in any 
event be unlawful under the GDPR.49
a) Example: An operator profiles the average deposit total of each player during 
the initial 6 weeks of the account being opened. Any players who do not deposit 
at least £50 during this time will have their accounts automatically closed. 
4.10 This example further demonstrates the restrictiveness of this provision, par-
ticularly in a commercial setting.  In cancelling a contract, the effect would be 
legal as well as potentially discriminative; however, in reality such an extreme 
action is highly unlikely given that operators generally do not wish to lose play-
ers (even less profitable ones). It is difficult therefore to imagine a less extreme 
instance where solely automated decisions would be taken which have a legal 
or similarly significant impact, particularly where such a decision would not al-
ready be prohibited as unfair (for example targeting players who have a propen-
sity to develop a gambling problem with bonuses). The practical value of article 
22 is therefore questionable given its apparent lack of wider applicability and 
authors have commented that this provision of the GDPR is likely to have the 
least effect in practice in the context of big data.50 
4.11 That is not to say that where article 22 does not apply, there are no obliga-
tions in relation to automated processing of personal data. It must still comply 
with the general provisions regarding processing which are discussed in further 
detail below. 
47  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p.20. 
48  PASQUALE, Frank, op. cit.
O’NEIL, Cathy - Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens 
democracy, 1st edn, New York, NY, USA, Crown Publishing Group, 2016.
49  GDPR Art. 5(1)(a).
50  ZARSKY, Tal «Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data», Seton Hall L. Rev. 47 (2017) 
995-1020, 1018.
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4.12 Exceptions. There are three exceptions where a data controller may make 
automated decisions which have a legal or similarly significant effect on a data 
subject. These are where the automated decision-making is:
a)  necessary for the performance of or entering into a contract; 
b) authorised by law, with suitable safeguards in place to protect the rights and 
freedoms of the individual; or 
c) based on the data subject’s explicit consent.51
4.13 The contractual exception should be interpreted narrowly, given that the 
decision-making must be necessary; it is therefore unlikely that the majority of 
forms of data analytics will qualify for this exception.52 Even where the automa- 
ted processing is used for greater consistency, increased fairness to reduce the 
risk of non-payment or improve efficiency, these considerations are not suffi-
cient to meet the requirement. Furthermore, if a less privacy intrusive method is 
available, then the processing will not be necessary and therefore not permitted 
under this exception.53 This results in the exception being restricted, which is 
welcomed to strengthen the protection under article 22.54 
4.14 Unfortunately, limited guidance is provided on the exception for algorith-
mic decisions authorised by law, save that it has been suggested that this could 
be interpreted by national authorities as wider than just fraud or tax evasion 
purposes.55 In the context of online gambling, it seems likely that where opera-
tors use big data analytics to make solely automated decisions for the purposes 
of combatting fraud, money laundering and problem gambling they may be able 
to rely on the article 22(2)(b) exception.56 For example, the UK Gambling Com-
mission requires, as a licence condition, that operators have procedures in place 
to allow for self-exclusion and to detect and combat underage and problem gam-
bling.57  The UKGC expects that operators “obtain and analyse data for the pur-
51  GDPR Art. 22(2).
52  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 13. This is explained in the context of the legal basis of processing 
under article 6(1)(b); however, the principle is transferable.
53  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p.23.
54  NOTO LA DIEGA Guido, op. cit., Section D.II.
55  GDPR Recital 71, NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.II.
56  GDPR Recital 71; UKGC GDPR Note, op. cit., p. 3.
57  LCCP, op. cit., SR Code 3.4.1.
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poses of ensuring that their social responsibility policies and procedures are fit for 
purpose, taking into account the state of the art and currently available techniques 
for identifying and minimising problem gambling”.58 Where big data analytics is 
used for this purpose, it is therefore likely that it will be permitted to the extent 
that it is necessary (which of course is not always straightforward to determine 
but should be interpreted narrowly, as demonstrated above). 
4.15 Similarly, it is regrettable that ‘explicit consent’ is not defined in the regu-
lations. It is clear from the terminology that ‘explicit consent’ should be more 
onerous than the general form of consent as a legal basis for processing under 
article 6.  What ‘explicit consent’ should look like, however, is ironically less than 
explicit. The WP29 suggests that the controller should obtain an express state-
ment of specific consent, in writing, signed by the data subject where possible 
for evidential purposes. Electronic equivalents could also be valid, such as an 
electronic form, email, a scanned signed document or an electronic signature.59 
4.16 More detailed information is provided regarding the general form of con-
sent as a lawful basis for processing.60 In order for consent to be valid, the data 
subject must signify their agreement to the processing of personal data for one 





• By a statement or clear affirmative action.62
4.17 The consent needs to be in clear, plain language in an easily accessible form; 
the user needs to have enough information to be able to understand exactly what 
they are consenting to, how the data will be used and the consequences of the 
58  UKGC GDPR Note, op. cit. p. 5.
59  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 
Adopted 28 November 2017 (‘Consent Guidelines’) p. 18.
60  GDPR Art. 6(1)(a).
61  GDPR Art. 6(1)(a).
62  GDPR Art. 4(11).
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processing.63 The consent itself can take a number of forms, such as: a written 
statement, including those taken by electronic means, ticking a box on the web-
site, choosing technical settings, or other conduct as long as it clearly represents 
the user’s affirmative agreement to the proposed processing of their data. Pre-
ticked boxes, silence or inactivity will not meet the criteria for valid consent.64 
The consent must also be freely given, which means that the user must have a 
free and genuine choice as to whether to provide consent and be given the option 
of refusing or withdrawing consent without detriment.65 Consent is presumed 
not to be freely given where it does not provide separate, distinct options for dif-
ferent purposes and data processing operations.66 For example, separate options 
for consent should be provided in order to send personalised marketing com-
munications and to share profile information with third party game providers 
for personalised games.
4.18 While the theory of consent is arguably well defined, in practice the limita-
tions of the consent model are well documented.67 Online consent is very often 
obtained by simply providing users with a link to a privacy policy at the time 
of registration and a request that they tick a box to confirm acceptance of the 
terms.68 Without ticking the box, users cannot proceed with the registration and 
indeed many notices state that if the terms are not accepted, the user should not 
continue to use the service.69 It is therefore difficult to see how an individual 
would ever be able to give free, genuine consent in commercial transactions, 
where the significant power imbalance between the individual and the company 
means that there is no chance to negotiate the terms, which are essentially pro-
vided on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.70 Moreover, if this model is utilised by most 
providers in the industry, who operate under broadly similar terms of use, how 
can users have a genuine choice even with the existence of multiple different 
63  GDPR Art. 7(2), Recital 42; WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 13.
64  GDPR Recital 32.
65  GDPR Article 7(4), Recital 42.
66  GDPR Recital 43; Consent Guidelines, op. cit., p.10.
67  See, for example: EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 33.
JOERGENSEN, Rikke Frank, «The unbearable lightness of user consent», Internet Policy Review 
3(4) (2014) 1-14.
68  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 66.
69  See for example Skybet Cookies Policy and Privacy Notice https://support.skybet.com/s/article/
Cookies-Policy-Privacy-Notice Section: ‘Privacy Rights: Can I object to having my personal 
information used in this way?’ Accessed 25 April 2018.
70  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 66.
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operators? Nonetheless given the lack of clarity as to what explicit consent should 
look like, it remains to be seen whether it will result in more meaningful consent 
being obtained, albeit in relatively restricted circumstances.
4.19 Safeguards. In order to rely on an exception under article 22(2), sufficient 
safeguards must be in place for the processing to be lawful.71 Controllers should 
have procedures in place to continuously assess and audit algorithms, to review 
accuracy and relevance of automated decisions, and to prevent errors, bias, inac-
curacy and discrimination.72 This is commendable as it encourages operators to 
be more accountable for data privacy issues by implementing a privacy by design 
approach, which moves the responsibility away from the individual. It is regret-
table, however, that this level of detail is only contained in the recitals and WP29 
guidance, rather than in the binding content of the regulation.
4.20 In addition to the internal safeguards, which an organisation should have 
in place, individuals must have access to certain rights, including the rights to 
human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation 
of the decision and to challenge the decision.73 The data subject must also be 
provided with specific information regarding the processing and the decision, 
in order to be able to properly challenge it.74  These rights will be considered in 
the next section.
5. Rights of the Individual
5.1 Right to human intervention. In the event that a solely automated decision 
is taken, which legally or similarly significantly affects an individual, but which 
can be justified on the basis of one of the three exceptions, that individual will be 
entitled to contest the decision and demand human intervention by the control-
ler.75 This extends the previous right of data subjects to express their viewpoint,76 
and means that controllers must put in place a procedure to allow individuals to 
appeal the automated decision, with meaningful human involvement in order to 
71  GDPR Recital 71; WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 28.
72  GDPR Recital 71.
73  GDPR Recital 71.
74  GDPR Recital 71, WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 27.
75  GDPR Art. 22(3).
76  Data Protection Directive Art. 15(b).
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ensure this effective right of defence.77 Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly what 
steps should be taken by the controller once the individual seeks to invoke this 
right. The WP29 guidelines suggest that the review should be carried out by a 
human with the authority to change a decision and should take into account all 
relevant data, including any additional information provided by the individual.78 
It is submitted that this is a positive step since it provides individuals with an 
active right against the automated decision, rather than simply being provided 
with information. It also requires meaningful human intervention, which is ge- 
nerally considered desirable as compared to solely automated processing, though 
it does not necessarily guarantee that the outcome of the decision will change.79 
It is unfortunate, though, that this right is only available in relation to those rare 
decisions which fall under article 22 and there is no obligation for controllers to 
offer the right in relation to automated decisions which do not meet the restric-
tive criteria under article 22. 
5.2 Right to an explanation. It has been submitted that the rights provided to 
data subjects in the context of automated decision-making, namely the right to 
be informed and the right to access together constitute a ‘right to an explana-
tion’.80 Interestingly, this apparent right is referred to in the non-binding reci- 
tals though there is no acknowledgement within the wording of the regulation.81 
This has led other commentators to dispute the existence of such a right.82 The 
apparent right to an explanation stems from the key principle of transparency 
in processing under article 5(1)(a), which is more onerous in the context of au-
tomated decision-making under article 22. These transparency obligations are 
entirely new to EU regulation; adding to the existing right of access under the 
77  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.II.1. 
78  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 27.
79  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.II.1.
80  See, for example: GOODMAN, Bryce and FLAXMAN, Seth, «European Union Regulations on 
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation”», ICML Workshop on Human Inter-
pretability in Machine Learning (2016).
EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 20. 
SELBST, Andrew and POWLES, Julia, «Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation», 
International Data Privacy Law 7(4) (2017) 233–242.
81  GDPR Recital 71.
82  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael op. cit., p. 44. 
WACHTER, Sandra et al, «Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation», International Data Privacy Law 7(2) (2017) 
76–99.
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Data Protection Directive.83 To satisfy the data subject’s right to be informed and 
ensure that the processing is fair and transparent, controllers must provide spe-
cific, easily accessible information about the automated decision-making.84 This 
must include details of:
• the fact that they are engaging in this activity;
• meaningful information about the logic involved; and
• the significance and envisaged consequences of processing.85
5.3 This information must be provided at the time of the data collection.86 Where 
the data is obtained indirectly (for example where inferred from other data), 
the information must be provided within a maximum of one month of the data 
being obtained.87 If the personal data are being used to communicate with the 
data subject or are being disclosed to another recipient then the data subject 
must be notified by the time of the first communication or disclosure.88 
5.4 Clearly, the mathematical models and algorithms used as part of the pre-
dictive analytics are complex in their nature and can therefore be difficult to 
explain in any meaningful way.  Recital 58, however, makes clear that technolo- 
gical complexity is not an excuse for failing to meet this obligation and provides 
that simple language and visualisation where appropriate should be employed 
so that the data subject is able to understand the reasons for the decision.89 The 
information should tell the data subject, in simple terms, the rationale behind 
the decision and the criteria used in reaching the decision in addition to the 
general transparency requirements under articles 12-15.90 As for informing the 
individual of the significance and envisaged consequences of the processing, the 
guidelines suggest that real, tangible examples of the types of possible effects 
83  Data Protection Directive Art. 12(a) This included access to the logic involved.
84  GDPR Art. 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g).
85  WP29 Guidelines, ob. cit., p. 25.
86  GDPR Art. 13.
87  GDPR Art. 14(3)(a).
88  GDPR Art. 14(3)(b) and (c).
89  GDPR Recital 58.
90  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 25.
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should be provided, and visual techniques could make the information more 
meaningful to the data subject.91
5.5 The data subject is also entitled to a right of access to all of the personal data 
that is held about them by the controller.92 In the context of profiling, this will 
include the personal data used as input for the profile, the categories of profiling 
and details of the profile itself including any segments which the data subject has 
been placed into.93 The specific information outlined above regarding automated 
decisions must also be provided.94 This means that, in addition to the explana-
tory information provided to all individuals before their data is processed, in-
dividuals can become aware of a decision made about him or her by exercising 
their rights of access. Pursuant to this right, the controller is obliged to provide 
a free copy of the personal data held about the individual.95 The data should be 
provided in an electronic format unless otherwise requested and where possible, 
data subjects should be able to remotely access a secure system providing direct 
access to their data.96 The guidelines do clarify, however, that the communication 
needs to provide general information on the envisaged consequences of the 
processing (including factors taken into account and their relative weighting); 
however, there is no requirement to give an explanation of a particular decision.97
5.6 Paradoxically, the provision purporting to provide clarity to individuals em-
ploys the term ‘meaningful’, which is extremely open to interpretation. It can be 
assumed that the average individual will not be a computer scientist who can un-
derstand the algorithm itself, which suggests that the information should there-
fore be provided using non-technical language. It has, however, been argued that 
the data subject should also be provided with the algorithm itself for evidential 
purposes, in order to obtain expert evidence and fully exercise their right to 
challenge the decision.98 Others suggest that an interactive model allowing the 
data subject to explore the algorithm would be more informative and therefore 
91  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 26.
92  GDPR Art. 15.
93  GDPR Recital 63; WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 17.
94  GDPR Art. 15(1)(h).
95  GDPR Art. 15(3).
96  GDPR Art. 15(3), Recital 63.
97  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 27.
98  NOTO LA DIEGA, Guido, op. cit., Section D.III.
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meaningful.99 Nonetheless, given that the right to be informed arises at the time 
of data collection and since there is no requirement for an explanation of a par-
ticular decision to satisfy the right to access, it is difficult to see how anything 
more than general information about the algorithm can be provided. This then 
begs the question of how meaningful this information reasonably be.100 
5.7 Another drawback of this right stems from the caveat provided to organisa-
tions in article 15(4), which allows a limited form of protection to the rights of 
others, including trade secrets or intellectual property rights.101 This could apply 
particularly in relation to algorithmic decision-making where the method used 
is commercially sensitive; however, it is not entirely clear how far organisations 
will be able to extend this argument.  It is evident, however, that organisations 
will not be able to rely on the protection of their trade secrets to refuse to provide 
information to the data subject, though it may further affect the meaningfulness 
of the information provided.102    
5.8 Whilst the specific obligations in relation to automated decision-making 
will only apply to situations covered by article 22, organisations will still have 
to comply with the general principle of transparency for other forms of big data 
analytics, including profiling. Explicitly, where personal data are used for profi- 
ling, the data subject should be informed  of the existence of the profiling and 
any automated decisions based on the profiling and be given access to the data 
that is held about them (though there is no requirement for ‘meaningful infor-
mation about the logic and consequences’).103 The data subject should also be 
informed of whether there is an obligation to provide their personal data and of 
the consequences of not providing such data.104 
5.9 The principle of transparency is an attractive one, particularly where one 
of the main criticisms of algorithmic decisions is their opacity; the processing 
generally goes on beneath the surface without being overtly obvious to the in-
dividual. Nonetheless, in the interests of looking beneath the surface, it must be 
asked whether the ‘right to an explanation’ is the most appropriate remedy for 
the average individual. Arguably, most individuals are unlikely to have the time, 
99  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 81.
100  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 52.
101  GDPR Art. 15(4).
102  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 17.
103  GDPR Art. 13(f) and 14(g); WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 16-17.
104  GDPR Recital 60.
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resources or expertise to meaningfully make use of this right, particularly given 
the uncertainties identified.105 Moreover, it is submitted that, for the types of de-
cisions that most individuals would invest the time, energy and resource to dis-
pute, they are less interested in obtaining an explanation about the decision and 
would actually prefer that the decision had not been taken in the first place.106  In 
reality, it seems more likely that an individual would just choose to open a new 
account with a different operator, given the choice of online gambling providers 
available, and either close the offending account or leave it dormant.  Expec- 
ting users to manage their own privacy by relying on an ambiguous right risks 
creating a “transparency fallacy”, similar in character to the free consent issues 
described above, where the right which purports to empower the individual is 
itself meaningless and has no power at all.107 
6. Additional rights
6.1 In addition to the above rights, individuals are entitled to exercise the follow-
ing additional rights regardless of whether the processing is subject to article 22.
6.2 Right to object. Under article 21 individuals are entitled to a right to object 
to processing, corresponding with the existing right under the Data Protection 
Directive.108 This right is available to individuals on any grounds relating to his 
or her personal situation, however only in the limited circumstances where the 
processing of personal data is justified under one of the following lawful bases:109
a) the processing is necessary in the public interest or in exercise of official au-
thority;110 or 
b) the processing is necessary for the legitimate interests of the controller or a 
third party.111 
105  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p 67.
106  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 67.
107  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 67.
108  Data Protection Directive Art. 14.
109  GDPR Art. 21.
110  GDPR Art. 6(1)(e).
111  GDPR Art. 6(1)(f).
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6.3 Controllers must cease to process the data unless compelling legitimate 
grounds to continue processing can be demonstrated which override the rights 
of the individual.112 Again, it is not entirely clear from the regulation what would 
meet this standard; however, the use of the word ‘compelling’ suggests that the 
threshold for balancing the interests of the controller and the data subject is 
higher than the balancing exercise required to rely on article 6(1)(f) as a legal 
basis in the first place.  The initial exercise for relying on legitimate interests as 
a legal basis involves a balancing act to determine whether the controller’s legi- 
timate interest would be overridden by the individual’s interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms.113 The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights 
of the data subject, with reference to considerations such as: 
• the reasonable expectations of the data subject at the time and in the 
context of the data collection, based on the relationship with the con-
troller;
• the level of detail of any profile (the more granular the detail, the more 
difficult it may be to justify); 
• the comprehensiveness of the profile;
• the impact of the profiling on the data subject; 
• the safeguards in place to ensure fairness, non-discrimination and ac-
curacy of processing.114 
6.4 The WP29 opinion on legitimate interests suggests that intrusive profiling, 
tracking practices, use of click-stream data and predictive algorithms suggest a 
high level of intrusiveness and would be difficult to justify using legitimate inte- 
rests as a lawful basis.115 This was confirmed in a recent case where the French 
data protection authority (CNIL) served a public notice on a smart meter com-
pany providing that it could not rely on the legitimate interest basis for the col-
lection and use of consumption data given the intrusive nature of the informa-
112  GDPR Art. 21(1).
113  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 14.
114  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 14.
115  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 15.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of 
the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC. European Commission, 9 April 2014. 
p. 47, 59, 60. (Though the Opinion relates to the previous Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the 
WP29 considers that the guidance remains relevant to the provisions of the GDPR.).
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tion it revealed about its customers (times at which they go to bed or wake up, 
periods of absence, number of people in the household etc.).116 
6.5 Thus, even if this relatively stringent standard is initially satisfied as a legal ba-
sis for processing, this would not be sufficient; there must be legitimate grounds 
which are compelling to override the individual’s objection.117 The burden of 
proof to demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds lies with the controller.118 
6.6 For direct marketing purposes, the individual’s right to object is even stron- 
ger. The data subject may object at any time to the processing of their personal 
data for the purposes of direct marketing, regardless of the legal basis for pro-
cessing, and there is no requirement to provide any grounds for the objection.119 
Following receipt of such a request, the controller must respect the wishes of 
the data subject without question; there is no need for a balancing act between 
competing rights.120  
6.7 Rights to rectification and erasure. The GDPR extends the existing rights 
regarding rectification and erasure under the Data Protection Directive.121 This 
is based upon another key principle that controllers must ensure that all personal 
data is kept accurate and up to date. Any inaccuracies identified must be erased 
or rectified without delay.122 Accuracy is particularly important in the context of 
big data analytics, given that any decisions or profiles generated from incorrect 
or outdated data will be defective, which could have a damaging effect on the 
data subject. It is therefore important that the raw data used for big data ana-
116  CNIL - DIRECT ENERGIE : mise en demeure pour une absence de consentement concernant 
les données issues du compteur communicant LINKY https://www.cnil.fr/fr/direct-energie-mise-
en-demeure-pour-une-absence-de-consentement-concernant-les-donnees-issues-du Accessed 23 
April 2018.
MOLE, Ariane - GDPR and smart meters: French Data Protection Authority serves a formal notice 
to a major energy supplier to get ready for GDPR https://web.archive.org/web/20180406215700/
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2ea028e-10d8-417c-b48a-ece1c268a948 
Accessed 23 April 2018.
(Although based on French data protection law, this finding is significant as it applies the same prin-
ciples set out in the GDPR.).
117  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 19.
118  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 19.
119  GDPR Art. 21(2).
120  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 19.
121  Data Protection Directive Art. 12(b) and (c).
122  GDPR Art. 5(1)(d).
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lytics is accurate to reduce the risk of inaccurate predictions, which could have 
a significant impact, for example if a player with a gambling addiction who has 
self-excluded is placed in a category eligible for bonuses. Data subjects have the 
right to rectify any inaccurate information as well as provide additional informa-
tion where the information is incomplete.123 
6.8 Perhaps more significantly, individuals also have the right to erasure (also 
known as the right to be forgotten) in certain circumstances, including where 
the information is no longer necessary for the purpose or where they wish to 
withdraw consent and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the pro-
cessing.124 Controllers are also obliged to take reasonable steps, taking into ac-
count available technology, to inform other controllers which are processing the 
information of the request for erasure.125 The WP29 guidance advises that these 
rights under articles 16 and 17 apply widely to all of the data associated with the 
individual’s profile and not just the data that was directly provided and used to 
create the profile.126
6.9 Right to data portability. Article 20 introduces a new right for individu-
als to receive the personal data they have provided to the controller in a ma-
chine-readable format to enable transmission of the data to another controller.127 
Unfortunately, the regulation is not explicit on the meaning of ‘provide’, which 
is unfortunate in view of the numerous ways that data can be obtained about an 
individual as a result of profiling. The WP29 guidance does however suggest that 
the right applies to all personal data which has been provided directly, or per-
sonal data observed about the data subject indirectly; though it does not apply to 
any profiles or inferences created by the data controller (which is more restrictive 
than the rights of rectification and erasure).128 The right also applies only to data 
which is processed by automated means (though not just solely automated), on 
the basis of consent or where necessary for the performance of a contract, and 
not therefore to information which is processed in compliance with a legal ob-
ligation or in the public interest.129 Thus, any information which is used for the 
purposes of detecting fraud or problem gambling would not be subject to this 
123  GDPR Art. 16.
124  GDPR Art. 16.
125  GDPR Art. 17(2).
126  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p.  18.
127  GDPR Art. 20.
128  GDPR Art. 20; WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 17.
129  GDPR Art. 20(1), Recital 68.
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right. The individual is also entitled, where technically feasible, to have the per-
sonal data transferred directly from one controller to another.130 In theory, this 
gives the individual more freedom to choose a service provider by being able to 
easily switch. In reality, however, in the gambling industry players often have 
multiple accounts open with a number of different operators. It therefore seems 
unlikely that a player would go through the trouble of porting their data to a dif-
ferent operator when they can easily open a new account, particularly where the 
data required to be ported under the regulation is relatively restrictive.
6.10 On the face of it, these additional rights demonstrate a positive step in em-
powering the individual to take control of their data by being able to actively 
object, amend or delete the personal data which a controller holds about them. 
In reality, however, the same issue exists in placing the onus on the individual 
to manage their own privacy, which may not be reasonable or actually desired. 
Indeed, it is argued that individuals are less concerned with preventing profiling 
altogether but would actually prefer to have more control over how they are pro-
filed and on the basis of what data.131 Furthermore, in order to properly utilise 
these rights, the individual must have access to a proper explanation of how their 
data is being used and, as demonstrated above, this may not be feasible. Finally, 
if a player was to exercise their rights under articles 17 and 20 they would ulti-
mately be terminating the relationship with the operator and would be unable to 
use any of the other services on offer whether or not they relate to the processing 
in dispute. The remedies might therefore be too extreme for the purpose they 
seek to achieve.
7. Non-Compliance and Accountability
7.1 While most of the principles outlined in the GDPR build upon existing core 
values of the existing data protection legislation, it is fair to say that the new regu-
lation introduces number of new rights and obligations which must be complied 
with. The consequences of non-compliance have also significantly increased in 
gravity; breach of the regulations can result in a fine of up to 20,000,000 Euros 
or 4% of the worldwide annual turnover from the previous financial year, which-
ever is greater.132 Moreover, any person who has suffered damage as a result of a 
130  GDPR Art. 20(2).
131  HILDEBRANDT, Mireille - Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law. Novel Entanglements of 
Law and Technology, 1st edn, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015.
EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 73.
132  GDPR Art. 83(5).
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breach shall have the right to compensation through court proceedings.133 Clear-
ly, the risks are reputational as well as financial. 
7.2 Accountability is therefore a key theme inherent within the GDPR and or-
ganisations need to be responsible for demonstrating compliance with the regu-
lations.134 One of the key tools provided for by the regulations is the data protec-
tion impact assessment (DPIA), which enables controllers to evidence the steps 
taken in considering and addressing risks of processing personal data.135 DPIAs 
are mandatory in relation to ‘a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal 
aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, in-
cluding profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects con-
cerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person’.136 
The WP29 guidelines suggest that in using the term ‘based on’ rather than ‘sole-
ly’, the requirement applies to decision-making that is only partially automated 
as well as solely automated decisions provided the decision produces a legal or 
similarly significant effect.137 It would therefore be sensible to assume that DPIAs 
are required for all algorithmic systems which may have a legal or similarly sig-
nificant effect upon an individual to determine which measures should be put in 
place to protect against the risks as well as to evidence compliance. 
7.3 DPIAs have been welcomed as a more appropriate way to combat the threats 
to individual privacy presented by big data analytics by moving the responsibi- 
lity away from the individual to enforce their rights. In placing the onus on the 
organisation to consider privacy when designing and implementing a process, 
DPIAs foster the principle of accountability; a theme which is arguably lacking 
in the majority of the regulation.138 It is just regrettable that DPIAs are only man-
datory in relatively restricted circumstances.
133  GDPR Art. 82.
134  GDPR Art. 5(2).
135  GDPR Art. 35.
136  GDPR Art. 35(3)(a).
137  WP29 Guidelines, op. cit., p. 29.
138  EDWARDS, Lillian and VEALE, Michael, op. cit., p. 77.




8.1 This paper sets out the key provisions under the GDPR which apply to big 
data analytics, including the general prohibition to automated decisions which 
have a legal or similarly significant impact on the individual. It also outlines the 
enhanced rights which are granted to individuals in an effort to provide them 
with more control over their personal data and ultimately protect the fundamen-
tal right to privacy.
8.2 It is argued, however, that this liberal approach of putting individuals in 
charge of managing their privacy may not be the most appropriate for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the strongest rights are only available in very restricted cir-
cumstances under article 22, where the decision is solely automated and there is 
a legal or similarly significant effect upon the individual. Certainly, in the context 
of online gambling there are few realistic examples, given that operators are keen 
to retain their players in a particularly competitive marketplace. Moreover, it is 
likely that the most extreme examples which would involve potential discrimina-
tion would already be classed as unfair and therefore unlawful.
8.3 Furthermore, the terminology used is often unclear and ambiguous, for 
example in the requirement for meaningful information about the logic involved 
to be provided. As a result, there is a significant lack of clarity as to the appli-
cation of the provisions, which makes it difficult for the average individual to 
understand the rules and avail themselves of the rights granted. The situation is 
further complicated for UK citizens as a result of Brexit, following which it will 
be unclear how and to what extent the provisions of the GDPR will be applied. 
Hopefully, the situation will become clearer following the implementation of the 
regulation and the arrival of relevant case law.
8.4 This leads to the final criticism that granting a set of enhanced rights to in-
dividuals who, in general do not have the time, resource or expertise to enforce 
them is perhaps not the most appropriate approach. Indeed, individuals are ar-
guably less concerned with obtaining an explanation and would prefer to have 
more control over how they are profiled, so that the offending decision is not 
made in the first place. There is a real risk of a “transparency fallacy” arising, 
where individuals are provided with rights which have no real value. Arguably, 
in an online gambling context, a player is arguably more likely to use their time 
to open a new account with a competitor than commence legal proceedings to 
enforce their rights. More emphasis should be placed on those provisions which 
require increased accountability from the organisation, such as ‘data protection 
impact assessments’, in order to counteract the inherent power imbalance and 
level the odds between the operator and the individual.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL 
MARKETS AND THE (LACK OF) 
CONSUMER PROTECTION: NEED FOR 
A LEGISLATIVE REFORM? 
Isa Meireles1
Abstract: If the concept of consumer has always been associated with a neces-
sary and crucial protection of the weakest part in market relations, the truth is 
that with the evolution and development of a new type of commerce and the 
disassociation of the market from the traditional on-site element, this concept 
and its inherent protection are constantly changing.
Keywords: Consumer. Digital markets. Consumer relations.
Summary: § 1. The traditionalist vision of the concept of consumer. 1.1. The 
concept of consumer in the light of consumer law. 1.2. The legislative intention 
in the creation of this concept. § 2. The new digital markets and their influence 
on the consumer. 2.1. The specific case of social networks. 2.2. Accommodation 
promotion platforms. § 3. The (in)sufficiency of the current legislation towards 
an effective consumer protection. 
§ 1. The traditionalist vision of the concept of consumer. 
The concept of consumer and the reality underlying consumer relations 
have presented, for some years now, an association to the “[biggest] economic 
group acting in the market, being influenced by (and influencing) all decisions 
1  Invited Assistant at the School of Law of the University of Minho, Lawyer, with a Master’s Degree 
in Contract and Business Law, e-mail: isameireles@direito.uminho.pt.
164
made at this level”2. The protection of consumers and the association of this 
consumer relation to an evident development of the market have been of crucial 
relevance in view of the “[imbalance] that underlies the consumer relation”3.
Therefore, without a better understanding, it seems crucial to us that the 
consumer would (probably) be considered the weakest part of the contractual 
chain. In this respect, several legal theories and case law opinions have been 
issued, which, after a natural case-by-case assessment, conclude that in consu- 
mer relations the premise is that the consumer is, indeed, the weakest part of the 
contractual chain45.
It is obvious that the initial vision the consumer had regarding the ap-
pearance of his protection cannot be the same as the one we face today. Histor-
ically, traditional commerce was associated to vendors and consumers meeting 
up in person, trading and concluding their contracts personally, the contractual 
subjects having direct contact with each other. 
With the technological evolution and the emergence of new types of com-
merce, it became necessary to also have this development, in terms of consumer 
protection in the legislation itself. 
The truth is that the evolution has been taking place at such a speed that it 
is often urgent to raise the question: is the consumer really protected in the light 
of the lawmaker’s intentions in assuring that the weakest part of this contractual 
chain won’t be left without protection?
2  CARVALHO, Jorge Morais, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 3rd edition, Lisbon, Almedina, 2016, 
p. 13.
3  CARVALHO, Jorge Morais, Os contratos de consumo – Reflexão sobre a autonomia privada no 
Direito do Consumo, Doctoral thesis in Private Law at the Faculty of Law of the Universidade Nova 
de Lisboa, Lisbon, March 2011, p. 11. 
4  For instance, on consumer credit, see the Ruling of 09 July 2015 of the Court of Appeal of Lisbon, 
whose reporting judge was Maria do Rosário Morgado, where it is stated that “[there is] a clear 
disparity of means in this type of consumer credit agreements, proving that consumers are the 
weakest part”.
5  In what concerns the question of consumer credits, see also that providing protection to the 
weakest part – this one being the consumer – comes up with a high preponderance in many of our 
legal theories. Luís de Lima Pinheiro states that “‘contracts concluded by consumers’ refer to those 
having as object the supply of goods or services to a person for a purpose which can be regarded 
as being outside his trade or profession, as well as the contracts to finance such supplies. This defi-
nition corresponds to the one used in article 13 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters and should be interpreted likewise, 
in the light of the purpose of protection of the weakest party”, PINHEIRO, Luís de Lima, “Dire-
ito aplicável às operações bancárias internacionais”, consulted on the internet through the URL 
https://www.oa.pt/conteudos/artigos/detalhe_artigo.aspx?idc=30777&idsc=64444&ida=64482, 
on 20 April 2018. 
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1.1. The concept of consumer in the light of consumer law: 
There are various pieces of legislation providing protection to consumer 
law. Here we choose to highlight the law on consumer protection (Portuguese 
Law no. 24/96 of 31 July), the law on distance and off-premises contracts (Por-
tuguese Decree-Law no. 24/2014 of 14 February), the law on boilerplate clauses 
(Portuguese Decree-Law no. 446/85 of 25 October), the law on sale of consu- 
mer goods and associated guarantees (Portuguese Decree-Law no. 67/2003 of 8 
April) and the law on consumer credit agreements (Portuguese Decree-Law no. 
133/2009 of 2 June).
It should also be mentioned that the paramount protection of consumer 
rights is provided and assured by the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, in 
particular in its article 60, under the heading “Consumer [rights]”. 
The truth is that the concept of consumer, although it tends to be uni-
form, has some variations depending on the legislation applied to the consumer 
relation that is being protected.
In what concerns the law on consumer protection (Portuguese Law no. 
24/96 of 31 July), the concept of consumer is presented as a broad concept, 
always fulfilled by four cumulative scopes. According to article 2 of the same 
Law, a consumer would be “everyone to whom goods are supplied, services are 
provided or any rights are conveyed, for non-professional use, by a person per-
forming an economic activity on a professional basis and with the purpose of 
obtaining benefits”.
In turn, in what concerns the distance and off-premises contracts (Por-
tuguese Decree-Law no. 24/2014 of 14 February), the subjective scope of the 
concept of consumer already presents some variations. Whereas in the law on 
consumer protection this definition covers every person, whether natural or le-
gal persons, in Decree-Law no. 24/2014 of 14 February, in particular in its arti-
cle 3(c), the consumer is regarded as “[the] natural person acting for purposes 
which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession”. 
Regarding the legislation on boilerplate clauses (Portuguese Decree-Law 
no. 446/85 of 25 October), we realise that this Decree-Law does not have a defi-
nition of consumer. When doubts arise from its application, and provided that 
the concept of consumer is fulfilled in the light of the law on consumer protec-
tion, its application does not cause us confusion. 
In what concerns the legislation governing the sale of consumer goods 
and associated guarantees (Portuguese Decree-Law no. 67/2003 of 8 April), the 
concept of consumer is enshrined in its article 1-B(a), which foresees that the 
consumer is “everyone to whom goods are supplied, services are provided or 
any rights are conveyed, for non-professional use, by a person performing an 
economic activity on a professional basis and with the purpose of obtaining 
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benefits”. Therefore, the concept of consumer underlying this Decree-Law is 
once again a broader concept, where there is no difference between the natural 
or legal character of the consumer, focusing instead on the quality in which the 
contractual parties act. 
Finally, in what concerns consumer credit agreements (Portuguese De-
cree-Law no. 133/2009 of 2 June), the article 4(1)(a) of this Decree-Law states 
that the consumer is regarded as “the natural person acting, in the legal tran- 
sactions covered by this Decree-Law, for purposes other than his trade, business 
or profession”.
Despite the existence of a variation in the concept of consumer, it is true 
that all the four scopes6, with more or less differences, end up being protected: 
(i) the subjective scope; (ii) the objective scope; (iii) the purposive scope, and 
finally, (iv) the relational scope.
1.2. The legislative intention in the creation of this concept:
It is obvious that the legislative intention reflected in each of the 
above-mentioned laws is guided by the protection of the weakest part in con-
tractual types that converge in a common point: they are likely to constitute and 
fulfil the conditions of the concept of consumer contract.
The way these contracts are formed and the special characteristic regar- 
ding the buyer/purchaser/beneficiary, commonly known as consumer, means 
that a more focused logic of protection should be taken into account regarding 
of who is indeed the weakest part in the contractual chain, although apparently 
it may rebut this presumption. 
§ 2. The new digital markets and their influence on the 
consumer:
Contracting and contracting methods have evolved: naturally, this should 
be clear in our study. Markets are no longer the common traditional market and, 
nowadays, there is an increase in new digital markets and influences which are 
contributing to a new concept of consumer.
Note that all the concepts we referred to are concepts whose legislative 
amendment has not affected their wording. The question that arises is associated 
with the evolution of contracting methods, the creation of new markets and, by 
6  For a deeper understanding of this subject, see CARVALHO, Jorge Morais, Manual de Direito do 
Consumo, 3rd edition, Lisbon, Almedina, 2016, pp. 18-23.
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contrast, the absence of any amendment in the concept of the weakest part of 
those relations. 
It should also be noted that digital markets, due to the dangers linked 
to the internet itself, end up leading to a bigger lack of consumer protection – 
which, in our opinion, and without a better understanding, can no longer be 
understood in its traditional form. 
We know that one of the means of formation of a distance contract7 is 
the contract concluded via the internet, which is naturally linked to electronic 
commerce8, on which we want to focus the scope of our study now. 
2.1. The specific case of social networks:
Electronic contracting naturally implies opening up new digital markets, 
where there is the propensity to practice consumer contracts. One of those mar-
kets, which is very pertinent in our opinion, is the market created by social net-
works. 
Social networks are often manipulated by influencers that, through their 
number of followers, can reach a certain number of potential consumers, attrac- 
ting them to that publicity. And, on the other hand, social networks, through 
their own algorithms, can understand the consumer’s propensity towards con-
tracting. 
Besides, there are countless tools and great ease in electronic contracting 
linked to social markets, more specifically to social networks. In many cases, it is 
possible to create professional profiles, where there is indeed brand promotion. 
But, in other cases, it is possible to advertise sales through an individual profile. 
The main issue concerns this contracting model: individual profiles, whose iden-
tity is not controlled at all, advertise online sales whether on their own Facebook 
pages or in the Marketplace. How is protection provided to the consumer? 
Since it consists in electronic commerce, we know that we have to apply 
and interpret Decree-Law no. 7/2004 of 7 January. However, we must not for-
get that the scope of application of Decree-Law no. 24/2014 of 14 February on 
7  Which is “[a] contract concluded between the consumer and the supplier of goods or the provider 
of services, without the simultaneous physical presence of both, under a sales or service-provision 
scheme organised for distance commerce through the exclusive use of one or more means of 
distance communication up to and including the moment at which the contract is concluded”, as 
defined in article 3(f) of the Decree-Law no. 24/2014 of 14 February.
8  For more details, see CARVALHO, Jorge Morais, Os contratos de consumo – Reflexão sobre a auto-
nomia privada no Direito do Consumo, Doctoral thesis in Private Law at the Faculty of Law of the 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, March 2011, pp. 141. 
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distance contracts may also be fulfilled in cases involving contracts concluded 
via the internet.
As mentioned above, the subjective scope of application of the legislation, 
related to the concept of consumer, must always be observed. At the same time, 
we must always appreciate the actual concept of distance contract, which is the 
contract “[concluded] between the consumer and the supplier of goods or the 
provider of services, without the simultaneous physical presence of both, under 
a sales or service-provision scheme organised for distance commerce through 
the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and 
including the moment at which the contract is concluded”, as provided in article 
3(f) of the Decree-Law in question. 
Considering that any distance contract is already characterised by the 
vulnerability and fragility of consumer protection, who is effectively unaware of 
the underlying reality of the vendor’s identity, as well as the real quality and cha- 
racteristics of the products, it should be stressed that the development of digital 
markets which do not ensure the real and effective identity of their users, means 
that the consumer can naturally be at the mercy of these networks.
Alongside this identity problem, which in our opinion is difficult to over-
come but can be remedied, the truth is that the application of Decree-Law no. 
24/2014 of 14 February falls very far short when it comes to the reality of social 
networks. First of all, because one of the guarantees aimed at providing protec-
tion to the weakest part9 is the pre-contractual information to be provided by the 
vendor to the consumer in accordance with article 4 of that Decree-Law. 
If the pre-contractual information was established by the lawmaker as 
a protection mechanism for the consumer regarding traditional commerce, the 
truth is that nowadays with the emergence of new markets (mainly the digital 
ones), the importance of this pre-contractual information ends up being relega- 
ted to the sidelines10.
In our opinion, article 4 of the Decree-Law, when appreciated under the 
analysis of electronic commerce, seems to be very difficult to implement and 
control, since, as previously stated, there is a lack of knowledge about the real 
identity of the persons in social network commerce, and, in addition, the fact 
that the concept of a supplier of goods as anyone engaged professionally in such 
commerce can be deliberately excluded. 
9  In other words, the consumer.
10  On distance contracts, see CARVALHO, Jorge Morais & PINTO FERREIRA, João Pedro, Con-
tratos celebrados à distância e fora do estabelecimento comercial, in I Congresso do Direito do 
Consumo, Lisbon, Almedina, 2016, p. 95.
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We will now assess the Marketplace11, whose membership is facilitated 
by Facebook to its users. Due to the inability in effectively knowing the owner-
ship and identity of the users joining the social network, a consumer can never 
really discover if a user’s contractual offer is being issued in the scope of his pro-
fession or if it is a non-professional user. Note that this is a very fine line and that, 
depending on the way the concept of consumer is constructed, the fulfilment of 
the relational element can be easily excluded. 
Considering that this lack of protection is verifiable, in other words, it is 
possible to exclude the fulfilment of the notion of consumer through the simple 
manipulation of users’ registration on the network, it is true that the evolution 
of electronic commerce has now placed the consumer in a more vulnerable po-
sition. 
It is certain that this more vulnerable position is not only justified by the 
existence of manipulation in users’ registration, but also because of the possibi- 
lity of lack of veracity in their identity. The problem is able to overcome these is-
sues when the algorithm policy is combined with the search for consumer desire, 
manipulating the suggestions that appear on Facebook and, therefore, conten- 
ding with the contracting desire. 
In view of the issues raised, it becomes clear that the following question 
has to be raised: what responsibility should be placed on the social network re-
garding consumer protection? After all, we are talking about a social network 
that profits from the users registered on it and that is able, by its own means, to 
influence the consumer’s contracting desire (by using his recent searches and 
following his digital footprint). 
In the light of the above, it is worth stating that these distance contracts, 
more specifically those concluded through social networks, are in fact deprived 
of an effective consumer protection. If, on the one hand, the ease of contracting 
in digital markets is a brave new world, the truth is that, on the other hand, there 
is no protection provided by the social network to the consumer. Moreover, the 
relational element might not even be fulfilled, regarding the vendor’s interven-
tion position, and its guarantees excluded as putative consumer.
 
11  Marketplace is presented by Facebook as a short cut allowing its users to discover, buy and sell 
items with their community. Indeed, in its presentation we can read “Discover, buy and sell items 
with people in your community”.
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2.2. Accommodation promotion platforms:
We have been discussing the subject of accommodation from the 
perspective of the lack of consumer protection12, because the digital platforms 
that increase the promotion of local accommodation end up being marked by 
the existence of boilerplate clauses, where the platform itself defines clauses (and 
clarifies) of its own irresponsibility towards certain situations that may be disad-
vantageous for the consumer. 
As it is easily understandable, the provision of accommodation, regard-
less of its nature, will always imply a correlation between two obligations: on 
the one hand, the provision of a service (whether the supply of goods including 
the provision, or not, of cleaning services, for instance) and, on the other hand, 
the pecuniary consideration or counterpart in this regard. Considering the exis- 
tence of these reciprocal obligations, which already constitute an integral part of 
a complex relation, they present complications when, in turn, they are integrated 
in electronic commerce. 
In the reality of accommodation, apart from social networks, the prob-
lems that were raised in their assessment are similar to these ones, except for 
very specific accommodation issues. 
The question that will always be raised is that, today, the promotion and 
contracting methods – the above-mentioned digital platforms – do not present 
any proper protection for the consumer who uses them to celebrate the contracts 
they intend to conclude. It is precisely because of this incongruity, which se- 
riously blurs the lawmaker’s will in providing protection to the weakest part of 
the contractual relationship, that we believe the right way would be: the direct re-
sponsibility of the digital markets, or rather the digital platforms, which are not 
simply the contracting method but are also financially supported by the increase 
in the number of views and negotiations taking place there. Therefore, as their 
use leads to benefits, it is worth stating that they will have to contribute more 
effectively to the protection of consumer rights.
§ 3. The (in)sufficiency of the current legislation towards 
an effective consumer protection. 
By way of conclusion, as the subject we proposed to address is relatively 
new and there are very few studies regarding it, we believe that the legislation 
12  MEIRELES, Isa, Alojamento Local e plataformas digitais: dos perigos na desproteção do consumi-
dor, 5.º Congresso Internacional de Direito na Lusofonia, University of Minho, School of Law, 
2018, pp. 167. 
The development of digital markets and the (lack of) consumer protection: 
need for a legislative reform? 
Isa Meireles
171
currently governing consumer law, as a means of providing consumer protec-
tion, does not accommodate the evolution of electronic commerce. 
Digital platforms are creating challenges that the current consumer law is 
not able to protect. First of all, the concept of consumer – subjective scope of the 
application of different legislations – has four cumulative elements that can easily 
be excluded simply by using electronic commerce.
Note that the difficulty regarding the authenticity of the users’ identity on 
social networks ends up leading, per se, to the lack of consumer protection. Fur-
thermore, if a supplier of goods professionally engaged in the sale of certain con-
sumer goods has the possibility to blur the fulfilment of the relational element 
by selling personally, anonymously or under another identity, consumer goods 
(take, for example, the sale of second-hand goods on the internet), we are leaving 
an open door for the consumer to be at the mercy of the supplier of goods.
On the other hand, the consumer – or putative consumer – that is pre-
sented with the need to demand his protection – constitutionally guaranteed –, 
may not have the means to identify the person who has caused him damages in 
his legal sphere. Let us remember that profiles can be easily deleted and that re-
questing access to identity (without guarantees of obtaining a real one) is a very 
lengthy process. That being said, shouldn’t these digital markets or, as one might 
say, digital platforms bear direct responsibility to the consumer?
We tend to reply in the affirmative, which lead us to a necessary (and 
urgent) legislative amendment. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION: TRI-GAMETIC 
IN VITRO FERTILISATION 
Between the miracle of reproduction and the dangers of 
dehumanisation
Diana Coutinho1
Abstract: Our paper integrates the matter of reproductive technology, namely 
the impact and influence of science and technology on assisted reproduction. 
The process of human reproduction underwent several changes in the last de-
cades: we have seen the separation of sexual intercourse from fertilisation, the 
use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, the egg and embryo freezing, the grow-
ing number of children born with the help of medically assisted reproduction 
techniques, among others. It seems that the trend will be for a progressive (and 
perhaps indiscriminate) use of assisted reproduction techniques, in addition to 
the use of “new” techniques. Among the “future” techniques, we highlight the 
artificial womb, cloning, parthenogenesis and tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation 
(TGIVF). We choose to focus our study on TGIVF, because its future is not so 
remote or utopian: the first birth using this technique occurred in 2016. This 
technique is essentially associated with mitochondrial diseases and aims to avoid 
that the future mother transmits to her child the defective mitochondria (the 
cause of severe problems). There are two procedures used in TGIVF: one per-
formed before fertilisation and another after. We analyse the input of this tech-
nique in fostering and enabling the miracle of reproduction, reflect on its risks, 
1 Invited Assistant at EDUM; Junior Researcher of Jus-Gov, dcoutinho@direito.uminho.pt.
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namely the eventual modification of the human genome and the strong risk of 
dehumanisation. This analysis, although mainly legal, is performed in two fields: 
a technical and scientific analysis of the technique and a legal analysis (in which 
we aim to understand the role of the Law here). 
Keywords: technology – reproduction – law
Summary: 1. Technology and human reproduction 1.1. General framework 1.2. 
The future of reproductive technology: the techniques 2. Tri-Gametic In Vitro 
Fertilisation (TGIVF) 2.1. From the notion to the terminological divergence 2.2. 
The birth of the first baby 2.3. TGIVF in the United Kingdom 2.4. TGIVF ver-
sus preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 2.5. Where does the law stand? 3. 
Concluding notes
“A squat grey building of only thirty-four stories. Over the main entrance the 
words, CENTRAL LONDON HATCHERY AND CONDITIONING CENTRE 
(…) “And this,” said the Director opening the door, “is the Fertilizing Room.” Bent 
over their instruments, three hundred Fertilizers were plunged, as the Director of 
Hatcheries and Conditioning entered the room, in the scarcely breathing silence, 
the absent-minded, soliloquizing hum or whistle, of absorbed concentration.”2
1. Technology and human reproduction  
1.1. General framework 
In the beginning of the 20th century, in England, Aldous Huxley projec- 
ted in his book “Brave New World” a futurist, industrial and inhuman vision of 
reproduction3. In Huxley’s society, traditional family values and personal rela-
tionships had no meaning (for example, the terms “mother” and “father” and 
the idea of a mother-child relationship is mentioned with deep contempt, sur-
prise and disgust). On the contrary, Huxley’s society was organised according to 
scientific principles: the reproduction process was entirely programmed (from 
reproduction to birth), there was no interference of the human body (there was 
no pregnancy; the embryo was implanted in an artificial “incubator” and deve- 
loped in the Hatchery and Conditioning Centre), people were genetically pro-
grammed to play a role in society (according to their caste or social group). 
2  Excerpt from the book written in 1931. HUXLEY, Aldous, Admirável Mundo Novo, Mário Henri-
que Leiria (translation), [S.I], Porto, Coleção Mil Folhas 47, 2003, p. 19. 
3  The story takes place in London in 2540. 
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Almost a century after this publication, we question if Huxley’s futurist 
(and fictional) vision may become true. Our concern arises due to the evolution 
of science and technology, especially of its impact in the scope of human repro-
duction. In “Brave New World”, among other aspects, Huxley anticipated chang-
es in the process of human reproduction, by describing a “hypothetical” future 
for reproduction techniques. We know this is a science fiction novel, which is 
based on a critical message of society at the time. However, science and tech-
nology have been showing that many aspects addressed in Huxley’s work are no 
longer a mere utopia. 
 The evolution of science and technology has led reproductive medi-
cine to approach the essence of humanity, because it is increasingly possible to 
realise the “natural” wish of reproduction. Therefore, we have seen significant 
changes in the phenomenon of human reproduction: it is possible to conceive 
human lives in cases which, until now, were considered absolutely impossible 
and with no hope. The use of medically assisted reproduction (MAR) techniques4 
allowed couples (infertile and others) to achieve the dream of being parents. 
The miracle of life is more and more distant from natural conception. 
On the one hand, fertilisation (conception) has been separated from sexuality, 
since it no longer only occurs as a result of sexual intercourse between a man 
and a woman. The MAR techniques enable human conception in lab, although 
gestation (v.g. pregnancy) continues to occur in a woman’s body. The last years 
were characterised by the increase in the number of children born with use of 
MAR. On the other hand, the MAR techniques5 allow reproduction with the use 
of donated genetic material (heterologous procreation); the diagnosis of genetic 
and chromosome changes in embryos, before their implantation, to avoid the 
birth of children with inherited diseases (preimplantation genetic diagnosis); are 
used to help surrogacy, among other abilities and possibilities. 
 From the legal point of view, the Law has been taking part in the re- 
gulation of many aspects inherent to assisted reproduction. By its own initiative 
(acting previously) or because it is called upon to take a position, the Law is 
not – and cannot be – indifferent to the questions regarding human reproduc-
tion, mainly in what concerns sensitive issues (sometimes, ethical and moral) 
or dangers that may result from an indiscriminate and unfounded use (without 
a pathological reason or medical cause that supports its use). Now, due to the 
4  In Portugal, the MAR techniques are governed by law no. 32/2006, of 26/07, with amendments 
introduced by the following laws: law no. 58/2017, of 25/07, law no. 25/2016, of 22/08, law no. 
17/2016, of 20/06 and law no. 59/2007, of 04/09. To refer to law no. 32/2006, we will use the ex-
pression “MAR law”. 
5  In accordance with article 2 of the MAR law, the following techniques are accepted: artificial in-
semination, in vitro fertilisation, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, transfer of embryos, gametes 
or zygotes and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. 
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constant evolution of reproductive medicine (v.g. emergence of new techniques), 
new rules are needed and, possibly, an update to the existing rules, respecting 
the fundamental principles of the States and not disregarding the evolution of 
society itself (and its values). Regulation of assisted reproduction is far from 
being consensual6. Although there are common values in the States, regarding 
the guarantee of human dignity, legislative diversity in this area has been ob-
served. Therefore, it is important to understand to what extent reproductive 
technology, in an attempt to realise the miracle of reproduction, jeopardises the 
principle of human dignity and which are its limits. We focus our study on the 
analysis of a new reproductive technique: the tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation7. 
Our paper aims to reflect8 on the main legal issues arising from this technique, 
by trying to understand if we run the risk of dehumanisation and how (and in 
which terms) the Law can take action.
1.2. The future of reproductive technology: the techniques 
As mentioned by Vera Raposo “technology allowed the current 
generation to control the genetic future of coming generations, by deciding 
which individuals will be born tomorrow”9. Well, which individuals are these? 
Which problems does the Law face with the massive and increasingly specific 
use of reproductive technology? Will this be the end of natural reproduction? 
As one can understand, there is a right to reproduction resulting from the right 
to form a family (art. 36 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic), it is 
also understandable that that right implies limits10. Considering that science and 
technology evolve at a blatant speed, knowing the increasing interest of society 
for MAR techniques, it seems appropriate to understand what will be the fu-
ture of human reproduction. In this context, a set of “new” techniques in the 
6  There are many contemporary problems surrounding assisted reproduction, for instance, the des-
tination of surplus embryos (and the ongoing discussion about the judicial nature of the embryo), 
the use of PGD for opposite or uncontrolled purposes, the dangers of exploiting and selling hu-
man life and reproductive tourism.
7  Hereinafter indicated by the abbreviation TGIVF. 
8  Although briefly. 
9  Our translation. RAPOSO, Vera, O Direito à Imortalidade: O exercício de direitos reprodutivos 
mediante técnicas de reprodução assistida e o estatuto jurídico do embrião in vitro, Coimbra, Alme-
dina, 2014, p. 997. 
10  COUTINHO, Diana, “A constituição de “novas” famílias com recurso à gestação de substituição 
face ao direito de constituir família”, in Paradigmas do Direito Constitucional Atual, PORTELA, 
Irene M. (dir.), MIRANDA GONÇALVES, Rubén; VEIGA, Fábio da Silva (coords.), e-book edi-
tion, Barcelos, Instituto Politécnico do Cávado e do Ave, pp. 167-178.
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reproduction and gestation processes is broached, namely, the artificial womb, 
cloning, parthenogenesis and tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation. 
Parthenogenesis is an asexual reproduction technique11, in other words, 
it implies the use of only one gamete, which is similar to cloning (also an 
asexual technique). However, in parthenogenesis, only the female gamete is 
used, excluding the male contribution to the creation of an embryo12. Therefore, 
parthenogenesis allows the development of an egg to embryo state, without the 
need of fertilisation from a male gamete. In fact, parthenogenesis is an effective 
reproduction process that occurs naturally, for instance, in the reproduction of 
bees (and other invertebrates), lizards or fish. In human beings, parthenogene-
sis implies the use of a mechanism that allows the development of an embryo 
using only female gametes, namely, “physical, chemical or thermal mechanisms, 
similar to cloning”13. Science and technology still don’t allow human repro-
duction through this technique. The future will tell us if that will be possible, 
however, we have serious doubts about its use. What would be the purpose? The 
use by female couples? Would it be a technique decoupled from infertility prob-
lems, used exclusively to satisfy women’s wishes of reproducing without a male 
contribution? Which would be the effects on the child? Would the child be like a 
clone? And where would this leave the best interest of the child? Would it be sur-
passed by the right to maternity? Would this deny the child the right of having a 
father in the first place14? 
Reproductive cloning is not exactly a “new” technique, however, it is not 
used as a technique for human reproduction15. In fact, it is forbidden pursuant 
to articles 7, 9 and 36 of the MAR law16. Article 26(3) of the Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic, which establishes that “the creation, development and use 
of technologies and in scientific experimentation” should respect the dignity of 
11  Opposing to sexual reproduction, in other words, the reproduction that implies the use of two 
gametes (one female and one male). 
12  RAPOSO, Vera, O Direito à Imortalidade, op. cit., p. 401. 
13  Our translation. Idem, ibidem. 
14  This occurs with some MAR techniques. 
15  On this topic, refer to, merely as an example, ARCHER, Luís, “Clonagem reprodutiva e não repro-
dutiva”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis Archer, Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, Michel Renaud 
(coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, pp. 128-131 and BARBAS, Stela, O Direito do genoma huma-
no, Doctoral thesis, Coimbra, Almedina, 2007. pp. 439-479. 
16  In the international context, we highlight the following legal instruments, among others: the Uni-
versal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997); the Declaration on Human 
Cloning (1997), of the World Health Organization; the European Parliament resolution on human 
cloning, of 12 March 1997; the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine, of 12 January 1992, which forbids human cloning; the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Cloning, of 8 March 2005. 
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the human person (article 1 of the CPR) and genetic identity. So, reproductive 
cloning is an asexual reproduction method and aims to reproduce genetically 
identical human beings, but it can also have therapeutic purposes (limited to cell 
reproduction with a therapeutic objective) and experimentation. This technique 
may result from the somatic cell nuclear transfer or the embryo splitting (em-
bryo splitting or division)17 18.
The artificial womb or ectogenesis19 will allow a total separation of the 
reproduction process from the female body, since pregnancy will occur outside 
the woman’s body. This technique will allow (if it becomes possible) the concep-
tion and development of the embryo or the foetus in an artificial environment: 
the artificial womb. The artificial womb takes us back to Aldous Huxley’s vision 
in Brave New World, in particular, it allows us to establish a sort of comparison 
between the hatchery centres and reproduction through an artificial womb. 
2. Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilisation (TGIVF)
2.1. From the notion to the terminological divergence 
The tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation is a MAR technique that stems from 
the “traditional” in vitro fertilisation. Generally speaking, in in vitro fertilisation, 
the fertilisation process takes place in a laboratory: in a test tube20. The procedure 
starts with the collection and treatment of male gametes (v.g. sperm) and female 
gametes (v.g. oocytes). After the collection and treatment of gametes, the fertili- 
sation is done in a test tube, originating the embryo. The embryos are maintained 
17  CARVALHO E SILVA, Willame/ FERREIRA, Valéria Cristina, Clonagem humana: abordagem 
sociológica e jurídica, [Online], VI CONGRESSO PORTUGUÊS DE SOCIOLOGIA, Universidade 
Nova de Lisboa, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, serial number 600, 2008, p. 4. [Con-
sult. 02.05.2018]. Available at: <URL: http://historico.aps.pt/vicongresso/pdfs/600.pdf>. 
18  The most famous case on reproductive cloning (although in animals) was Dolly sheep, born in 
1997, whose birth raised the extensive and heated debate on this topic. 
19  For a further study, see COUTINHO, Diana, “O ‘futuro’ da tecnologia reprodutiva: o útero arti-
ficial”, in Direito na Lusofonia: Direito e novas tecnologias, Braga, EDUM/JusGov, 2018, pp.53-62 
and ATLAN, Henri, O útero artificial, Ana M. André (transl.) [S.I], Lisbon, Instituto Piaget, 2007. 
20  SILVA, Paula Martinho da/COSTA, Marta, A lei da procriação medicamente assistida anotada (e 
legislação complementar), 1st edition, PLMJ, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2011, pp.14 and 15. 
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in an artificial environment “until they reach the blastocyst phase21”22, moment 
in which they are implanted in a woman’s body23. 
 The tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation consists in the fecundation in 
laboratory – such as the in vitro fertilisation –, but with the particularity of 
using genetic material of three people: two women and one man. Thus, female 
gametes (oocytes) of two women and one male gamete (sperm) are used, com-
bining three different DNAs24 (the child is born with three genetic codes)25. 
The terminology26 used to define this technique is not homogeneous or 
consensual, since there are several names, as we will see below. These names are 
subject to criticism due to the fact that the nomenclature is susceptible of trans-
mitting a wrong or fake idea regarding the technique, not effectively correspon- 
ding to its meaning and procedure. Which expressions are those? In addition 
to tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation, we found expressions like mitochondrial do-
nation, mitochondrial therapy, mitochondrial transfer, mitochondrial replace-
ment, mitochondrial modification, three-parent babies, among others27. 
Without entering into a deeper argument on the conceptual divergence 
– very dependent on scientific explanations – we prefer to adopt the expression 
TGIVF, because we consider it the most neutral and the one that best reflects 
the meaning of the technique. In fact, this expression seems to create less confu-
21  Embryo with five or six days. 
22  Our translation. SILVA, Paula Martinho da/COSTA, Marta, A lei da procriação medicamente as-
sistida anotada, op. cit., p. 15.
23  The intracytoplasmic sperm injection also arises from the in vitro fertilisation. The difference is 
that the sperm is inject directly in the oocyte. Idem, ibidem. 
24  The DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is a molecule composed “of four types of small chemical bases 
– the nucleotides (represented by the letters A, T, C and G). Four trivial letters that are linked and 
succeed one another, by a specific order, which is the secret of life, in a total number of about three 
million”, in other words, the genome that exists in each human cell. This is DNA, which contains 
hereditary characteristics of human anatomy and physiology. (Our translation.) ARCHER, Luís, 
“O genoma humano”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis Archer, Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, 
Michel Renaud (coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, p. 137 and BARBAS, Stela Marcos de Almeida 
Neves, O Direito ao genoma humano, op. cit, pp. 91-100.
25  With nuclear DNA from the future parents and mitochondrial DNA from a female donor. RAPO-
SO, Vera, O Direito à Imortalidade, op. cit., p. 394. Further ahead, we will see how this procedure 
takes place.
26  Cf. HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers in 
U.K. debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, in Monash 
Bioeth Review, [Online], 33, 2015; 33, pp. 364–365. [Consult. 14.04.2018]. Available at <URL: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4801981/>. 
27  Cf. NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, in EMBO Molecular Medicine, [Online], 8 (6), 2016, p. 589. [Consult. 
14.04.2018]. Available at <URL: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4888849/>. 
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sion/misunderstandings about how it works (use of three gametes) and what is 
effectively replaced. Our position comes from a comparative analysis of different 
expressions used to refer to the technique, taking into account the degree of re-
liability and transparency in reflecting its practical and actual implementation. 
For example, in the United Kingdom (as we will see better below), the expression 
mitochondrial donation is used. Well, whether it is this name or mitochondrial 
“replacement” or “transfer”, none seem to reflect the most appropriate and cor-
rect terminology, because they mirror the idea that there is a donation (transfer 
or replacement) of mitochondria28. However, as a matter of fact, what happens 
in this technique is precisely the opposite (as we will see in the technical expla-
nation), the purpose of the technique is to remove the nuclear DNA (without 
the defective mitochondria) from an egg (woman no. 1, v.g. future expectant 
mother)29 and transfer it to a female donor30 (woman no. 2)31. Thus, at the same 
time, the nuclear DNA of the donated egg (woman no. 2) is removed so it can 
receive the nuclear DNA from woman no. 132. The donor’s egg is then fertilised 
with a male gamete (v.g. future expectant father) and it will be implanted in 
woman no.1’s body. Therefore, the TGIVF goal is not donating or transferring 
mitochondria, but removing defective mitochondria so fertilisation can occur. 
There is effectively a donation, because the donor donates her egg without nucle-
ar DNA, containing only her mitochondria. There is, in effect, a transfer or re-
placement, but of woman no. 1’s nuclear DNA and not of mitochondria. It is true 
that the donor contributes with her mitochondria (they are not removed from 
the donated egg), however, those expressions tend to be insidious. In alternative, 
28  The mitochondria are small structures present in the cytoplasm of cells that produce energy and 
also host its own DNA (a different and separated DNA from the main volume of DNA located in 
the cell nucleus). If the mitochondria are defective, the cell cannot execute its function. The mito-
chondria exist in every cell of our body. The mitochondria of a future baby are in the cytoplasm of 
the oocyte, which means, they are inherited from the female gamete. The nucleus of a cell contains 
99.8% of our DNA (called nuclear DNA), while the cell mitochondria contain only a small amount 
of genetic material (between 0.2 and 0.1%). Cf. KINGSLEY NAPLYE, First cases of mitochondrial 
donation therapy in the UK and why the “three-parent baby” headlines are misleading, [Online], 2 
February 2018, p. 1. [Consult. 14.04.2018]. Available at <URL: https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/
insights/blogs/family-law-blog/first-cases-of-mitochondrial-donation-therapy-in-the-uk-and-
why-the-three>. 
29  It refers to the woman that suffers of a mitochondrial disease (at least, in theory, because the 
technique might be used for other purposes).
30  We adopt the donor expression (the one that gives) because it is the one adopted in the MAR law, 
without prejudice of considering the donor expression (the one that donates) as appropriate, since 
it refers to a donation (and not a selling) of eggs. 
31  The host or receiver “egg”. 
32  Woman no. 2’s nuclear DNA is useless. As we will see ahead, this is only one of the types of TGIVF, 
the other one implies doing the procedure in embryos. Both have the same objective and there is 
no mitochondrial transfer. 
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it would be more correct to use the expression nuclear DNA transfer or replace-
ment. On the other hand, the donation/transfer/replacement expressions seem 
to suggest that the egg donor only contributes mitochondria, which is not true. 
The “receiver” or “host” egg contains the donor’s mitochondria (woman no. 2), 
but also all the structure and substance required by the nuclear DNA transferred 
from woman no. 1 and the genetic material of the man33. Therefore, the donated 
egg is not a simple host or receiver: there are influences, even if minimal, of the 
donor’s DNA. 
2.2. The birth of the first baby 
Despite the introduction of this technique regarding the future of assis- 
ted reproduction, the reality is that this technique is not mere science fiction or 
in a distant future: in 2016, in Mexico34, the birth of the first baby (a boy) with 
TGIVF took place35. The event was disclosed in September 201636, by the British 
journal “New Science”. From the information published, it is mentioned that the 
genetic material of three people was used: the (genetic and legal) parents and a 
female donor. The reason for using TGIVF was to avoid the transmission of a 
genetic disease. The legal mother (who also contributes with genetic material) 
has genetic mutations of Leigh syndrome. It is a neurological disease, with no 
cure, that affects the development of the nervous system, causing the progressive 
destruction of the central nervous system. Due to the risk of transmission – 
33  Cf. HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers in 
U.K. debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, op. cit., p. 364. 
34  A country that does not foresee or regulate the technique. 
35  At the end of the 1990s, in the USA, in order to increase the chances of success of the MAR 
techniques (fighting infertility cases), researchers combined genetic material of three people but 
used a technique with some differences (transfer of cytoplasm with healthy mitochondria from 
a donor to the future mother’s oocyte, and then proceeded with the fertilisation of that oocyte). 
From this technique, 17 children were born, but some had problems, such as developmental 
disorders, migraines, etc. Such consequences led the Food and Drug Administration (the US 
agency responsible for the regulation of drugs, food and medical treatments) to suspend the pro-
cedure. In 2001, American researchers used the cytoplasm tissue (part of the egg nucleus) from a 
fertile woman and implanted it in the egg of an infertile woman (thousands of children were born 
thanks to this technique). However, due to the ethical and legal issues, this technique was also 
suspended. FERREIRA, Nicolau, “Nasceu bebé com três pais graças a nova técnica”, in Público, 
[Online], 2016. [Consult. 11.04.2018]. Available at: <URL: https://www.publico.pt/2016/09/27/
ciencia/noticia/nasceu-bebe-com-tres-pais-gracas-a-nova-tecnica-1745364,>. 
36  FERREIRA, Nicolau, “Nasceu bebé com três pais graças a nova técnica”, in Público, [Online], 
2016. [Consult. 11.04.2018]. Available at: <URL: https://www.publico.pt/2016/09/27/ciencia/noti-
cia/nasceu-bebe-com-tres-pais-gracas-a-nova-tecnica-1745364,>. 
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which had already happened in the past37 – the couple, from Jordan, decided to 
use this technique38 as their last hope for having a biological child. The process 
of conception took place as follows: in the first phase, the genetic material of the 
three elements mentioned above was collected; in the second phase, the replace-
ment of the oocyte nucleus, which contained the mutations of Leigh syndrome 
(legal mother’s egg) with the healthy nucleus of the egg donor was made; and the 
last phase corresponded to the fertilisation through the use of in vitro fertilisa-
tion, being the embryo implanted in the uterus of the Jordan woman. 
 In January 2016, in Ukraine39, a baby with the genes of three people 
was also born. The mother’s egg was fertilised with the husband’s sperm and, 
then, the combination of genes was transferred to the egg nucleus of the donor40. 
However, in this case, there was no mitochondrial disease; the technique was 
used because the couple was infertile (after 15 years of trying to get pregnant, 
including the use of in vitro fertilisation): the medical team considered that this 
technique would result in this couple as an alternative to traditional techniques. 
So, the use of the technique for other purposes opens a door to a diverse (and 
indiscriminate) use, which makes us further question, when and who may use 
this technique. 
2.3. TGIVF in the United Kingdom 
The only country that accepts the use of TGIVF is the United Kingdom, 
as of 201541, although no birth has occurred using this technique. The approval 
of the technique, named mitochondrial donation42, introduced changes to the 
37  Before this birth, the couple had two babies that died with Leigh syndrome (in addition to several 
miscarriages). 
38  It seems that the purpose underlying the technique – non-transmission of the disease – was 
achieved. The medical exams performed on the baby, in 2016, showed that only 1% of his mito-
chondria had that genetic mutation. FERREIRA, Nicolau, “Nasceu bebé com três pais graças a 
nova técnica”, op. cit.
39  Ukraine regulates MAR broadly and with rare restrictions, facing it as an expensive business 
(consider the example of surrogacy, which is permitted against payment). [Consult. 12.05.2018]. 
Available at: <URL: http://sicnoticias.sapo.pt/mundo/2017-01-18-Bebe-nasce-na-Ucrania-com-
ADN-de-tres-pais 
40  The pronuclear transfer technique was used, which we will address later. 
41  Approved by The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 
2015, no. 572: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Mitochondrial Donation), 2015, no. 572. 
Available at: <URL: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111125816/contents>. 
42  Original expression: mitochondrial donation.
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 199043 and aims to avoid the trans-
mission of serious (mitochondrial) genetic diseases44. The technique allows the 
defective mitochondrial DNA contained in the mother’s egg (legal and also ge-
netic) to be replaced by healthy DNA from a female donor and aims to avoid that 
harmful mutations are inherited45. The mitochondrial diseases assume several 
forms; some of them are caused by mutations in DNA contained in each mito-
chondrion46. 
Three years after the approval of this technique, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) permitted the birth of the first children47. 
The future mothers are two women diagnosed with MERRF (Myoclonic Epilepsy 
with Ragged Red Fibers) syndrome, in other words, a multisystem mitochondri-
al disease that changes the energy metabolism of the cells. If it reaches the central 
nervous system48 it may cause spasms, weakness and progressive tightness of 
muscle fibres, difficulty in coordinating movement, seizures and heart diseases.
 In the United Kingdom, the technique is not totally consistent with the 
procedure followed in the birth of the first baby with three DNAs. Firstly, the 
technique applies when there is a risk of transmitting mitochondrial disease to 
43  Article 35A. of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, amended in 2008. 
44  HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, Mitochondrial donation treatment. Available 
at: <URL:https://www.hfea.gov.uk/treatments/embryo-testing-and-treatments-for-disease/mito-
chondrial-donation-treatment/>. 
45 Both genders can inherit the disease, but only women are at risk of transmitting the disease to 
their children. Therefore, the mitochondrial DNA is inherited from the female element while the 
nuclear DNA is the result of the combination of female and male gametes. Cf. SALMAN, Sar-
ah, Ethical and Legal Thought on Mitochondrial Donation, [Online], Research Center for Islamic 
Legislation and Ethics, 2015. [Consult. 14.04.2018]. Available at <URL: https://www.cilecenter.
org/en/articles-essays/ethical-and-legal-thought-on-mitochondrial-donation/>. 
46  HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers in U.K. 
debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, op. cit., p.360.
47  For a clinic to use this technique, it needs to get the respective licence.
48  SHERRAT, Sam, “Women selected for mitochondrial donation in Uk”, in BioNews, [Online], 936, 
2018. [Consult. 14.04.2018]. Available at: < https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_96351> 
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both the oocyte49 and the embryo50. In other words, there are two procedures 
used in mitochondrial donation: one performed before in vitro fertilisation (tar-
gets the egg) and the other after in vitro fertilisation (targets the embryo). In 
the first case, it is designated as Maternal Spindle Transfer (MST) and in the 
second case, Pronuclear Transfer (PNT)51. In both cases, the eggs and embryos 
are created using the nuclear genetic material of the recipients and the healthy 
mitochondria contained in the egg donated by a third element. In both, the eggs 
and the embryos cannot be used for any other purpose other than the intended 
for this technique. 
The maternal spindle transfer procedure52 is divided into three steps (cf. 
point 4 of Regulations 2015). In the first step, the entire nuclear DNA (which 
contains the nuclear chromosomes) is removed from the egg designated as egg 
A (it is the healthy egg, the donor’s egg) and the egg designated as egg B (it is the 
unhealthy egg, the one that contains defective mitochondria)53. In other words, 
the goal is the removal of the egg’s nuclear DNA, which contains the affected 
mitochondria and its insertion in the donated egg54. In the second step, the en-
tire nuclear DNA of egg B55 is transferred to egg A56, creating egg P, which does 
49  We transcribe here point 5 of The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Dona-
tion) Regulations 2015: “Permitted egg: circumstances 5. The circumstances referred to in re- 
gulation 3(b) are that—(a) the Authority has issued a determination that—(i) there is a particular 
risk that any egg extracted from the ovaries of a woman named in the determination may have 
mitochondrial abnormalities caused by mitochondrial DNA; and (ii) there is a significant risk that 
a person with those abnormalities will have or develop serious mitochondrial disease; and (b) egg 
B was extracted from the ovaries of the woman so named.”
50  We transcribe here point 8 of The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Dona-
tion) Regulations 2015: “Permitted embryo: circumstances 8. The circumstances referred to in 
regulation 6(b) are that—(a) the Authority has issued a determination that—(i) there is a particu-
lar risk that any embryo which is created by the fertilisation of an egg extracted from the ovaries 
of a woman named in the determination may have mitochondrial abnormalities caused by mito-
chondrial DNA; and (ii) there is a significant risk that a person with those abnormalities will have 
or develop serious mitochondrial disease; and (b) embryo B was created by the fertilisation of an 
egg extracted from the ovaries of the woman so named.”
51  These are the two types of treatment of mitochondrial disease, in other words, two forms of use 
of this technique. 
52  Cf. NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues 
in mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., pp. 589–591. 
53  Cf. point 4 of Regulations 2015. 
54 NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., p. 589. 
55  In other words, the essential nucleus of the cells without defective mitochondria DNA is trans-
ferred. 
56  “3) In step 2 all the nuclear DNA of egg B which is not polar body nuclear DNA is inserted into 
egg A.”
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not suffer any change in the nuclear or mitochondrial DNA (since it is created 
through this process – cf. point 3(c) of Regulations 2015)57. In the third step, the 
egg is fertilised using in vitro fertilisation, which means, egg P is fertilised with 
the sperm, creating an embryo. 
 The pronuclear transfer procedure is divided into four steps. In a first 
moment, the in vitro fertilisation is used to fertilise the recipient’s egg(s) (legal 
and genetic mother) with the sperm (v.g. father) and fertilise the donor’s egg(s) 
with the father’s sperm, originating two groups of embryos. In a second moment, 
the nuclear genetic material (the nuclear DNA) is removed from the two embry-
os: embryo A (healthy, resulting from the fertilisation of two gametes from the 
donor and the father) and embryo B (with unhealthy mitochondria, resulting 
from the fertilisation of the gametes from the recipients). In a third moment, 
the nuclear DNA of embryo B is inserted into embryo A, in other words, the 
nuclear genetic material of embryo B is transferred to embryo A (which contains 
the healthy mitochondria and whose nucleus was already removed). Finally, the 
embryo is implanted in the recipient’s uterus (cf. point 7 of Regulations 2015). 
In the United States of America (USA), this technique is forbidden. The 
American Congress forbids the use of techniques susceptible of changing genes, 
including TGIVF58. In 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 
and Medicine (NASEM) recommended that the use of this technique should 
only be performed in certain circumstances and the implantation of male em-
bryos is the only procedure considered possible59. 
2.4. TGIVF versus preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
When we began studying TGIVF, the first question on which we focused 
was trying to understand if this technique would be included in PGD, since both 
are methods for treating genetic diseases. In order to answer our doubt, next we 
will refer the common aspects of these techniques and what distinguishes them. 
 The PGD is a MAR technique, accepted in the Portuguese legal order 
(cf. articles 2(1)(d), 28 and 29 of the MAR law). This technique, performed 
57  Egg P is not materially a third egg, but only the result of the transfer of genetic material from egg 
B to egg A. It is the result of the union of the donated egg with the nuclear DNA of the recipient’s 
egg. 
58  Cf. LOIKE, John D./ REAME, Nancy, “Opinion: Ethical Considerations of “Three-Parent” 
Babies”, in The Scientist Magazine, [Online], December 2016, p.1. Available at <URL: https://
www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/47725/title/Opinion--Ethical-Considerations-of-
-Three-Parent--Babies/>. 
59 NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., p. 589. 
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before the implantation of the embryos, aims to detect serious abnormalities 
(avoid the transmission of serious genetic diseases or major chromosome abnor-
malities), according to article 28 of the MAR law. Therefore, the embryos that 
are not in “conditions for developing successfully” will not be implanted60. Pur-
suant to article 29 of the MAR law “PGD is intended for people from families 
with changes that cause early death or serious disease, when there is a high risk 
of transmission to their descendants”61. 
TGIVF also aims to prevent (eradicate) the transmission of mitochondri-
al diseases. However, avoiding the transmission of such diseases is not reason 
enough to use PGD, in other words, the “normal” use of a MAR technique to 
later verify if the embryo suffers from any abnormality. PGD is not used to find 
a healthy embryo, it is used to identify and prevent the implantation of em-
bryos identified with abnormalities. Therefore, only with the TGIVF procedure 
– explained above – is it possible to avoid the transmission of mitochondrial 
diseases, since the defective mitochondria are not transmitted to the donated and 
implanted egg. 
In this sense, and answering our question, TGIVF is not a synonym of 
PGD. Both raise reluctance and contradictory positions: from defending the use 
of these techniques to defending their eradication, since these attract a high risk 
of eugenics62 (a projected choice of babies), questions related to the selection 
of embryos, the destination of surplus embryos, among many others, which we 
will analyse ahead. 
2.5. Where does the law stand? 
a). General notes 
The deeper study of this matter, from technical and scientific questions to 
problems regarding the technique, is beyond the scope of our paper63. However, 
60  Our translation. SILVA, Paula Martinho da/COSTA, Marta, A lei da procriação medicamente 
assistida anotada, op. cit., p.15. 
61  Our translation.
62  Eugenics consists on the “genetic modification of an embryo in view of obtaining certain desi- 
rable characteristics” (our translation). MEDEIROS, Rui/CORTÊS, António, “Comentário ao art. 
26.º da CRP”, in Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, Jorge Miranda/Rui Medeiros 
(org.), Vol. I, 2nd edition, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2011, p. 631.
63  We recognise we had the need to present a more technical and scientific framework, in order to 
understand the technique and to understand the legal issues that may result from its application. 
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we briefly intend to list some of the eventual legal issues surrounding the tech-
nique, without denying its ethical and moral ones. 
By focusing on the law, this technique raises an array of questions: the 
legitimacy to access the technique, concerns relating to an eventual genetic mo- 
dification of human beings, the donor’s anonymity versus the right to know the 
genetic origins, the destruction of surplus and useless embryos, the instrumental 
nature of the egg’s donor (will this be faced as a mean to an end?), the risk of 
eugenics, among many others64. 
In the Portuguese legal order, the technique is not accepted, as we men-
tioned above, only the MAR techniques foreseen (and in the terms) in article 2 
of the MAR law are allowed. Nevertheless, the absence of legal regulation is not 
synonymous of denying the technique or considering it as in conflict with funda-
mental values and principles of our legal order. It seems to us that the “absence” 
results from TGIVF’s own state of evolution. On the one hand, the scientific 
research is relatively recent (a few years), and is starting to present results of 
effective usability, but unknowing the impacts and effects that it might have on 
the child after birth (if it effectively eliminates the mitochondrial disease; the 
influence of the donor’s DNA, etc.). On the other hand, we cannot disregard that 
only one country has regulated this matter, the United Kingdom, where no birth 
has taken place so far. So, the eugenic concerns (of genetic modification) inhe- 
rent to the nature of the technique raise many constraints and doubts regarding 
its application. 
b). The principle of dignity of the human person 
Comparatively to the current legislative framework on assisted reproduc-
tion, it is essential to emphasise the need that TGIVF65 respect the principle of 
dignity of the human person established in article 1 of the CPR, article 1 of the 
MAR law and in several international legal instruments. The rule of dignity of 
the human person is the basis of the entire law and assumes a special importance 
in human reproduction, especially in assisted reproduction. The main problems 
relate to the dangers of using technology for genetic changes, to create projected 
babies based on medically unjustifiable choices (such as, choosing race or eye 
colour), promoting the risk of eugenics and attacking human dignity. Alongside 
are the concerns regarding the exploitation of the human being, the treatment 
of a person as a means to a certain end, the risk of marketing related to MAR 
64  NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., p. 589.
65  Such as any MAR technique. 
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techniques, the lack of protection of the best interest of the child born from the 
technique. Well, all these fears also apply to the application of TGIVF. Will this 
technique effectively guarantee the respect of human dignity? Isn’t Man trying to 
replace human nature? 
We highlight once again article 26(3) of the CPR, since it establishes that 
reproductive techniques should respect human dignity and genetic identity. To 
ensure respect for genetic identity, it is necessary that the MAR techniques do 
not promote eugenics. Article 13 of the Oviedo Convention66 establishes that 
“an intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken 
for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to 
introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants”. Article 8 of the 
Portuguese law of personal genetic information and health information (law no. 
12/2005, of 26 January) establishes that “the medical intervention seeking to in-
tentionally modify the human genome may only be undertaken after verifying 
the conditions established in this law, for preventive and therapeutic purposes”67. 
This law forbids, in article 8(2), “any medical intervention seeking genetic ma-
nipulation of characteristics considered normal, as well as changing the germline 
of a person”68. Article 16(1) of the same law mentions that “research on the hu-
man genome follows general rules of scientific research in the field of health, be-
ing obliged to reinforce confidentiality regarding the identity and characteristics 
of studied individuals”. Finally, it is important to mention that article 11(2) of the 
same law forbids the discrimination against genetic characteristics. Thus, it is 
important to understand if TGIVF constitutes a genetic change. 
c). Genetic modification and donor exploitation 
The birth of the first baby through TGIVF fostered a deeper debate on the 
technique and brought to the media the expression “three-parent babies”. In this 
sense, one of the main controversies of this technique has been understanding 
if the technique reflects genetic change or if the child has, in fact, three parents. 
As we have seen above, the nuclear DNA belongs to the future expectant parents 
(to the father and the mother); however, the mitochondrial DNA belongs to the 
egg’s donor: so, in fact, there are genetic elements (DNA) from three distinctive 
subjects. For researchers, the answer to our concern is in the proportion of DNA, 
which means, the genetic contribution of each subject. According to the scien-
tific explanation, around 99.9% of human DNA is in the nuclear DNA chromo-
66  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine. 
67  Paragraph 1 of the mentioned article (our translation). 
68  Associated to the right to privacy of genetic information (our translation). 
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somes (almost 23 000 genes)69. On the contrary, the mitochondrial DNA only 
represents 0.1% of human DNA70. So, the genetic contribution from the child’s 
parents will be extremely higher than the contribution from the mitochondria 
donor and the receiver egg: about 99% against 0.1 or 0.2%. 
It is the nuclear DNA that defines physical characteristics (hair colour, 
eye colour, etc.) and personality; the mitochondrial DNA does not contribute to 
this definition71. Mitochondria only provide the energy necessary for the cells to 
work properly. Therefore, science seems to transmit the message that the child 
born through this technique is not a child of three parents, due to the minimal 
contribution of the female donor’s DNA. Such contribution is not sufficient for 
the child to carry the donor’s characteristics, nor for the donor to assume any 
rights and obligations. For instance, in the United Kingdom, legislation estab-
lishes that the donor is considered a donor, never a parent, not having any rights 
or obligations related to maternity. According to the English law, the legal mo- 
ther is the gestational mother (the one who gives birth to the child), in this case, 
it will be the woman using the TGIVF technique72.
 On the contrary, as mentioned above, science sustains that the female do-
nor not only contributes with mitochondrial DNA, but she also offers the initial 
environment, favourable for the development of the embryo (the egg that will 
be fertilised is the donor’s egg, although without its nuclear DNA)73. The donor 
cannot be seen as an object nor be exploited: without her, this technique would 
not be possible. It is the donor’s contribution that will allow the child to be born 
without the mother’s defective mitochondrial DNA. By “devaluating” the contri-
bution of the donor’s DNA, TGIVF seems to treat it as a means to an end. The 
English law compares the mitochondrial donation to organ donation (tissues, 
etc.)74 and blood transfusion. The reasons for this treatment are very different 
and may aim to “hide” or minimise the actual contribution of the female donor 
(even if minimal) to the child’s physical or psychological characteristics75. So, 
if we understand that genetic contribution is essential for the definition of the 
69  Cf. HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers 
in U.K. debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, op. cit., 
p. 373. 
70  Idem, ibidem. 
71  Idem, ibidem. 
72  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 2008, 33. 
73  Idem, ibidem. 
74  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA), 2013, 6.64.
75  Cf. HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers 
in U.K. debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, op. cit., 
p. 373. 
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child’s characteristics, we can compare this technique to egg or sperm donation 
with the inherent legal consequences. 
In another perspective, there are people76 who considers this technique 
unnecessary, because it does not cure the disease (unnecessary) and the reci- 
pients may use egg donation. Against this technique, there is the argument that 
not even all carriers of mitochondrial diseases develop the disease, so the use 
of a technique in which there is no absolute “risk” of developing the disease is 
not acceptable. We do not consider these sustainable arguments to rule out the 
application of the technique, because accepting these arguments would also be 
denying the use of PGD. In other words, the use of PGD does not eliminate 
the carrier’s disease, but it allows that the disease is not transmitted to descen- 
dants. The same happens with TGIVF: it does not eliminate or cure the mother’s 
disease, but it allows the child to be born with no defective mitochondria. In 
addition, with egg donation, reproduction is heterologous (even with the male 
element having contributed with his gametes), not completely achieving the wish 
of a biological child. In turn, TGIVF, despite the contribution of the donor’s mi-
tochondrial DNA, is closer to achieving a biological child (the genetics of the 
future parents prevails). 
Does TGIVF effectively cause a modification of the human genome77? 
This is the aspect which is at the heart of the question, doubts, fears, reservations 
and denial of this technique. Is there violation of the human genome? Is there 
genetic modification of the child? Science has divided this topic according to the 
child gender that is born: female or male. Let us see, any child (boy or girl) in-
herits the donor’s mitochondria, but only the girls may transmit those mitochon-
dria to their children in the future, because mitochondria are transmitted by the 
female element78. Therefore, for example, the USA argues that the use of TGIVF 
can only be accepted for the birth of male children. The idea is that the girls born 
from the technique, by transmitting the donor’s mitochondria, are contributing 
to the genome modification (described as germline modification)79. The NASEM 
report distinguishes genetic modification from germline modification (NASEM, 
2016, section 3)80. Therefore, genetic modification is considered the alteration/
76  Idem, ibidem. 
77  For a deeper legal study on the human genome, refer to BARBA, Stela Marcos de Almeida 
Neves, Direito do genoma humano, op. cit. 
78  Cf. SALMAN, Sarah, Ethical and Legal Thought on Mitochondrial Donation, op. cit., p. 7 
79  Cf. HAIMES, Erica/TAYLOR, Ken, “Rendered invisible? The absent presence of egg providers 
in U.K. debates on the acceptability of research and therapy for mitochondrial disease”, op. cit., 
p.371.
80  NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., p. 589.
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change in the genetic material of a cell, while germline modification81 is consi- 
dered the inherited genetic alteration/modification82. So, it considers that TGIVF 
causes a germline modification when a girl is born83. On the contrary, the Uni- 
ted Kingdom Department of Health considers that the technique only involves 
a germline modification84 “in that the result of mitochondrial donation – the 
avoidance of the transmission of a serious mitochondrial disease – will be passed 
down to future generations”85. They compare the mitochondrial donation to the 
donation of organs and blood, because people who receive an organ transplant or 
blood transfusions are not considered genetically modified86. However, the po-
sition of the United Kingdom has been criticised, in particular, they are accused 
of “hiding” or denying what effectively occurs when using this technique: the ge-
netic modification. Luís Archer gives as an example of germline germ therapy87 
as a “type” of TGIVF and considers that it represents a form of germline genetic 
manipulation88. The intervention in the germline causes “a modification in all 
81  It seems that TGIVF can be integrated in gene therapy, since it presents some similarities. The 
gene therapy is defined “as the deliberate transfer of genetic material to a patient’s cells, aiming to 
cure or prevent an inherited or acquired disease”. The gene therapy may be germline or somatic, 
based on the type of cells which are object of that transfer: germline cells (“they are sperm or 
oocytes and its precursor cells, as well as the early stages of human embryos, before the differen-
tiation of germline”) or somatic (all the other cells). (Our translation.) ARCHER, Luís, “Terapia 
génica somática”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis Archer, Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, Mi-
chel Renaud (coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, p. 164. Furthermore, the germline gene therapy 
allows “avoiding the transmission of inherited genetic diseases (monogenic or multifactorial)”; 
ensuring the cure of the individual and of all his descendants (in contrast to the somatic gene 
therapy, which only cures the disease of one person). (Our translation.) Cf. BARBAS, Stela, O 
Direito ao genoma humano, op. cit., p. 96. 
82  NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues in 
mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., p. 591. 
83  Idem, ibidem. 
84  Cf. DIMOND, Rebecca, “Social and ethical issues in mitochondrial donation”, in British Medi-
cal Bulletin, [Online], vol. 115, 2015, p. 178. [Consult. 02.05.2018]. Available at: <URL: https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26351372>. 
85  Idem, ibidem. 
86  Idem, ibidem. 
87  The germline gene therapy is distinguished from genetic improvement engineering. The second 
aims to improve the (non-pathological) characteristics of healthy people (living people or that 
are not yet born, we add), through the improvement of certain characteristics. ARCHER, Luís, 
“Terapia génica germinativa – erradicar doenças hereditárias”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis 
Archer, Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, Michel Renaud (coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, p. 
168. 
88  It refers to the use of the technique also in cases with mitochondrial diseases. In this case, “blas-
tocyst produced in vitro by the gametes of a couple” is extracted from the stem cell nucleus and 
is transferred to the oocytes without nucleus from the female donor. (Our translation.) ARCHER, 
Luís, “Terapia génica germinativa – erradicar doenças hereditárias”, op. cit., p. 168. 
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the individual’s cells (….) changes the human identity or the genetic inheritance 
of humanity and has possible eugenic consequences, constituting a violation of 
human dignity”89. For the author, the dangers and negative effects related to this 
manipulation are still unknown90, therefore, the prohibition of the transfer of 
modified embryos to the human body (subject to experimentation)91 is justified.
Luís Archer relates the principles of bioethics (autonomy, beneficence 
and non-maleficence, justice) with the germline gene therapy92. Regarding the 
principle of autonomy of choice (related to the dignity of the human person), 
he refers that the use of technology to avoid the transmission of serious diseases 
assumes the presumed consent of the descendants (those who were born thanks 
to the technique), which does not happen (and does not count) in the case of 
genetic improvement engineering93. So, can one expand the presumed consent 
to the case of generations born through TGIVF? We have serious doubts that the 
presumed consent can legitimate genetic manipulation, especially in TGIVF94. 
On the one hand, the consent required for the practice of any medical act should, 
as a rule, be expressed or tacit, being only presumed in cases of emergency si- 
tuations (exceptional situations) in which consent cannot be obtained95. Here, 
consent is given by the parents of the child, who does not exist at the time of the 
manipulation, as a holder of rights and obligations. The parents give consent96 
to the manipulation of genetic material that belongs to them, but whose goal is 
to give birth to a new life. It is possible that the child (future adult) agrees with 
the intervention performed, but would this legitimate the use of the technique? 
Will this “presumed consent” be justified only by health reasons or also by other 
grounds? It is here that the concern regarding this type of techniques exists: the 
line between the attempt of preventing diseases or avoiding the transmission of 
89  Our translation. Idem, p.170. 
90  They were in 2001 (time when the article was written) and still are to the present date. 
91  ARCHER, Luís, Terapia génica germinativa – erradicar doenças hereditárias”, op. cit., p. 168. 
92  Idem, pp. 169 and 170. 
93  Idem, p. 169. 
94  On the informed consent for the knowledge and intervention in human genome cf. BARBAS, 
Stela, O direito ao genoma humano, op. cit., pp. 325-388. 
95  Article 16(4) of the Portuguese law no. 12/2005, of 26 January, establishes the demand in ob-
taining informed consent for research on human genome, “the research on the human genome in 
people cannot be performed without the informed consent of those people, expressed in written, 
after the explanation of their rights, research nature and purposes, the procedures used and the 
potential risks involved for them and third parties” (our translation). Consent is also required in 
the use of MAR techniques (article 14 of the MAR law). 
96  Informed consent must respect the needs of capacity, information and voluntariness. Cf. 
COUTINHO, Diana, O Consentimento Informado na Responsabilidade Civil Médica, Master’s 
Thesis at the School of Law of the University of Minho, 2014, pp. 66-110. 
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serious and disabling health problems is very close to the line of using this tech-
nique for non-pathological purposes97. 
In what concerns the principle of beneficence and non-maleficence, the 
germline therapy is presented as a long-term beneficiary, because it enables sa- 
ving “an unlimited number of expensive and costly therapies in somatic cells”98, 
reduces the number of inherited diseases and may appear as a medical impera-
tive (the duty of a doctor to treat a patient), if it is proven that the risks are not 
harmful99.
Regarding the principle of justice, one of the main critiques appointed to 
this technique (and fear) is that it becomes human improvement engineering100 
with the inherent eugenics issues. Also, in the case of improvement engineering 
– if it becomes possible – what would be the access criteria? Only those with fi-
nancial means could have access? Or would the technology be used to help those 
most in need (people with dementia, cognitive problems, etc.)101? In Portugal, as 
mentioned above, gene therapy (cf. article 8(2) of the law no. 12/2005, of 26 Ja- 
nuary), whose objective is the genetic manipulation of characteristics considered 
normal, as well as changes in a person’s germline, is forbidden.
d). TGIVF recipients
Another relevant legal question is the legitimacy of access to TGIVF. Who 
can use the technique? In the United Kingdom, only women with mitochondrial 
disease can. In addition, the United Kingdom restricts the access to heterose- 
xual couples, since in TGIVF, sperm donation is not accepted. Therefore, the 
access to single women or female couples that suffer from mitochondrial disease 
is blocked. 
If the technique is approved in other countries, will the access be limited 
to mitochondrial disease? The regulation of MAR techniques differs, from order 
to order, between “the freedom of use of techniques and rigorous and subsidiary 
criteria”102. So, we fear that the same may happen in the use of TGIVF, namely, 
97  ARCHER, Luis, “Programar o homem do futuro”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis Archer, 
Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, Michel Renaud (coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, p. 192. 
98  Our translation. Idem, ibidem. 
99  ARCHER, Luis, “Terapia génica germinativa – erradicar doenças hereditárias”, op. cit., p. 170. 
In the same sense, BARBAS, Stela, O Direito ao genoma humano, op. cit., pp. 96-101. 
100  Idem, ibidem. 
101  ARCHER, Luis, “Programar o homem do futuro”, op. cit., p. 192. 
102  Our translation. Cf. COUTINHO, Diana, “O futuro da tecnologia reprodutiva: o útero artificial”, 
op. cit., p. 59. 
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a use for purposes different from the one for avoiding the transmission of the 
disease. For example, will a female couple be able to use the technique so a child 
can be born with the genetic contribution of both women (being one the mi-
tochondria donor)? Or a female couple in which one of them has the disease? 
Will it be used to improve fertility, emerging as a helpful technique for infertility 
problems?103 Also, consider the hypothesis presented by Vera Raposo104: the use 
of the technique with genetic material of two women with no health problems. 
This technique would be very appealing to those couples, but may it constitute 
an alternative to sperm donation? We doubt that something like this can happen 
in Portugal, due to the subsidiary nature of these techniques (cf. article 3 of the 
MAR law), even in the case of female couples105. A well-founded reason is neces-
sary to use these techniques so, excluding male DNA (if possible) does not seem 
a valid reason to us. On the one hand, the impacts that such a fact would have 
on a child to be born are unknown. In addition, if the mitochondrial DNA only 
represents about 0.1% of genetics, not contributing to physical and emotional 
characteristics, the use of this technique on a child who will be born with the 
genetic material of “two women” does not seem justifiable. On the other hand, 
there is the use of the techniques to purely satisfy the interests of the couple, 
without a justifiable medical cause106, attacking fundamental values and princi-
ples of our society, particularly, the right to form a family. Article 36 of the CPR 
establishes the right to form a family, which includes the possibility of forming a 
family through MAR techniques (cf. article 67 of the CPR). However, that right 
has limits, namely, the restrictions of article 18 of the CPR “such restrictions 
must be limited to those needed to safeguard other constitutionally protected 
rights and interests” (2) and “must have a general and abstract nature and may 
not have a retroactive effect or reduce the extent or scope of the essential content 
of the constitutional precepts” (3). Therefore, pursuant to article 18 of the CPR, 
the prohibition of TGIVF – as a restriction to the reproductive right – attacks the 
principle of proportionality if it is considered inappropriate, unnecessary and 
disproportional (in a narrow sense). In other words, it is essential to know if 
103  Cf. DIMOND, Rebecca, “Social and ethical issues in mitochondrial donation”, op. cit., p. 175. 
Such as what happened in the case of the baby born in Ukraine. 
104  Cf. RAPOSO, Vera, O direito à imortalidade, op. cit., p. 395.
105  In 2016, the access to MAR techniques was extended to female couples and single women. 
106  On the balancing of interests, it may be argued if it is discrimination to remove a female couple 
when one of them suffers from the disease. So, these women also have a viable alternative: the use 
of the healthy woman’s eggs, with no need to resort to this technique. A specific demand for using 
the eggs of the woman who suffers from mitochondrial disease, when there is an alternative, may 
lead to the arguments mentioned in this article. Consider the access of female couples to MAR: 
one contributes with the egg and the other creates the child. 
Technology and human reproduction: tri-gametic in vitro fertilisation
Diana Coutinho
195
the technique will be constitutionally protected and, if so, when its use can be 
restricted.
The question will be subject to the confrontation between the reproduc-
tive right through TGIVF and the limitation of other constitutionally guaran-
teed rights. And what would be those rights? In the sense of prohibition, we 
find safeguarding the best interest of the child, the dignity of the human person 
(considering the technique as an exploitation of the donor and the child) and 
the prohibition of genetic modifications. Supporting the technique, we find the 
fundamental rights (and of personality) such as the right over one’s own body 
and the right to develop personality. As mentioned above, it seems that the use 
of this technique for the mere desire of having a child with genetic material of 
the parents is not enough. A justifiable (medical) reason that prevents the use of 
natural reproduction and other (homologous) MAR techniques is necessary. A 
person cannot wish for a (biological) child by any means. In addition, the fact 
that these women still have access to heterologous procreation techniques, such 
as egg donations, with the reproductive right not completely blocked (contrary 
to what happens with women who are not able to bear a pregnancy with donated 
gametes) should also be considered. 
The absolute prohibition, however, may be a point of contention and dis-
crimination when compared to women who can use PGD. If women (alone or 
as a couple) can use PGD to avoid the transmission of diseases, will it be dis-
proportionate to forbid the access to TGIVF? It seems to us that an answer to 
this concern must include effective scientific explanations, namely regarding the 
actual contribution of the genetic material of each of the subjects to the child’s 
characteristics (to be who he/she will be) and if that contribution effectively 
causes genetic changes. If we consider the contribution as minimal and with no 
reflections in the formation of the child’s physical and psychic characteristics, 
it will be unequal to deny access when access to PGD is allowed. Furthermore, 
it can be considered disproportionate in comparison to the use of heterologous 
procreation techniques, in which it is effectively known that the donated materi-
al will determine the child’s characteristics. By contrast, if genetic modification is 
proven, the prohibition will be justified, taking into account other fundamental 
values. 
We are still in a very early stage to understand the consequences of this 
technique on the child’s development; we believe the future will help us un- 
derstand which direction to take. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, we also 
recognise that regulation may change from country to country. In fact, as we 
have States that accept any practice of assisted reproduction, we would not be 
surprised if it became possible for female couples and single women to use this 
technique, opening the door to more reproductive tourism, human reproduc-
tion marketing risks, among others.
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e). Surplus embryos 
One of the critiques regarding the technique is the destination of sur-
plus embryos107, which reopens the debate on the embryo’s legal status108. We 
highlight the United Kingdom, where it is possible to use this technique on the 
embryo itself. The use of TGIVF may change according to the status awarded 
to the embryo and the consequent protection of the right to life. Article 24 of 
the CPR establishes that the right to life is inviolable. In Portugal, the embryo 
is not considered a living being, it does not have legal personality (article 66 
of the Portuguese Civil Code). However, it deserves legal protection such as 
the criminal law (criminal abortion) or judicial assistance (genetic counselling). 
rui Medeiros and JorGe Pereira silva refer that “the lawmaker is not constitu-
tionally obliged to award legal personality to the embryo”109, but that does not 
mean that it does not deserve protection. So, that protection should be ensured in 
order to avoid unequal, unnecessary and exploiting practices. Article 9(1) of the 
MAR law forbids the creation of embryos whose purpose is scientific research. 
The scientific research in embryos is only lawful with the “goal of prevention, 
diagnosis and therapy of embryos, improvement of MAR techniques, creation 
of stem cell banks for transplantation programmes or any other therapeutic pur-
poses” (article 9(2))110. For that effect, only “cryopreserved, surplus embryos, 
with no parenting project, embryos whose state does not allow the transfer or 
cryopreservation for reproduction purposes; embryos carriers of serious genetic 
abnormality, in the scope of the preimplantation genetic diagnosis; and embryos 
obtained without the use of fertilisation by sperm”111 can be used (article 9(4)(a-
d)). Pursuant to article 25 of the mentioned law, the destination of the embryos 
is established. Paragraph 1 refers that “they should be cryopreserved, being the 
recipients committed to using them in a new process of embryo transfer within 
a maximum period of three years.”112 After that period, the embryos may be do-
107  Cf. SILVESTRE, Margarida, “Embriões criopreservados – que destino”, in Direito da Saúde –
Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Guilherme Oliveira, João Loureiro, André Dias Pereira 
and Carla Barbosa (coord.), vol. 4, Coimbra, Almedina, 2016, pp. 143-157. 
108  Cf. LOUREIRO, João Carlos, “Estatuto do embrião”, in Novos Desafios à Bioética, Luis Archer, 
Jorge Biscais, Walter Osswald, Michel Renaud (coord.), Porto, Porto Editora, 2001, pp. 110-121. 
109  Our translation. MEDEIROS, Rui/SILVA, Jorge Pereira, “Comentário ao art. 24.º da CRP”, in 
Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, Jorge Miranda/Rui Medeiros (org.), Vol. I, 2nd 
edition, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2011, p. 517.
110  Our translation. Article 42 of the CPR establishes the freedom of intellectual, artistic and scien-
tific creation. The freedom of scientific creation includes scientific research. 
111  Our translation.
112  Our translation. The period can be extended for three more years (cf. article 25(2) of the MAR 
law). 
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nated “to other recipient people, whose medical recommendation of infertility 
advise it, with the decisive factors subject to record, or donated for scientific 
research pursuant to article 9 (article 25(3)). If donation is consented, “as long as 
in the six years following the cryopreservation the embryos have not been used 
for other recipients or in research projects approved in accordance with article 9, 
they can be thawed and disposed of, by determination of the centre’s director”113 
(article 25(6)) and “if donation is not consented (…) the embryos can be thawed 
and disposed of, by determination of the centre’s director, previously reported 
to the Medically Assisted National Procreation Counsel’s President.”114 (article 
25(7)). stela barbas refers that the freedom of research has limits, it is not 
absolute, under the risk of undermining constitutional rights, such as, the right 
to life (article 24), the right to moral and physical integrity (article 25), the right 
to personal and genetic identity (article 26), the right to freedom and security 
(article 27) and the right to equality (article 13)115.
f). Right to anonymity of the female donor versus the knowledge and 
identification of the female donor and the right to personal identity and free 
development of personality 
The donor’s role and her contribution evoke the (traditional) debate if 
the child that is born from TGIVF will have the right to know who donated the 
egg and the mitochondrial DNA. How can the confrontation between the right 
to know the genetic origins and the female donor versus the right to the donor’s 
anonymity be solved? We return to the case of the United Kingdom because it 
is the only country that has regulated the technique to this date. The English le- 
gislation establishes that there is no parental relationship between the child and 
the mitochondrial donor, assuming no rights and obligations are inherent to the 
exercise of parental responsibilities. As we have seen, the donor is compared to 
tissue donors, and not to an egg donor for other fertilisation treatments. Despite 
being a common problem to the heterologous MAR techniques, the doctrine116 
argues the existence of differences between the disclosure of the donor’s identity 
in TGIVF when compared to other techniques. For the advocates of the pre- 
valence of the right to the donor’s anonymity (no right to know who the donor 
is) the disclosure is not justifiable, since the child does not inherit the donor’s 
physical characteristics (something that can happen in a simple egg donation)117. 
113  Our translation.
114  Our translation.
115  BARBAS, STELA, O Direito ao Genoma Humano, op. cit., p. 495. 
116  Cf. NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues 
in mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit., pp. 590-591. 
117  Idem, ibidem. 
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The child inherits the parents’ nuclear DNA118. To protect the best interest of the 
child (his/her well-being and development), they argue that the impact of the 
disclosure may be more harmful than the non-disclosure, due to the minimal 
percentage of DNA contribution. Furthermore, they consider that the disclosure 
of information may translate the idea that the donor had a larger contribution 
than the one she actually had119. 
Without entering the field of doctrinal and legal divergence regarding the 
confrontation between these rights, it is our obligation to leave a note on the 
Portuguese case. The MAR law establishes the right to the donor’s anonymity in 
detriment of the right to the child’s personal identity, born from these techniques 
(cf. article 15). However, the law foresees the right to know the genetic origins, in 
other words, information of genetic nature (article 15(2)). The donor’s identity 
can only be disclosed if he/she expressly allows it or in case of “serious reasons 
recognised by judgement”120 (article 15(3 and 4)). Well, recently, in April 2018, 
the Decision no. 225/2018 of the Portuguese Constitutional Court declared the 
unconstitutionality, with general binding effect, of article 15(4). The CC121con-
sidered that the rule of anonymity constitutes an “unnecessary restriction to the 
rights to personal identity and development of personality”122. The decision is 
recent, so the amendments to the law have not been performed yet, but these 
amendments have generated controversy and the drastic decrease in the number 
of donors and candidates to heterologous procreation is being broached. There-
fore, if the Portuguese legal order regulates TGIVF, it will have, in the current 
circumstances, to obey the CC decision. In this line of thinking, the child born 
from this technique will have the right to know who was the egg donor.
3. Concluding notes
Coming to the end of the paper, we would like to leave a few notes on our 
immersion in a brave new world. The influence and the impact of technology and 
science in human reproduction is undeniable: the human being stopped repro-
ducing exclusively by natural means and started to increasingly use technology 
118  According to point 6.49 of the HFEA “the child’s sense of self would be inherited from their 
[social] parents”.
119  Cf. NEWSON, Ainsley/WILKINSON, Stephen/ WRIGLEY, Anthony, “Ethical and legal issues 
in mitochondrial transfer”, op. cit, pp. 590-591.
120  Our translation.
121  Contrary to that delivered in the decision no. 101/2009. 
122  Our translation. COMUNICADO DO TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, Acórdão n.º 225/2018, 
24 April 2018. [Consult. 24.04.2018]. Available at: <URL: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/
tc/imprensa02-bd4453.html>. 
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as a way to help fight infertility causes, avoid the transmission of serious diseases, 
etc. Human nature makes humans curious beings, on a continuous search for 
knowledge and the improvement of life conditions. In fact, intellectual capacity 
(v.g. human intelligence) is the human being’s main engine. Therefore, the same 
human being that protects and proclaims respect for the dignity of the human 
person and for other fundamental values, that proclaims respect for natural con-
ception or MAR subsidiarity, is the same human being that promotes scientific 
research, the eagerness for knowledge and that intends to use technology in the 
area of reproductive medicine. In this sense, it seems that we are not in Aldous 
Huxley’s imaginary society, we are still far from such an industrial and mechanic 
view of life. However, we do not deny that science and technology have been 
building some hypotheses that have led us back to that society. In this regard, 
the Law arises with a fundamental role in an attempt to “balance” the rampant 
search of science and technology for knowledge and to guarantee the respect of 
fundamental principles and values. 
TGIVF arises in a fine line between the miracle of reproduction and 
dehumanisation. It is true that some of its questions (issues) are new, however, 
it presents common issues with other MAR techniques. The major concern sur-
rounding the technique is related to the eventual change of the human genome 
and, thus, eventual problems with eugenics that may occur (violating human 
dignity). We consider that if it is effectively proven that there is an alteration 
of the human genome, TGIVF should not be accepted and practised. We have 
serious doubts regarding the effects and consequences of this technique, mainly 
in the child to be born. We fear the proximity with genetic improvement engi-
neering. Where are we headed? We fear the future of reproductive technology is 
headed towards design baby. 
Finally, despite our concerns, we believe that natural human reproduc-
tion will not become extinct. It is certain that Aldous Huxley had foreseen a fu-
turist society in Brave New World, but it is also true that twenty-seven years ago 
the author returned to that society123 and concluded that natural reproduction 
will not disappear. Despite the influence of technology, our society is based on 
values and principles that lead us to believe that assisted reproduction will not 
become a rule. 
123  In the book “Brave New World Revisited”.
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